Cartesian Method and the Self

The idea that the ‘I’ of Meditation One stands for a solipsistic self is familiar enough; but is it correct? The reading proposed here does not saddle Descartes with so questionable a doctrine, and yet it does not shield him from Wittgensteinian criticism either. Descartes is still vulnerable, but on a different flank. I first consider critically the claim that Descartes is committed to solipsism. Then I take issue with the attribution to him of the idea that privacy is the mark of the mental. Finally, I consider his tendency to “first‐personalize” knowledge and to trace to “the prejudices of childhood” certain prephilosophical errors. Here is where Wittgensteinian criticism comes genuinely into its own.     

From Bourdieu and Wolin, `Inside and Outside the Box': A Frame for the Special Issue

Utilizing the writings of Pierre Bourdieu and Sheldon Wolin,this paper introduces a special issue on ``Educational Rights andEntitlements.' Its purpose is to characterize and critique `the box ofliberalism' that both advances and constrains what is conceived andenacted in education. Following it are a set of significantcontributions from the sixth biennial conference of the InternationalNetwork of Philosophers of Education, August 1998, Ankara.     

Social cognition, artefacts, and stigmergy: A comparative analysis of theoretical frameworks for the understanding of artefact-mediated collaborative activity

Collective behaviour is often characterised by the so-called ‘coordination paradox’: looking at individual ants, for example, they do not seem to cooperate or communicate explicitly, but nevertheless at the social level cooperative behaviour, such as nest building, emerges, apparently without any central coordination. In the case of social insects such emergent coordination has been explained by the theory of stigmergy, which describes how individuals can effect the behaviour of others (and their own) through artefacts, i.e., the product of their own activity (e.g., building material in the ants’ case). Artefacts clearly also play a strong role in human collective behaviour, which has been emphasised, for example, by proponents of activity theory and distributed cognition. However, the relation between theories of situated/social cognition and theories of social insect behaviour has so far received relatively little attention in the cognitive science literature. This paper aims to take a step in this direction by comparing three theoretical frameworks for the study of cognition in the context of agent–environment interaction (activity theory, situated action, and distributed cognition) to each other and to the theory of stigmergy as a possible minimal common ground. The comparison focuses on what each of the four theories has to say about the role/nature of (a) the agents involved in collective behaviour, (b) their environment, (c) the collective activities addressed, and (d) the role that artefacts play in the interaction between agents and their environments, and in particular in the coordination of cooperation.     

Inviting passage to new discourse: ‘Alive moments’ and their spiritual significance

Some social constructionists assert that therapeutic change occurs when clients' meanings for problems and solutions shift from those found in resource‐impoverished discourses to those affording resourceful and preferred possibilities. Referred to as ‘positioning theory’, our research examined this assertion by inviting clients and therapists to speak of a significant, but ambiguous, experience in unfamiliar discourse: spiritual discourse. Clients were asked to review videotapes of their sessions, selecting moments that felt most ‘alive’ to them for discussions with the researcher, including inquiries as to whether ‘alive’ moments held any spiritual significance. The outcomes are portrayed as a ‘poetic collaboration’ between the researcher, clients and therapists — while clients' and therapists' reported experiences for changes in discourse and meaning are highlighted. Implications regarding sensitivities required when co‐constructing meanings for ambiguous but significant experiences in therapy are discussed. Possibilities for more research examining poetic practices and processes in therapy are also considered in terms of positioning theory.     

The Limits of Principlism and Recourse to Theory: The Example of Telecare

Principlism is the approach promoted by Beauchamp and Childress for addressing the ethics of medical practice. Instead of evaluating clinical decisions by means of full-scale theories from moral philosophy, Beauchamp and Childress refer people to four principles—of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. Now it is one thing for principlism to be invoked in an academic literature dwelling on a stock topic of medical ethical writing: end-of-life decisions, for example. It is another when the topic lies further from the mainstream. In such cases the cost of reaching for the familiar Beauchamp and Childress framework, with its formulaic set of concerns, may be to miss something morally important. After discussing an example of the sort of academic literature I have in mind, I propose to distinguish the uses of the formulaic from the uses of the more unapologetically theoretical in applied ethics, and to suggest that the latter can make up for some of the limitations of the former. This is not to say that the more theoretical literature has no limitations of its own, or that it should take the place of the formulaic. On the contrary, there is room in applied ethics and a use in applied ethics for both. But there is a sense in which there is a greater dependence of principlism on theory than the other way round, and at the end I try to spell out the significance of this fact.     

5th International Conference on Spatial Cognition: Space and Embodied Cognition

Communication

5th International Conference on Spatial Cognition: Space and Embodied Cognition Rome, Italy: September 4–8, 2012     

Come rain or come shine: individual differences in how weather affects mood

There is a widespread belief that weather affects mood. However, few studies have investigated this link, and even less is known about individual differences in people's responses to the weather. In the current study, we sought to identify weather reactivity types by linking self-reported daily mood across 30 days with objective weather data. We identified four distinct types among 497 adolescents and replicated these types among their mothers. The types were labeled Summer Lovers (better mood with warmer and sunnier weather), Unaffected (weak associations between weather and mood), Summer Haters (worse mood with warmer and sunnier weather), and Rain Haters (particularly bad mood on rainy days). In addition, intergenerational concordance effects were found for two of these types, suggesting that weather reactivity may run in the family. Overall, the large individual differences in how people's moods were affected by weather reconciles the discrepancy between the generally held beliefs that weather has a substantive effect on mood and findings from previous research indicating that effects of weather on mood are limited or absent.     

Grounding person memory in space: Does spatial anchoring of behaviors improve recall?

In two experiments, we examine and find support for the general hypothesis that memory for behavioral information in the context of an impression formation task depends on where that information is located in vertical space. These findings extend earlier work showing that memory for location and shifts of spatial attention are influenced by the “good is up” metaphor. Specifically, we show that person memory is better for behavioral information in metaphor compatible locations (positive in upper space and negative in lower space) than in metaphor incompatible locations (positive in lower space and negative in upper space). These findings show for the first time that person‐specific information, and person memory in general, is structured spatially. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.