Rescuing Basic Equality

In the debate on the basis of moral equality, one conclusion achieves near consensus: that we must reject all accounts that ground equality in the possession of some psychological capacity (Psychological Capacity Accounts). This widely held view crystallises around three objections. The first is the Arbitrariness Objection, which holds that the threshold at which the possession of the relevant capacities places an individual within the required range is arbitrary. The second is the Variations Objection, which holds that there is rational pressure to acknowledge that variations in psychological capacities between individuals are morally relevant. The third is the No Rational Agency Objection, according to which Psychological Capacity Accounts have unpalatable implications for our treatment of humans who do not possess the relevant capacities. We develop a Psychological Capacity Account based on the capacity for a conception of the good and offer a novel defence of the account against these objections.     

Who drops-out? Do measures of risk to self and to others predict unplanned endings in primary care counselling?

Aims: Unplanned endings, where clients unilaterally end therapy, are of concern for psychological therapy services generally as they raise questions about the appropriateness of the treatment and it's delivery for some clients. Limited available data indicates that those who drop-out often have more severe symptoms at entry, and have poorer clinical outcomes. This raises further questions about risk to self and others for those clients who leave therapy prematurely and how these clients might be identified and kept engaged. Method: This paper uses a large dataset of CORE data collected routinely in a primary care counselling service between 2000 and 2003. Logistic regression was utilised to consider different measures of risk and other client characteristics recorded at assessment to predict drop-out from the service. Results: These indicate that younger age, greater psychological distress at assessment, an addiction problem and greater risk to others, are associated with an unplanned ending. However, no reliable logistic regression model could be produced. This may be partly due to data quality issues or important characteristics not being available in the data. Implications for practice: The paper concludes that counsellors should actively seek to minimise unplanned endings, as amongst them may be represented the more distressed and risky clients referred to primary care counselling.     

Justice and power: when will justice concerns encourage the advantaged to support policies which redistribute economic resources and the disadvantaged to willingly obey the law?

Two studies are presented which test whether justice can motivate support for government policies and authorities even when such support is not in people's obvious personal or group interest. In the first study, White San Francisco Bay area residents' attitudes toward Congressionally-authored affirmative action policies and anti-discrimination laws were investigated. In the second study, African-American San Francisco Bay area residents' feelings of obligation to obey the law were investigated. The results from both studies show a significant relationship between evaluations of social justice and respondents' political attitudes. More importantly, a significant relationship between relational evaluations of Congress and political attitudes is found in both studies. This relationship suggests how justice can motivate policy and government support even if such support does not yield direct personal or group benefits. Finally, the results from both studies indicate when instrumental and relational concerns will be related to political attitudes. If people identified with their particular advantaged or disadvantaged group, instrumental concerns were more strongly related to their political attitudes, but if people identified with a superordinate category that included both potential outgroup members and relevant superordinate authorities, relational concerns were more strongly related to their political attitudes.     

Increased forefoot loading is associated with an increased plantar flexion moment

The aim of this study was to identify the cascade of effects leading from alterations in force generation around the ankle joint to increased plantar pressures under the forefoot. Gait analysis including plantar pressure measurement was performed at an individually preferred and a standardized, imposed gait velocity in diabetic subjects with polyneuropathy (n = 94), without polyneuropathy (n = 39) and healthy elderly (n = 19). The plantar flexion moment at 40% of the stance phase was negatively correlated with the displacement rate of center of pressure (r = ?.749, p < .001 at the imposed, and r = ?.693, p < .001 at the preferred gait velocity). Displacement rate of center of pressure was strongly correlated with forefoot loading (r = ?.837, p < .001 at the imposed, and r = ?.731, p < .001 at the preferred gait velocity). People with a relatively high plantar flexion moment at 40% of the stance phase, have a faster forward transfer of center of pressure and consequently higher loading of the forefoot. This indicates that interventions aimed at increasing the control of the roll-off of the foot may contribute to a better plantar pressure distribution.     

Altruism and Ambition in the Dynamic Moral Life

Some people are such impressive altruists that they seem to us to already be doing more than enough. And yet they see themselves as compelled to do even more. Can our view be reconciled with theirs? Can a moderate view of beneficence's demands be made consistent with a requirement to be ambitiously altruistic? I argue that a reconciliation is possible if we adopt a dynamic view of beneficence, which addresses the pattern that our altruism is required to take over time. This frees up theoretical space for understanding how a moral duty of self-development can intersect with the requirements of beneficence, so that the amount that we are required to sacrifice increases without our beneficence becoming immoderate.