Affectivity in Its Relation to Memory

It seems obvious that various feelings (various kinds of affectivity) are memorized, forgotten, and recollected to various degrees. Some of them are forgotten. Some of those forgotten can be recollected, while others are lost forever. For example, short and long-lasting feelings and shallow and deep feelings are memorized and remembered in different ways. In this paper I analyse from a conceptual point of view several categories of memory-of-feelings and offer a comprehensive map of them. In the end, the richness of categories in the realm of memory is interpreted as a proof of the intricacy of affectivity.     

Automaticity in reading and the Stroop task: testing the limits of involuntary word processing

We investigated the parameters of involuntary word reading in the Stroop task in 7 experiments. Experiments 1-4 varied response modality and the presence of congruent word trials in a test of the claim that presenting a Stroop color word with only one letter in the target color eliminates the Stroop effect. Experiments 5 and 6 addressed the roles of spatial attention and orthographic processing as possible mechanisms behind the reduction of Stroop effects with the single-letter format. Experiment 7 investigated the limits of involuntary reading under optimal conditions for selective processing of rectangular color patch targets. We found that the single-letter format reduced but never eliminated Stroop effects, spatial attention but not orthographic processing plays a role in the effect of the single-letter format, and word reading is not completely prevented even with austere presentation conditions. We conclude with a defense of the involuntariness criterion for automaticity in the Stroop task, particularly when word reading is viewed in the context of a skilled performance.     

Rich interpretation vs. deflationary accounts in cognitive development: the case of means-end skills in 7-month-old infants

Seven-month-old infants appear to learn means-end skills, such as pushing a button to retrieve a distant toy (Psychological Review 104 (1997) 686). The present studies tested whether such apparent means-end behaviors are genuine, or simply the repetition of trained behaviors under conditions of greatest arousal, as suggested by a dynamic systems reinterpretation. When infants were trained to repeat behaviors that did not serve as means to retrieving toys (pushing a button to light a set of distant lights), their button-pushing differed significantly from infants for whom button-pushing served as a means for retrieving toys. Further, infants demonstrated means-end skills with behaviors that they had not been trained to repeat. Implications for early means-end abilities and for debates surrounding the interpretation of infant behavior are discussed.