A cognitively-gated place? The role of need for closure in a biased perception of the place’s past

Biased memory of the past is often a starting point for intergroup conflicts. In three correlational studies, we examined the relationship between need for closure (NFC) and historical ethnocentric bias, a tendency to overestimate the role of one’s ethnic group in the multicultural history of the city of residence. In addition, we checked whether this relationship would be mediated by an individual preference for essentialist places. We found that higher NFC was related to increased historical ethnocentric bias. Moreover, this relation was mediated by preference for an essentialist type of a place. Our results may contribute to understanding the role of individual differences and preferred type of place in shaping a biased representation of the past. Furthermore, our research findings point to the importance of raising awareness of the multicultural past among high NFC individuals.

     

Religion and behavioral procrastination: Mediating effects of locus of control and content of prayer

Religion is a significant predictor of self-regulatory processes. Procrastination has been described as the very essence of self-regulatory failure. In this study, we examined the relationship between religiousness and procrastination, with locus of control and styles of prayer playing mediating roles. These relationships were tested using data from 196 students. We applied the Centrality of Religiosity Scale, Levenson’s Locus of Control Scale, the God Control Scale, the Content of Prayer Scale, and the Behavioral Procrastination Scale. The results showed that: God control fully mediates the effects of ideology and intellect on procrastination; internal control fully mediates the effect of public prayer and religious experience on procrastination; and passive style of prayer was a mediator in the relationship between centrality of religion and procrastination. Our findings suggest that religious people may give up internal control, believing that their matters are in God’s hands. Being subject to God’s power provides them with a replacement form of control, which reduces problems of self-regulation.

     

Valence of Affective Verbal Fluency: fMRI Studies on Neural Organization of Emotional Concepts <Emphasis Type="Italic">Joy</Emphasis> and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Fear</Emphasis>

The present study was designed to examine the underlying brain mechanisms of positive and negative emotional verbal fluency. Three verbal fluency tasks (one non-emotional phonemic task, two emotional tasks: Joy and Fear) were used in this study. The results were analyzed for 35 healthy, Polish-speaking, right-handed adults aged 20–35. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (3T) was used to show brain activity during active participation in emotional verbal fluency tasks. The results reported for emotional fluency confirmed activation of different brain regions for the negative and positive emotional verbal fluency: in positive emotional verbal fluency Joy elicits greater activation in the frontal regions and the cingulate cortex, while in negative verbal fluency Fear is reflected in activation of parietal and temporal areas. The study provides an evidence for differentiation in neural mechanisms between positive and negative emotional verbal fluency and/or positive and negative retrieving processes, and differentiation in brain-related determinants of the emotional concepts organization.     

Social modulation of learning in rats

It is well known that emotions participate in the regulation of social behaviors and that the emotion displayed by a conspecific influences the behavior of other animals. In its simplest form, empathy can be characterized as the capacity to be affected by and/or share the emotional state of another. However, to date, relatively little is known about the mechanisms by which animals that are not in direct danger share emotions. In the present study, we used a model of between-subject transfer of fear to characterize the social interaction during which fear is transmitted, as well as the behavioral effects of socially transmitted fear. We found that (1) during social interaction with a recently fear-conditioned partner, observers and demonstrators exhibit social exploratory behaviors rather than aggressive behaviors; (2) learning and memory in a shock-motivated shuttle avoidance task are facilitated in rats that underwent a social interaction with a partner that had been fear conditioned; and (3) a brief social interaction with a recently fear-conditioned partner immediately before fear conditioning increases conditioned freezing measured on the next day. The observed effects were not due to a stress-induced increase in pain sensitivity or analgesia. Collectively, these data suggest that a brief social interaction with a cage mate that has undergone an aversive learning experience promotes aversive learning in an otherwise naïve animal. We argue that socially transferred fear is an adaptation that promotes defensive behavior to potentially dangerous situations in the environment.Human empathy can be defined as the ability to experience and share the thoughts and feelings of others (de Waal 2008). Obviously, this is a complex social phenomenon that, until recently, has received much attention from philosophers and psychologists rather than neuroscientists (Decety and Lamm 2006). However, in its simplest form, empathy can be characterized as the capacity to be affected by and/or share the emotional state of another (de Waal 2008). Tuning one''s emotional state to that of another increases the probability of similar behavior, which thereby allows rapid adaptation to environmental challenges (Hatfield et al. 1994). This social adaptation may be particularly important for emotions that signal a potential danger, such as fear. Although one can learn about potentially harmful stimuli by directly experiencing an aversive event, observation or interaction with a conspecific in danger and/or in pain may also provide information about threats in the environment. There is a vast literature on learning about direct danger (Maren 2001) as well as sharing emotions through observation (see, e.g., Church 1959; Langford et al. 2006; Olsson and Phelps 2007). However, relatively little is known about the mechanisms by which animals that are not in a direct danger share emotions.We have recently designed an experimental rat model of between-subject transfer of emotional information (Knapska et al. 2006). In this model, rats are housed in pairs and one member of the pair (the “demonstrator”) is removed and subjected to fear conditioning. After the fear-conditioning episode, the conditioned animal is allowed to interact with its naïve cage mate (the “observer”). We showed that the demonstrator''s fear is socially transferred to the observer, resulting in both rapid increase in exploratory behavior of the observer and a pattern of c-Fos activation in the observer''s amygdala that parallels that of the shocked demonstrators.These results suggest that the social interaction between the demonstrator and observer results in a transfer of information that promotes aversively motivated learning in the observer. However, the nature of the social interaction and how it comes to influence aversively motivated behavior is not known. Therefore, the present study aimed to characterize the behavior of both the demonstrators and observers during their social interaction and further characterize the nature of the influence of socially transmitted fear on aversively motivated learning and memory. We hypothesized that the social interaction between observers and demonstrators would result in a social transfer of fear that would promote learning and memory of both active defensive responses (avoidance) as well as defensive immobility (freezing). To test this hypothesis, we carried out five experiments that examined the nature of the social interaction between shocked demonstrators and observers (Experiment 1), the acquisition and retention of active avoidance (Experiment 2), and conditioned freezing (Experiment 3). Because it is not clear if social transfer effects can be observed among unfamiliar animals and to control for social buffering, we also compared the social transfer of fear in familiar and unfamiliar rats (Experiment 4). To control for the possible influence of different pain sensitivity thresholds in the observers paired with shocked demonstrators, we carried out pain tests (Experiment 5).     

Second order propositional operators over cantor space

We consider propositional operators defined by propositional quantification in intuitionistic logic. More specifically, we investigate the propositional operators of the formA* :p q(p A(q)) whereA(q) is one of the following formulae: (¬¬q q) V ¬¬q, (¬¬q q) (¬¬q V ¬q), ((¬¬q q) (¬¬q V ¬q)) ((¬¬q q) V ¬¬q). The equivalence ofA*(p) to ¬¬p is proved over the standard topological interpretation of intuitionistic second order propositional logic over Cantor space.We relate topological interpretations of second order intuitionistic propositional logic over Cantor space with the interpretation of propositional quantifiers (as the strongest and weakest interpolant in Heyting calculus) suggested by A. Pitts. One of the merits of Pitts' interpretation is shown to be valid for the interpretation over Cantor space.Presented byJan Zygmunt     

Causes,Conditions and Counterfactuals

The article deals with one particular problem created by the counterfactual analysis of causality à la Lewis, namely the context-sensitivity problem or, as I prefer to call it, the background condition problem. It appears that Lewis’ counterfactual definition of causality cannot distinguish between proper causes and mere causal conditions – i.e. factors necessary for the effect to occur, but commonly not seen as causally efficacious. The proposal is put forward to amend the Lewis definition with a condition, based on the notion of cotenability, which would eliminate the problem. It is shown that the corrected definition of causality leads to the transitivity of the causal relation. Possible objections to the proposed solution, involving the assumption of indeterminism and the preemption cases, are given a thorough consideration.     

Are Some Psychotherapies Much More Effective Than Others?

In a previous paper we had reported on the examination of comparisons of 18 metaanalyses of active treatments with each other (Luborsky, Rosenthal, Diguer, et al., 2001). These metaanalyses gave a small and nonsignificant mean level of difference between types of treatments. The smallness of this correlation confirms Rosenzweig's (1936) expectation that because of the large overlap in effective ingredients of different psychotherapies, comparative studies of psychotherapies would show little difference. Such a comparison that includes psychoanalyses seems a long way off, but if outcomes of psychoanalyses are defined similarly to those in the other psychotherapies, the expected differences in outcomes may also be small.