Underestimation of prior remembering and susceptibility to false memories: two sides of the same coin?

In two studies, we explored whether susceptibility to false memories and the underestimation of prior memories (i.e., forgot-it-all-along effect) tap overlapping memory phenomena. Study 1 investigated this issue by administering the Deese/Roediger–McDermott task (DRM) and the forgot-it-all-along (FIA) task to an undergraduate sample (N = 110). It was furthermore explored how performances on these tasks correlate with clinically relevant traits such as fantasy proneness, dissociative experiences, and cognitive efficiency. Results show that FIA and DRM performances are relatively independent from each other, suggesting that these measures empirically apparently refer to separate dimensions. However, they do not seem to define different profiles in terms of dissociation, fantasy proneness, and cognitive efficiency. Study 2 replicated the finding of relative independence between false memory propensity (as measured with the DRM task) and the underestimation of prior memories (as measured with an autobiographical memory dating task) in people with a history of childhood sexual abuse (N = 35).     

Post-conflict slowing: cognitive adaptation after conflict processing

The aftereffects of error and conflict (i.e., stimulus or response incongruency) have been extensively studied in the cognitive control literature. Each has been characterized by its own behavioral signature on the following trial. Conflict leads to a reduced congruency effect (Gratton effect), whereas an error leads to increased response time (post-error slowing). The reason for this dissociation has remained unclear. Here, we show that post-conflict slowing is not typically observed because it is masked by the processing of the irrelevant stimulus dimension. We demonstrate that post-conflict slowing does occur when tested in pure trials where helpful or detrimental impacts from irrelevant stimulus dimensions are removed (i.e., univalent stimuli).     

Using mu rhythm desynchronization to measure mirror neuron activity in infants

The Mirror Neuron System hypothesis stating that observed actions are projected onto the observer’s own action system assigns an important role to development, because only actions mastered by the observer can be mirrored. The purpose of the present study was to investigate whether there is evidence of a functioning mirror neuron system (MNS) in 8-month-old infants. High-density EEG was used to assess the mu rhythm desynchronization in an action observation task where the infants observed a live model. To reduce noise, ICA decompositions were used. The results show a higher desynchronization of the mu rhythm when infants observed a goal-directed action than when they observed a spatially similar non-goal-directed movement. The localizations of the sources are in agreement with those proposed by the MNS hypothesis. This indicates that the MNS is functioning at this age.     

Applied Ethics. A Defence

Given a reasonable coherentist view of justification in ethics, applied ethics, as here conceived of, cannot only guide us, in our practical decisions, but also provide moral understanding through explanation of our moral obligations. Furthermore, applied ethics can contribute to the growth of knowledge in ethics as such. We put moral hypotheses to crucial test in individual cases. This claim is defended against the challenges from moral intuitionism and particularism.     

The effects of motion on in-vehicle touch screen system operation: A battle management system case study

The use of in-vehicle touch screen devices is currently common in both military and civilian vehicles; despite this, the effects of motion on touch screen device operation within vehicles remains largely unexplored. This article describes a study that examined, using driving simulation, the influences of motion on performance, workload and usability when using a touch screen in-vehicle battle management system. Acting in the role of battle management system operator, 20 participants undertook four simulated drives, two under high motion (representative of an unsealed road) and two under normal motion (representative of a sealed road), whilst performing various battle management tasks. In the high motion condition, lower accuracy and longer task completion times were found, along with greater levels of subjective and physiological workload and lower levels of perceived device usability, when compared to the normal motion condition. The findings indicate that, compared to normal motion, the high motion condition impaired key aspects of battle management system operation. In closing, the importance of considering motion and its effects during touch screen system design is discussed.     

Einsatz von Bupropion bei älteren Patienten

Die chronische bipolare Depression bei ?lteren Menschen ist eine klinische Herausforderung und erfordert unter Umst?nden, wie der vorliegende Fallbericht zeigt, Behandlungswege, die von Leitlinien nicht unbedingt abgedeckt werden.     

The acquisition of scientific knowledge: the influence of methods of questioning and analysis on the interpretation of children's conceptions of the earth

Studies of children's knowledge of the Earth have led to very different conclusions: some appear to show that children construct their own, non‐scientific ‘theories’ (mental models) of the flat, hollow or dual Earth. Others indicate that many young children have some understanding of the spherical (scientific) Earth, and that their knowledge lacks the coherence of mental models. The reasons for these contrasting views were tested by interviewing French children (N = 178) aged 5–11 years and varying the different methods used in previous research, namely the types of questions (open and forced‐choice), the form of representation (two‐dimensional pictures and three‐dimensional models), and the method of analysis (the mental model theorists' coding scheme and a statistical test for associations using MANOVA). Forced‐choice questions resulted in higher proportions of scientific answers than open questions, and children appeared to have naïve mental models of the Earth only when the mental model theorists' coding scheme was used. These findings support the view that children tend to have ‘fragments’ of scientific knowledge, and that naïve mental models of the Earth are methodological artifacts. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why do you play? The development of the motives for online gaming questionnaire (MOGQ)

Although the majority of research focuses on the risks and disadvantages of online gaming, the present authors suggest that online games also represent new ways of satisfying basic human needs within the conditions of modern society. The aim of our present study was to reveal and operationalize the components of the motivational basis of online gaming. A total 3,818 persons (90.6% males; mean age 20.9 years, SD = 5.81) were recruited through websites providing online games. A combined method of exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis was applied. The results confirmed our preliminary model as we identified seven motivational factors (social, escape, competition, coping, skill development, fantasy, and recreation), which were used to develop the 27-item Motives for Online Gaming Questionnaire (MOGQ). The seven dimensions identified seem to cover the full range of possible motives for gaming, and the MOGQ proved to be an adequate measurement tool to assess these motives.     

Exaggeration is harder than understatement, but practice makes perfect!

Previous research on the fakeability of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) yielded inconsistent results. The present study simultaneously analyses several relevant factors: faking direction, type of instructions, and practice. Furthermore, it takes baseline individual differences into account. After a baseline assessment in a self-esteem IAT without faking instructions (t0), participants in the faking conditions then (t1) faked high or low scores without being provided with recommended strategies on how to do so (i.e., individual strategies). At t2 and t3, they were asked to fake the IAT after having received information on recommended faking strategies. At t4, faking direction was reversed. Without the recommended strategies, faking high scores was not possible, but faking low scores was. With the recommended strategies, participants needed additional practice to fake high scores. When faking directions were reversed, participants were successful without additional practice, suggesting a transfer in faking skills. In most of the faking attempts, faking success was moderated by individual differences in baseline implicit self-esteem. This suggests that the complex interplay of factors influencing faking success should be taken into account when considering the issue of fakeability of the IAT.