Propositionalism about intention: shifting the burden of proof

A widespread view in the philosophy of mind and action holds that intentions are propositional attitudes. Call this view ‘Propositionalism about Intention’. The key alternative holds that intentions have acts, or do-ables, as their contents. Propositionalism is typically accepted by default, rather than argued for in any detail. By appealing to a key metaphysical constraint on any account of intention, I argue that on the contrary, it is the Do-ables View which deserves the status of the default position, and Propositionalism which bears the burden of proof. I go on to show that this burden has not been met in the literature.     

Unfounded beliefs among teachers: The interactive role of rationality priming and cognitive ability

Previous research suggests that unfounded beliefs (UB)—such as conspiracist beliefs and beliefs in the supernatural—stem from similar cognitive and motivational mechanisms. More specifically, it has been demonstrated that cognitive ability is negatively associated with UB but only among individuals who value epistemic rationality. The present study goes beyond previous correlational studies by examining whether the negative association between cognitive ability and UB can be strengthened through a subtle rationality prime. In a large scale online experiment (N = 762 French teachers), we demonstrate that priming rationality (vs. control) does enhance the negative relationship between cognitive ability and adherence to supernatural beliefs, as well as conspiracy mentality (d = 0.2). This effect was not obtained for illusory pattern perception. This study's usefulness as a “proof of concept” for future interventions aimed at reducing UB prevalence among the general public is discussed.     

A comparison of computer‐assisted and therapist‐led instruction for children with autism spectrum disorder

The current investigation applied a model of assessment‐based instruction to an evaluation of the efficacy and efficiency of computer‐assisted and therapist‐led instruction on skill acquisition for 3 participants with autism spectrum disorder. We also evaluated the participant's attending during instruction and the social validity of each format of instruction. The results showed that computer‐assisted instruction was most efficient for 2 of the 3 participants, although attending varied across instructional formats. In addition, the social validity of instructional formats varied across participants.     

Accountability,Collaboration, and Social Change: Ethical Tensions in an Action Research Project to Address Untested Sexual Assault Kits (SAKs)

We conducted a collaborative action research project with stakeholders in Detroit, Michigan, to develop long‐term policy strategies to resolve ~11,000 untested rape kits that were discovered in a police storage facility in August 2009. In our research, we uncovered overwhelming evidence of victim‐blaming behaviors and fundamental disrespect of rape survivors by the police, which directly contributed to their decisions not to submit kits for forensic testing. We had an ethical responsibility to report these negative findings accurately and completely, and in doing so, we were concerned that police stakeholders might disengage from the action research project and hamper our other ethical responsibilities to promote general and public welfare. In this article, we examine the ethical challenges of balancing accountability, collaboration, and social change.     

The Stories We Tell: Introduction to the Special Issue on Ethical Challenges in Community Psychology Research and Practice

This Special Issue examines ethical challenges in community psychology research and practice. The literature on ethics in community psychology has remained largely abstract and aspirational, with few concrete examples and case studies, so the goal of this Special Issue was to expand our written discourse about ethical dilemmas in our field. In these articles, researchers and practitioners share stories of specific ethical challenges they faced and how they sought to resolve them. These first‐person narratives examine how ethical challenges come about, how community psychology values inform ethical decision making, and how lessons learned from these experiences can inform an ethical framework for community psychology.     

Reasoning about make-believe and hypothetical suppositions: Towards a theory of belief-contravening reasoning

The present study explores how suppositions which conflict with accepted beliefs are represented and reasoned about. Two studies test the predictions regarding the nature and developmental changes in children's ability to represent and reason about hypothetical or make-believe suppositions which violate their everyday knowledge and beliefs. In Study 1, 46 4th- and 5th-graders were introduced to a hand puppet, Freddy, who made claims inconsistent with generally accepted beliefs (e.g., “all dogs meow”) because he was pretending (Make-Believe Condition) or believed them (Hypothetical Condition). Participants were asked to think like Freddy and judge whether a conclusion (“There's a dog; does it meow?”) follows logically from the claim. In Study 2, 40 kindergarten (6-year-olds), 3rd–4th grade (10-year-olds), and college students were asked to represent belief contravening make-believe (pretend in a make-believe world that dogs meow) and hypothetical (imagine what the real world would be like if dogs meow) premises, evaluate conclusions of the premises (Rover is a dog, does Rover meow?) and make judgments about the attributes (growl, wag tail, purr, and eat mice) of the entity (a meowing dog) they created. The prediction that it would be easier to represent and reason from belief-contravening suppositions in the Make-Believe than Hypothetical conditions was confirmed in each study, although the two forms of reasoning were directly correlated (Study 2). The results were discussed in terms of the similarities (compartmentalization and integration) and differences (reconciliation) of processes involved in fancifully (make-believe) or seriously (hypothetical) representing and reasoning about belief-contravening suppositions.     

Individual Differences and Beliefs Concerning Preference for University Assessment Methods

This paper explores the relationship between personality, IQ, gender, beliefs about intelligence, and preference for assessment methods at university in 3 separate studies. Study 1 ( N = 367) examined attitudes toward examinations (ATE) and attitudes toward continuous assessment (ATCA) using specific assignments with regard to subjectively assessed intelligence (SAI), entity and incremental beliefs about intelligence (BAI), just-world beliefs, and gender. Studies 2 ( N = 120) and 3 ( N = 93) found significant and negative associations between neuroticism and preference for both essay-type and oral exams. IQ was positively and significantly related to preference for multiple-choice exams. Study 3 tested the relationship of preference for assessment methods with academic performance. Results indicated that preferences are associated with individual differences, rather than academic performance. Findings are discussed in terms of the advantages and disadvantages of introducing alternative methods of student assessment at the university level.     

The extent of working memory deficits associated with Williams syndrome: exploration of verbal and spatial domains and executively controlled processes

The present study investigated verbal and spatial working memory (WM) functioning in individuals with the neuro-developmental disorder Williams syndrome (WS) using WM component tasks. While there is strong evidence of WM impairments in WS, previous research has focused on short-term memory and has neglected assessment of executive components of WM. There is a particular lack of consensus concerning the profile of verbal WM functioning in WS. Here, WS participants were compared to typically developing participants matched for (1) verbal ability and (2) spatial ability (N = 14 in each of the 3 groups). Individuals with WS were impaired on verbal WM tasks, both those involving short-term maintenance of information and executive manipulation, in comparison to verbal-matched controls. Surprisingly, individuals with WS were not impaired on a spatial task assessing short-term maintenance of information in memory (remembering spatial locations) compared to spatial-matched controls. They were, however, impaired on a spatial executive WM task requiring the manipulation of spatial information in memory. The present study suggests that individuals with WS show WM impairments that extend to both verbal and spatial domains, although spatial deficits are selective to executive aspects of WM function.