Temperature reinforcement for visual discrimination training in baby chicks

A fully automated training apparatus, using thermoregulation as performance incentive, was constructed to train baby chicks on visual discrimination and reversal problems. In the base condition, the S is bathed in cold air in a small training cubicle. Two stimuli are back-projected onto two display windows according to a pseudorandom balanced schedule. A peck at the positive stimulus gives convective as well as radiant heat reward with adjustable temperature and duration. A peck at the negative stimulus merely advances the program to the next trial. Permanent printout records give trial-to-trial information on response choice and latency. Performance data of 64 Ss are reported.     

Visual reinforcement in fighting cocks

Fighting cocks were conditioned to emit a key-pecking response on a fixed ratio reinforcement schedule leading to the visual image of another fighting cock. In addition, the relative reinforcing properties of the visual reinforcer were compared with food and water reinforcers in a three-choice, non-reversible option situation. The relative reinforcing effects of mirror presentation and another rooster visually presented through a window, were compared. The mirror maintained a relatively lower response output.     

Finitism and Divisibility: A Reply to Puryear

Puryear (AJP, 2014) develops an objection against a prominent attempt to show that the universe must have a temporal beginning. Here I formulate a reply.     

What Triggers Anger in Everyday Life? Links to the Intensity,Control, and Regulation of These Emotions,and Personality Traits

Why do people experience anger? Most of our knowledge on anger‐triggering events is based on the study of reactions at a single time point in a person's life. Little research has examined how people experience anger in their daily life over time. In this study, we conducted a comprehensive examination of the situational determinants of anger over the course of 3 weeks. Using daily diary methodology, people (N = 173; 2,342 anger episodes) reported their most intense daily anger and, with an open‐ended format, described the trigger. Participants also answered questions on anger intensity, control, and regulatory strategies, along with baseline personality trait measures. Using an iterative coding system, five anger trigger categories emerged: other people, psychological and physical distress, intrapersonal demands, environment, and diffuse/undifferentiated/unknown. Compared with other triggers, when anger was provoked by other people or when the source was unknown, there was a stronger positive association with anger intensity and lack of control. Personality traits (i.e., anger, mindfulness, psychological need satisfaction, the Big Five) showed few links to the experience and regulation of daily anger. Although aversive events often spur anger, the correlates and consequences of anger differ depending on the source of aversion; personality traits offer minimal value in predicting anger in daily life.     

Why I’m still a proportionalist

Mark Schroeder has, rather famously, defended a powerful Humean Theory of Reasons. In doing so, he abandons what many take to be the default Humean view of weighting reasons—namely, proportionalism . On Schroeder’s view, the pressure that Humeans feel to adopt proportionalism is illusory, and proportionalism is unable to make sense of the fact that the weight of reasons is a normative matter. He thus offers his own ‘Recursive View’, which directly explains how it is that the weight of reasons is a normative matter. In this paper, I argue against Schroeder that a Humean ought to be a proportionalist. On my view, proportionalism is clearly an intuitive theory of weighting for a Humean, so we should resist it only if Schroeder can demonstrate either that there is a serious problem with the view, or that there is a better alternative. I then further argue that Schroeder fails to deliver on either condition. As a result, I conclude that there are good intuitive reasons for a Humean to be a proportionalist, and no good reason not to be.