Is There a Problem of Special Angelic Action?

One of the most widely discussed topics in the recent science & theology literature has been divine activity. It is odd that in this literature there has been no discussion of whether and how to accommodate special angelic action (hereafter SAA). Just as the Bible records many instances of apparent SDA, it records many instances of apparent SAA. This neglect may be due to an assumption that there is no distinct problem relating to SAA; the existing suggested solutions to the problem(s) surrounding SDA may be transferable to the angelic context. My aim is to disprove that idea.     

Regularities,laws, and an exceedingly modest premise for a cosmological argument

In reply to certain cosmological arguments for theism, critics regularly argue that the causal principle ex nihilo nihil fit may be false. Various theistic counter-replies to this challenge have emerged. One type of strategy is to double down on ex nihilo nihil fit. Another, very different strategy of counter-reply is to grant for the sake of argument that the principle is false, while maintaining that sound cosmological arguments can be formulated even with this concession in place. Notably, one can employ a weaker opening premise formulated in modal terms, proceeding for instance from the proposition that for any contingent object coming into existence it is at least possible that it (or a duplicate) have a cause. My aim here is to try out a related strategy for weakening the relevant opening premise. Granting that it is possible for a contingent object to come into existence out of nothing without a cause, I proceed from the extremely modest claim that the obtaining of exceptionless (or nearly exceptionless) longstanding contingent regularities demands an explanation. As such, the contingent regularity that empirically accessible macro-level contingent objects do not pop into existence causelessly demands explanation. And as it turns out, that explanation will have to be in terms of an object or objects possessed of at least some of the traditional divine attributes.     

Renegotiating Identity: A Phenomenological Investigation of the College Transition for Former High School Athletes No Longer Engaged in Varsity Competition

A breadth of research has examined the influence of athletic identity on college student-athlete experiences (e.g., Harrison et al., 2011; Lally & Kerr, 2005). In addition, scholars have investigated role transition among college student-athletes at the end of their eligibility (e.g., Taylor & Ogilvie, 2001; Wylleman & Lavallee, 2004). However, despite that 97% of high school athletes will not participate collegiately (National Collegiate Athletic Association, 2016), little attention has been paid to identity renegotiation among college students who discontinued sport participation after high school. The present study was designed to fill this gap by addressing the impact of sport disengagement on former high school athletes no longer engaged in varsity competition during the first year of college. In-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 13 university freshmen at three time points: the end of the first month, the end of the first semester, and the end of the first year. Commonalities among participants’ transition experiences were identified. Findings yielded three major themes, role transition, identity renegotiation, and reflection and projection, each being facilitated by the building of camaraderie. Findings deepen current understanding of role transition and identity renegotiation and offer directions for future research related to sense of self during the college transition.     

Criterion‐Related Validity of Statistical Operationalizations of Group General Cognitive Ability as a Function of Task Type: Comparing the Mean,Maximum, and Minimum1

The objective of the present study was to investigate the comparative criterion‐related validity of different statistical operationalizations of group general cognitive ability (i.e., mean, maximum, and minimum) as a function of task type based on Steiner's (1966, 1972) task typology. In contrast to recent investigations, we hypothesized that, regardless of task type, the mean of group members’ general cognitive ability would predict group performance as well as or better than other statistical operationalizations of group general cognitive ability. We conducted a laboratory study where 157 four‐person groups worked on 4 tasks that conformed to Steiner's typology (additive, compensatory, conjunctive, and disjunctive). The results indicate that the mean was the strongest predictor of group performance across all 4 task types and, in particular, was significantly stronger than the maximum and minimum on both the disjunctive and conjunctive tasks.     

The Center for Brain,Consciousness, and Cognition at Maharishi University of Management

The work at the Center for Brain, Consciousness and Cognition is summarized.     

Reply to Josipovic: Duality and non-duality in meditation research

We agree with Josipovic that a fundamental differentiating feature of meditation techniques is whether they remain within the dualistic subject–object cognitive structure, or they transcend this structure to reveal an underlying level of non-dual awareness. Further discussion is needed to delineate the basic non-dual experience in meditation, where all phenomenal content is absent, from the more advanced experience of non-duality in daily life, where phenomenal content is obviously present as well. In this discussion, it is important to recognize that the experiencer–object relation makes the experience dual or non-dual, rather than the nature of the object experienced.     

XII—The Twilight of Empiricism

There is a principle that both generates and destroys empiricism. It is a plausible principle, thus often appealed to. (Bernard Williams and Michael Dummett are notable subscribers.) Its consequences prove it wrong. This is a story of empiricism's rise and fall (a fall Frege mapped out for it). It is historically sketchy. But one should focus on the principle.     

Evaluating conditional arguments with uncertain premises

Treating conditionals as probabilistic statements has been referred to as a defining feature of the “new paradigm” in cognitive psychology. Doing so is attractive for several reasons, but it complicates the problem of assessing the merits of conditional arguments. We consider several variables that relate to judging the persuasiveness of conditional arguments with uncertain (probabilistic) premises. We also explore ways of judging the consistency of people's beliefs as represented by components of conditional arguments. Experimental results provide evidence that inconsistencies in beliefs are more prevalent if the arguments’ components are spatially and temporally dispersed than if they are contiguous in space and time. This supports the idea that assuring the consistency among even a small number of beliefs is difficult to do, especially if the beliefs in question are not brought into consciousness at the same time; but consistency can be enhanced when beliefs are considered simultaneously or nearly so.