Post-response stimulation and the Simon effect: Further evidence of action-effect integration

The recently proposed action-concept view of perceptual-motor behaviour posits that a stimulus which consistently follows a certain response will become associated with that response. Some evidence in favour of this view comes from the finding that the size of the Simon effect can be altered by the inclusion of post-response stimuli. However, only one study has investigated the effects of including same-side in addition to opposite-side post-response stimuli, as well as a neutral Simon condition, and, possibly because of a failure of random assignment, the results from that study were inconclusive. In light of this limitation, a Simon experiment was performed in which the location of post-response stimulation was manipulated within subjects. The results showed that: (1) the Simon effect can both decrease and increase in the presence of post-response stimuli, and (2) the amounts of Simon interference and Simon facilitation are both affected by post-response stimuli, whereas performance on neutral trials is not. These findings provide additional support for the action-concept view and suggest that further research concerning this new approach is warranted.     

Why Maximize Expected Choice-Worthiness?1

This paper argues in favor of a particular account of decision-making under normative uncertainty: that, when it is possible to do so, one should maximize expected choice-worthiness. Though this position has been often suggested in the literature and is often taken to be the ‘default’ view, it has so far received little in the way of positive argument in its favor. After dealing with some preliminaries and giving the basic motivation for taking normative uncertainty into account in our decision-making, we consider and provide new arguments against two rival accounts that have been offered—the accounts that we call ‘My Favorite Theory’ and ‘My Favorite Option’. We then give a novel argument for comparativism—the view that, under normative uncertainty, one should take into account both probabilities of different theories and magnitudes of choice-worthiness. Finally, we further argue in favor of maximizing expected choice-worthiness and consider and respond to five objections.     

Between-dimension flanker effects: A clarification with encouraging implications

Models of selective and divided attention have evolved to be remarkably similar (e.g., Cohen & Shoup, 1997; Mordkoff & Yantis, 1993). One remaining difference between these models is the inclusion of all-or-none gates within a recent model of selective attention; the existence of these gates is supported by the absence of a between-dimension flanker effect. However, the existence of these gates is also inconsistent with a recent model of divided attention. In the present experiment, the evidence in favor of all-or-none gates was explored, with the following result: When the task involves colors and letters as the stimuli, and when display features are presented at equal rates, no evidence of these gates is observed. Although other issues remain to be resolved, these findings bode well for the general goal of a unified model of divided and selective attention.     

Fairness and futility

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - William Lane Craig argues that both God and immortality are required for life to have meaning; life is futile without either of the two. I argue...     

Can parts cause their wholes?

Synthese - Part–whole causation (PWC) is the thesis that some causes are part of their effects. PWC has been objected to because of its incompatibility with the criterion that causes not be...     

Don’t make me angry,you wouldn’t like me when I’m angry: Volitional choices to act or inhibit are modulated by subliminal perception of emotional faces

Volitional action and self-control—feelings of acting according to one’s own intentions and in being control of one’s own actions—are fundamental aspects of human conscious experience. However, it is unknown whether high-level cognitive control mechanisms are affected by socially salient but nonconscious emotional cues. In this study, we manipulated free choice decisions to act or withhold an action by subliminally presenting emotional faces: In a novel version of the Go/NoGo paradigm, participants made speeded button-press responses to Go targets, withheld responses to NoGo targets, and made spontaneous, free choices to execute or withhold the response for Choice targets. Before each target, we presented emotional faces, backwards masked to render them nonconscious. In Intentional trials, subliminal angry faces made participants more likely to voluntarily withhold the action, whereas fearful and happy faces had no effects. In a second experiment, the faces were made supraliminal, which eliminated the effects of angry faces on volitional choices. A third experiment measured neural correlates of the effects of subliminal angry faces on intentional choice using EEG. After replicating the behavioural results found in Experiment 1, we identified a frontal-midline theta component—associated with cognitive control processes—which is present for volitional decisions, and is modulated by subliminal angry faces. This suggests a mechanism whereby subliminally presented “threat” stimuli affect conscious control processes. In summary, nonconscious perception of angry faces increases choices to inhibit, and subliminal influences on volitional action are deep seated and ecologically embedded.     

ARMSTRONG AND THE MODAL INVERSION OF DISPOSITIONS

D.M. Armstrong has objected that the dispositionalist theory of laws and properties is modally inverted, for it entails that properties are constituted by relations to non-actual possibilia. I contend that if this objection succeeds against dispositionalism, then Armstrong's nomic necessitation relation is also modally inverted. This shows that at least one of Armstrong's reasons for preferring a nomic necessitation theory is specious.     

Exploring the Public Understanding of Basic Genetic Concepts

It is predicted that the rapid acquisition of new genetic knowledge and related applications during the next decade will have significant implications for virtually all members of society. Currently, most people get exposed to information about genes and genetics only through stories publicized in the media. We sought to understand how individuals in the general population used and understood the concepts of “genetics” and “genes.” During in-depth one-on-one telephone interviews with adults in the United States, we asked questions exploring their basic understanding of these terms, as well as their belief as to the location of genes in the human body. A wide range of responses was received. Despite conversational familiarity with genetic terminology, many noted frustration or were hesitant when trying to answer these questions. In addition, some responses reflected a lack of understanding about basic genetic science that may have significant implications for broader public education measures in genetic literacy, genetic counseling, public health practices, and even routine health care.