Judging body weight from faces: the height-weight illusion

Being able to exploit features of the human face to predict health and fitness can serve as an evolutionary advantage. Surface features such as facial symmetry, averageness, and skin colour are known to influence attractiveness. We sought to determine whether observers are able to extract more complex features, namely body weight. If possible, it could be used as a predictor for health and fitness. For instance, facial adiposity could be taken to indicate a cardiovascular challenge or proneness to infections. Observers seem to be able to glean body weight information from frontal views of a face. Is weight estimation robust across different viewing angles? We showed that participants strongly overestimated body weight for faces photographed from a lower vantage point while underestimating it for faces photographed from a higher vantage point. The perspective distortions of simple facial measures (e.g., width-to-height ratio) that accompany changes in vantage point do not suffice to predict body weight. Instead, more complex patterns must be involved in the height-weight illusion.     

When contributions make a difference: Explaining order effects in responsibility attribution

In two experiments, we established an order effect in responsibility attributions. In line with Spellman (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 126: 323-348, 1997), who proposed that a person's perceived causal contribution varies with the degree to which it changes the probability of the eventual outcome, Experiment 1 showed that in a team challenge in which the players contribute sequentially, the last player's blame or credit is attenuated if the team's result has already been determined prior to her acting. Experiment 2 illustrated that this attenuation effect does not overgeneralize to situations in which the experienced order of events does not map onto the objective order of events; the level of the last person's performance is only discounted if that person knew that the result was already determined. Furthermore, Experiment 1 demonstrated that responsibility attributions remain sensitive to differences in performance, even if the outcome is already determined. We suggest a theoretical extension of Spellman's model, according to which participants' responsibility attributions are determined not only by whether a contribution made a difference in the actual situation, but also by whether it would have made a difference had things turned out somewhat differently.     

Antagonistic modulatory influences of negative affect on cognitive control: Reduced and enhanced interference resolution capability after the induction of fear and sadness

The present behavioral study investigated the influence of negative affect on the neural mechanisms of cognitive control. We expected to find evidence for an antagonistic modulation of cognition by threat-relevant and threat-irrelevant negative affect (i.e. fear and sadness) that should promote bottom-up monitoring and top-down selection, respectively. Subjects performed one of three conflict tasks (Stroop, Flanker, or Simon) that tap distinct control mechanisms of conflict resolution, comprising specific attentional and motor control processes. On each task trial, target stimuli were preceded by a face stimulus exhibiting a fearful, sad, or neutral expression, providing three affect conditions. Our data provides strong evidence for substantially increased selection (attentional and motor selection) after priming of threat-irrelevant negative affect (sadness). Deviating from the results of previous studies, our analysis did not consistently yield increased monitoring after fear priming. We discuss these findings with respect to the effectiveness of different experimental affect priming procedures (i.e. stimuli) and the role of the task context, among others.     

Preferences and illusions in quantified spatial relational reasoning

The following presents the results of an investigation of strategies and preferences in human reasoning about quantified spatial relational assertions. An empirical study revealed a clear preference effect for specific models: The initially constructed model depends on the number of mental model operations. The participants' strategies can be classified as follows: (1) Models with grouped elements are preferred; (2) Models are constructed according to a parsimonious representation strategy. Systematic reasoning errors and illusions can be identified with logical connectors (AND: 86 % valid initial models; XOR: 47 %; Wilcoxon z = 4.6; p < .001). Error rates were smallest when using two universal quantifiers (All-All), they increase significantly when using one (Some-All; All-Some) and again using none (Some-Some) (Page's L = 436; z = 3.40 p < .001). Although the different assertions allowed for multiple situations, the difficulty can be traced back to specific quantifiers and logical connectors.     

Phenomenal consciousness, attention and accessibility

This article re-examines Ned Block??s (1997, 2007) conceptual distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. His argument that we can have phenomenally conscious representations without being able to cognitively access them is criticized as not being supported by evidence. Instead, an alternative interpretation of the relevant empirical data is offered which leaves the link between phenomenology and accessibility intact. Moreover, it is shown that Block??s claim that phenomenology and accessibility have different neural substrates is highly problematic in light of empirical evidence. Finally, his claim that there can be phenomenology without cognitive accessibility is at odds with his endorsement of the 'same-order-theory' of consciousness.     

The Endurance/Perdurance Controversy is No Storm in a Teacup

Several philosophers have maintained in recent years that the endurance/perdurance debate is merely verbal: these prima facie distinct theories of objects’ persistence are in fact metaphysically equivalent, they claim. The present paper challenges this view. Three proposed translation schemes (those set forth by Miller in Erkenntnis 62:91–117, 2005, McCall and Lowe in Noûs 40:570–578, 2006, and Hirsch in Metametaphysics—new essays on the foundations of ontology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) are examined; all are shown to be faulty. In the process, constructive reasons for regarding the debate as a substantive one are provided. It is also suggested that the theories may have differing practical implications.     

Intention,Emotion, and Action: A Neural Theory Based on Semantic Pointers

We propose a unified theory of intentions as neural processes that integrate representations of states of affairs, actions, and emotional evaluation. We show how this theory provides answers to philosophical questions about the concept of intention, psychological questions about human behavior, computational questions about the relations between belief and action, and neuroscientific questions about how the brain produces actions. Our theory of intention ties together biologically plausible mechanisms for belief, planning, and motor control. The computational feasibility of these mechanisms is shown by a model that simulates psychologically important cases of intention.     

Charity Begins at Home: Cultural Differences in Social Discounting and Generosity

People often consider how their actions influence others when making decisions. However, we are not equally generous to everyone alike. Our willingness to share resources declines as a function of social distance between the decision maker and the recipient. This function is likely to be influenced by culture, but research on behavioral decision making is still lacking empirical evidence. In Western societies, individuals generally perceive themselves as autonomous and independent from others, whereas the distinction between self and close others is less sharply defined by Eastern individuals where relationships and group membership are more centralized. Therefore, the social discount function should reflect this difference in the distinction of self and others by a reduced decline in generosity over close social distances. A social decision‐making task was adapted to the intercultural context, and data were collected in Germany and China. For seven different social distances, we estimated how much money German and Chinese subjects were willing to forego to give a certain reward to another person. A hyperbolic model was fitted to the data. We found that other‐regarding generosity declines as a function of social distance independent of cultural identity. However, German subjects showed a marked drop in generosity across close social distances, which was significantly less pronounced in Chinese participants. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Kognitive Dissonanz nach Entscheidungen und psychische Erkrankungen

Building upon Grawe’s consistency theory the target of this study was to examine if cognitive dissonance has an influence on mental disorders. More precisely, whether post-decisional cognitive dissonance (1) is more pronounced in patients with mental disorders and (2) whether it correlates with symptom burden. Obsessive-compulsive disorder patients (OCD; n?=?15), depressive patients (n?=?20) and controls (n?=?42) completed a post-decisional cognitive dissonance scale as well as a scale assessing their respective symptom burden. Solely OCD patients showed heightened cognitive dissonance compared to controls (p?=?0.019). Among depressive patients, however, a very high correlation was found to exist between symptom burden and cognitive dissonance (r?=?0.70). Therefore, OCD seems to be related to increased cognitive dissonance which supports the assumption that cognitive dissonance plays a role in this mental disorder.     

The effect of articulatory suppression and manual tapping on serial recall

Concurrent tasks, such as articulatory suppression and manual tapping, are used to understand the mechanisms underlying short-term memory by overloading domain-specific resources. The present study addresses the debate regarding the theoretical frameworks accounting for interference in serial recall by comparing the effects of both the modality of concurrent tasks (verbal vs. spatial) as well as the state of the tasks (steady vs. changing) in both verbal and spatial recall. The findings indicate that the verbal changing-state concurrent task significantly impaired digit recall, whereas the spatial changing-state concurrent task significantly impaired block recall. The theoretical implications are discussed in the context of a multimodal working memory model with domain-specific resources and a unitary approach to short-term memory.