Anorexia Nervosa and the Analyst’s Paternal Function: Response to Schoen,Zerbe, and Boulware

To expand upon the commentaries by Schoen, Zerbe, and Boulware (this issue), I clarify my thinking about the entropic body as a defensive structure. I then introduce my own theorizing about the relationship between agency and anorexia nervosa. In agreement with Schoen that these patients relegate their agency to the somatic realm, I highlight the aggressivity of that agency. Amplifying Zerbe’s recognition of the patient’s “father hunger,” I point out the importance of the paternal presence in helping these patients to modulate their aggression and, in the process, develop their agency.     

The Entropic Body: Primitive Anxieties and Secondary Skin Formation in Anorexia Nervosa

This paper develops a metapsychological view of anorexia nervosa, including not only its symptomatic presentation but also its etiology and characteristic psychic and relational styles. Because patients with anorexia are understood as not having internalized maternal comforting functions in the period of separation-individuation, they are unable to digest trauma experiences of infancy. I argue that the anorexic patient’s disturbed relationship with food reflects distortions in transitional object usage. Lacking the ability to contain intense anxieties about disintegration and falling apart, patients with anorexia must find other ways to hold themselves together. The fear of getting fat expressed by these patients is one way that this fear of disintegration is expressed. Furthermore, the almost addictive experience of emaciation holds the personality together. Elaborating this idea, I develop the notion of the entropic body, a particular version of the false body (Goldberg, 2004) employed by patients with anorexia nervosa in an attempt to compensate for absent maternal comforting functions. This body-state (Petrucelli, 2014), which develops against a background of profound early trauma, eschews hunger and dependence in favor of omnipotently controlled protection.     

Self-reported reasons for moral decisions

Many investigations of moral decision-making employ hypothetical scenarios in which each participant has to choose between two options. One option is usually deemed “utilitarian” and the other either “non-utilitarian” or “deontological”. Very little has been done to establish the validity of such measures. It is unclear what they measure, let alone how well they do so. In this exploratory study, participants were asked about the reasons for their decisions in six hypothetical scenarios. Various concerns contributed to each decision. Action decisions occurred when utilitarian concerns dominated. Bystanding decisions resulted from different concerns or combinations of concerns dominating in different situations, with utilitarianism usually among participants’ concerns. None of the labels usually used for either decision therefore seems entirely appropriate. Five concerns were identified as necessary and sufficient to predict over 85% of participants’ decisions. This suggests great promise for future research, particularly in investigation of real-world moral decisions.     

Organized Crime and Preventive Justice

By comparison with the prevention of terrorism, the prevention of acts of organized crime might be thought easier to conceptualize precisely and less controversial to legislate against and police. This impression is correct up to a point, because it is possible to arrive at some general characteristics of organized crime, and because legislation against it is not obviously bedeviled by the risk of violating civil or political rights, as in the case of terrorism. But there is a significant residue of legal, moral and political difficulty: legislation against organized crime is hard to make effective; the harm of organized crime is not uniform, and so some preventive legislation seems too sweeping and potentially unjust. More fundamentally, the scale and rewards of organized crime are often dependent on mass public participation in markets for proscribed goods, which may point to a hidden public consensus in favour of some of what is criminalized. For all of these reasons, I argue that existing preventive policing and legislation against organized crime may be harder to justify than their counterparts in counter-terrorism, at least in the UK.     

Underestimation of prior remembering and susceptibility to false memories: two sides of the same coin?

In two studies, we explored whether susceptibility to false memories and the underestimation of prior memories (i.e., forgot-it-all-along effect) tap overlapping memory phenomena. Study 1 investigated this issue by administering the Deese/Roediger–McDermott task (DRM) and the forgot-it-all-along (FIA) task to an undergraduate sample (N = 110). It was furthermore explored how performances on these tasks correlate with clinically relevant traits such as fantasy proneness, dissociative experiences, and cognitive efficiency. Results show that FIA and DRM performances are relatively independent from each other, suggesting that these measures empirically apparently refer to separate dimensions. However, they do not seem to define different profiles in terms of dissociation, fantasy proneness, and cognitive efficiency. Study 2 replicated the finding of relative independence between false memory propensity (as measured with the DRM task) and the underestimation of prior memories (as measured with an autobiographical memory dating task) in people with a history of childhood sexual abuse (N = 35).     

Post-conflict slowing: cognitive adaptation after conflict processing

The aftereffects of error and conflict (i.e., stimulus or response incongruency) have been extensively studied in the cognitive control literature. Each has been characterized by its own behavioral signature on the following trial. Conflict leads to a reduced congruency effect (Gratton effect), whereas an error leads to increased response time (post-error slowing). The reason for this dissociation has remained unclear. Here, we show that post-conflict slowing is not typically observed because it is masked by the processing of the irrelevant stimulus dimension. We demonstrate that post-conflict slowing does occur when tested in pure trials where helpful or detrimental impacts from irrelevant stimulus dimensions are removed (i.e., univalent stimuli).     

The effects of motion on in-vehicle touch screen system operation: A battle management system case study

The use of in-vehicle touch screen devices is currently common in both military and civilian vehicles; despite this, the effects of motion on touch screen device operation within vehicles remains largely unexplored. This article describes a study that examined, using driving simulation, the influences of motion on performance, workload and usability when using a touch screen in-vehicle battle management system. Acting in the role of battle management system operator, 20 participants undertook four simulated drives, two under high motion (representative of an unsealed road) and two under normal motion (representative of a sealed road), whilst performing various battle management tasks. In the high motion condition, lower accuracy and longer task completion times were found, along with greater levels of subjective and physiological workload and lower levels of perceived device usability, when compared to the normal motion condition. The findings indicate that, compared to normal motion, the high motion condition impaired key aspects of battle management system operation. In closing, the importance of considering motion and its effects during touch screen system design is discussed.     

The concept of voluntary consent

Our primary focus is on analysis of the concept of voluntariness, with a secondary focus on the implications of our analysis for the concept and the requirements of voluntary informed consent. We propose that two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions must be satisfied for an action to be voluntary: intentionality, and substantial freedom from controlling influences. We reject authenticity as a necessary condition of voluntary action, and we note that constraining situations may or may not undermine voluntariness, depending on the circumstances and the psychological capacities of agents. We compare and evaluate several accounts of voluntariness and argue that our view, unlike other treatments in bioethics, is not a value-laden theory. We also discuss the empirical assessment of individuals' perceptions of the degrees of noncontrol and self-control. We propose use of a particular Decision Making Control Instrument. Empirical research using this instrument can provide data that will help establish appropriate policies and procedures for obtaining voluntary consent to research.