The Priesthood of No Believer: On the Priesthood of Christ and his Church

This article seeks to begin to rebalance the relative neglect over the past fifty years of the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers, a doctrine which is central to non‐episcopal forms of Protestantism. However, in so doing, the article seeks to offer a corrective to traditional accounts of the doctrine. Critiquing the tendency for the priesthood of all believers to enter discussion in relation to ecclesial polity rather than more fundamental theological concerns, the article advocates that the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers needs to be considered theologically in terms of what it says about the nature of the church, not the polity of the patterns of its ministry. The article traces the evolution of the idea of priesthood through the Levitical priesthood and New Testament to the early church. It then considers the recovery of the idea of priesthood belonging to the whole church at the Reformation; but argues that even here the magisterial Reformers' ecclesial‐political setting determines that they largely treat the priesthood of all believers as a negative doctrine about church order, and, indeed, that the relation of the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers to issues of ecclesial polity and governance continues in contemporary ecclesiological discussion. This is to the detriment of the positive theological content that identifying the church as a priesthood might offer. Thus, the concluding section of this article sketches what positive theological content might be provided in speaking of the church as a priesthood.     

Rescuing Basic Equality

In the debate on the basis of moral equality, one conclusion achieves near consensus: that we must reject all accounts that ground equality in the possession of some psychological capacity (Psychological Capacity Accounts). This widely held view crystallises around three objections. The first is the Arbitrariness Objection, which holds that the threshold at which the possession of the relevant capacities places an individual within the required range is arbitrary. The second is the Variations Objection, which holds that there is rational pressure to acknowledge that variations in psychological capacities between individuals are morally relevant. The third is the No Rational Agency Objection, according to which Psychological Capacity Accounts have unpalatable implications for our treatment of humans who do not possess the relevant capacities. We develop a Psychological Capacity Account based on the capacity for a conception of the good and offer a novel defence of the account against these objections.