Reduction of implicit cognitive bias with cathodal tDCS to the left prefrontal cortex

Implicit associations can interfere with cognitive operations and behavioral decisions without direct intention. Enhancement of neural activity with anodal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) was proposed to reduce implicit associations by means of improved cognitive control. However, a targeted reduction of distractive implicit associations by inhibitory cathodal tDCS, recently shown in spatial–numerical associations, provides an interesting alternative approach to support goal-directed behavior with transcranial brain stimulation. To test this rationale with a sham-controlled cross-over design, a standardized Implicit Association Test (IAT) was performed by 24 healthy participants parallel to 1 mA cathodal or sham tDCS to the left prefrontal cortex. In this double-classification task, insect versus flower pictures and negative versus positive words are mapped together onto two shared response keys with crossed response assignments in separate blocks. Responses were faster when insect + negative and flower + positive stimuli required the same answer (IAT effect). Most critically, the IAT effect was reduced during cathodal tDCS as compared to sham stimulation. Thus, results are consistent with the proposed stimulation rationale, with previous observations, and complementary to previous studies using different tDCS configurations.     

Elaborative feedback: Engaging reward and task-relevant brain regions promotes learning in pseudoword reading aloud

Although much is known about the cognitive and neural basis of establishing letter-sound mappings in learning word forms, relatively little is known about what makes for the most effective feedback during this process. We sought to determine the neural basis by which elaborative feedback (EF), which contains both reward-related and content-specific information, may be more helpful than feedback containing only one kind of information (simple positive feedback, PF) or the other (content feedback, CF) in learning orthography-phonology (spelling-sound) mappings for novel letter strings. Compared to CF, EF activated the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, implicated in reward processing. Compared to PF, EF activated the posterior middle temporal, superior temporal, and supramarginal gyri—regions implicated in orthography-phonology conversion. In the same comparison, EF also activated the left fusiform gyrus/visual word form area—implicated in orthographic processing. Also EF, but not CF or PF, modulated activity in the caudate nucleus. In a postscan questionnaire, EF and PF were rated as more pleasant than CF, suggesting that modulation of the caudate for EF may be due to the coupling of reward and skill content. These findings suggest the enhanced effectiveness of EF may be due to concurrent activation of reward-related and task-relevant brain regions.     

Vulnerability of Individuals With Mental Disorders to Epistemic Injustice in Both Clinical and Social Domains

Many individuals who have mental disorders often report negative experiences of a distinctively epistemic sort, such as not being listened to, not being taken seriously, or not being considered credible because of their psychiatric conditions. In an attempt to articulate and interpret these reports we present Fricker’s concepts of epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007, p. 1) and then focus on testimonial injustice and hermeneutic injustice as it applies to individuals with mental disorders. The clinical impact of these concepts on quality of care is discussed. Within the clinical domain, we contrast epistemic injustice with epistemic privilege and authority. We then argue that testimonial and hermeneutic injustices also affect individuals with mental disorders not only when communicating with their caregivers but also in the social context as they attempt to reintegrate into the general society and assume responsibilities as productive citizens. Following the trend of the movement of mental health care to the community, the testimonies of people with mental disorders should not be restricted to issues involving their own personal mental states.     

“How can you make friends if you don't know who you are?” A qualitative examination of international students' experience informed by the Social Identity Model of Identity Change

This paper explores the contribution of social identity change to international students' health and well‐being. International students typically face a range of challenges from the time they leave their home country, including the need to adapt both to a new culture and norms and to a new educational landscape. Previous research informed by the Social Identity Model of Identity Change (SIMIC) suggests that during such life transitions, an individual's group memberships and associated social identities can provide a buffer against the threats to well‐being that such transitions present. To examine the relevance of SIMIC for the transitions that international students' experience, semistructured interviews were conducted with 15 international students attending an Australian university. Thematic analysis provided support for the relevance of SIMIC's social identity gain and social identity maintenance pathways in the transition and revealed a number of associated factors that acted as either facilitators (e.g., a host family that supported community integration) or barriers (e.g., experiencing culture shock) to social identity change. These findings present the first qualitative support for SIMIC within an international student population and help to flesh out the specific ways in which social identity processes contribute to both positive and negative health and well‐being outcomes.     

Counter‐intuitive moral judgement following traumatic brain injury

Several neurological patient populations, including traumatic brain injury (TBI), appear to produce an abnormally ‘utilitarian’ pattern of judgements to moral dilemmas; they tend to make judgements that maximize the welfare of the majority, rather than deontological judgements based on the following of moral rules (e.g., do not harm others). However, this patient research has always used extreme dilemmas with highly valued moral rules (e.g., do not kill). Data from healthy participants, however, suggest that when a wider range of dilemmas are employed, involving less valued moral rules (e.g., do not lie), moral judgements demonstrate sensitivity to the psychological intuitiveness of the judgements, rather than their deontological or utilitarian content (Kahane et al., Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7, 2011, 393). We sought the moral judgements of 30 TBI participants and 30 controls on moral dilemmas where content (utilitarian/deontological) and intuition (intuitive/counter‐intuitive) were measured concurrently. Overall TBI participants made utilitarian judgements in equal proportions to controls; disproportionately favouring utilitarian judgements only when they were counter‐intuitive, and deontological judgements only when they were counter‐intuitive. These results speak against the view that TBI causes a specific utilitarian bias, suggesting instead that moral intuition is broadly disrupted following TBI.     

Treating Procrastination Using Cognitive Behavior Therapy: A Pragmatic Randomized Controlled Trial Comparing Treatment Delivered via the Internet or in Groups

Procrastination is a common problem among university students, with at least half of the population reporting great difficulties initiating or completing tasks and assignments. Procrastination can have a negative impact on course grades and the ability to achieve a university degree, but can also lead to psychological distress. Cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) is believed to reduce procrastination, but few studies have investigated its effectiveness in a regular clinical setting. The current study explored its effects using a pragmatic randomized controlled trial comparing treatment delivered during 8 weeks as self-guided CBT via the Internet (ICBT) or as group CBT. In total, 92 university students with severe procrastination were included in the study (registered as a clinical trial on Clinicaltrials.gov: NCT02112383). Outcome measures on procrastination, depression, anxiety, and well-being were distributed at pre- and posttreatment as well as 6-month follow-up. An outcome measure of procrastination was administered weekly. Linear mixed and fixed effects models were calculated, along with improvement and deterioration rates. The results showed large within-group effect sizes on procrastination, Cohen’s d of 1.29 for ICBT, 95% Confidence Interval (CI) [0.81, 1.74], and d of 1.24 for group CBT, 95% CI [0.76, 1.70], and small to moderate benefits for depression, anxiety, and well-being. In total, 33.7% were regarded as improved at posttreatment and 46.7% at follow-up. No differences between conditions were observed after the treatment period, however, participants in group CBT continued or maintained their improvement at follow-up, while participants in self-guided ICBT showed some signs of deterioration. The findings from the current study suggest that CBT might be an effective treatment for those struggling with severe procrastination, but that a group format may be better for some to sustain their benefits over time and that the clinical significance of the results need to be investigated further.     

Nietzsche,intention, action

Nietzsche sometimes writes as if we are not in control—at least not in conscious control—of our actions. He seems to suggest that what we actually do is independent of our intentions. It turns out, though, that his understanding of both intention and action differs radically from most contemporary treatments of the issue. In particular, he denies that our actions are caused by their intentions, whose role is hermeneutical in a sense that this essay develops. How then is responsibility to be assigned, since its moral variety, at least, depends, on several views, on the intention with which an action is performed? Nietzsche, of course, is not interested in making attributions of moral responsibility. Still, his views on the relationship between an individual action, its intention, other actions by its agent, and the agent's character, as this essay presents them, provide a reasonable account of action generally and a different, broader account of responsibility for oneself.     

Understanding the prevalence and correlates of implicit theories of weight in the United States: Insights from a nationally representative sample

Objectives: The primary aim of this research is to understand how mindsets about weight controllability in the United States relate to population health. We examined the distribution of people’s implicit theories of weight, from an incremental (controllable) to an entity (not controllable) mindset, in a nationally representative sample, as well as their relation to: sociodemographic factors, beliefs about behaviour and genetics as causes of obesity and engagement in weight management-relevant behaviours.

Methods: We report data from the National Cancer Institute’s Health Information National Trends Survey 4.

Results: A majority of respondents endorsed an incremental mindset of body weight, but endorsement of this mindset was stronger among younger, white respondents, and those with a higher income and more educational attainment. A stronger incremental mindset was related to stronger behaviour and weaker genetic causal beliefs about obesity, as well as a tendency to report increased engagement in weight management-relevant behaviours.

Conclusions: Our research provides evidence that although incremental mindsets are more common overall and associated with engagement in health behaviours that can contribute to or detract from population health, incremental mindsets are less common among individuals from more marginalised groups.     

Our Followers Are Lions,Theirs Are Sheep: How Social Identity Shapes Theories About Followership and Social Influence

Two studies examine how self‐categorization theory can be used to refine our understanding of people's implicit theories about followership and social influence. Results from Study 1 show that perceivers regard followers of a group they themselves identify strongly with (rather than not at all) to be more representative of the prototype of effective followers (displaying enthusiasm, industry, good citizenship) and to be less representative of the antiprototype of effective followers (displaying conformity, incompetence, and insubordination). Results are replicated in a second experiment in which we compare the views of those self‐categorizing as either Republican or Democrat responding to followers of the Republican and Democratic Party. Results of Study 2 replicate those of Study 1 and also reveal qualitative differences in the preferred influence strategy for dealing with followers. Specifically, respondents seek to engage in persuasion when trying to change the behavior of ingroup followers, while resorting to coercion when trying to change the behavior of outgroup followers. Our results are the first to provide evidence that perceivers' theories about what followers are like and how they are influenced most effectively are structured by perceivers' identification (and dis‐identification) with the particular groups that leaders are championing.