Inferring correlations: From exemplars to categories

Research and theorizing suggest a processing advantage of category-level correlations over exemplar-level correlations. That research has also shown that category-level correlations serve as a proxy for inferring exemplar-level correlations. For example, an individual may learn that the demand for a product category, like cheese, in one store predicts the demand for this category in another. The individual could then draw the unwarranted conclusion that the demand for an exemplar, like cheddar, would also predict the demand for this exemplar in the other store. This notion is supported by previous experiments demonstrating that the subjective exemplar-level correlation follows the implication of the category-level correlation. However, in virtually all previous experiments suggesting a processing advantage for category-level over exemplar-level correlations, the stimulus correlation at the category level was substantial, whereas the correlation at the exemplar level was weak. Here, we tested the hypothesis that individuals process the level that is most informative, either the exemplar or the category level. We presented participants with a zero correlation at the category level, but varied the correlation at the exemplar level. Participants presented with a zero correlation across exemplar products correctly reproduced a zero correlation across product categories. When presented with a substantial correlation at the exemplar level, however, they erroneously reproduced a similar correlation at the category level. These findings therefore imply that there is no general processing advantage for correlations at higher aggregation levels. Instead, individuals seemingly attend to the level that holds the most regular information. Findings are discussed regarding the role of covariation strength in correlation detection and use.     

The interplay of math anxiety and math competence for later performance

Social Psychology of Education - Math anxiety’s negative effects on performance are well-documented. The interplay of math anxiety and mathematical competence regarding later performance is...     

Gamers against science: The case of the violent video games debate

This article explores the notion that scientific research programs and empirical findings are fundamentally devalued when they threaten a perceiver's social identity. Findings from three studies show the following: (1) identification with the group of “gamers” (i.e., people who play video games on a regular basis) influences the extent to which perceivers devalue research suggesting that playing violent video games has negative consequences; (2) this effect is mediated by the feeling that the group of gamers is being stigmatized by such research (Studies 1 and 2) as well as by anger about this research (Study 2); (3) the effect of in‐group identification on negative research evaluations cannot be explained by attitude or behavioral preference inconsistency (Studies 1 and 3); and (4) strongly identified gamers not only devalue a specific scientific study but also generalize their negative evaluations to the entire field of violent video games research (Study 3). The findings suggest that the influence of social identity processes on the evaluation of research is larger than it has previously been recognized. Implications of these findings for science communication are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Positive mental health moderates the association between depression and suicide ideation: A longitudinal study

Background/Objective: Depression and suicide ideation regularly occur together. Yet, little is known about factors that buffer individuals against the development of suicide ideation. The present study investigated, whether positive mental health buffers the association between depression and suicide ideation in a longitudinal study design. Methods: A total of 207 German students (70.3% female; age: M = 26.04, SD = 5.33) were assessed at a baseline evaluation and again twelve months later. Data were collected using self-report questionnaires. Linear hierarchical regression analysis was used to analyze the data. Positive mental health was considered to moderate the impact of depression on suicide ideation – controlling for age and gender. Results: Positive mental health was shown to moderate the impact of depression on suicide ideation: in those students who reported higher levels of positive mental health, depression severity showed no association with suicide ideation over time. Conclusion: Positive mental health seems to confer resilience and should be taken into account, when assessing individuals for suicide risk.     

The effect of different distractions on remembering delayed intentions

In safety-critical domains, frequently intentions need to be delayed until an ongoing task is completed. Research using the delay-execute paradigm showed that interruptions during the delay cause forgetting. However, staff members often handle an initial distraction not by interrupting the ongoing task but by acknowledging the distraction or multitasking. In Experiments 1a and 1b, we observed that, compared to a no distraction condition, multitasking significantly decreased remembering of intentions and interrupting decreased remembering even further. In Experiment 2, interruptions with context change reduced remembering of intentions compared to uninterrupted delays, and at the same time, interruptions without context change improved memory performance compared to uninterrupted delays. However, improved memory performance resulted in decreased interrupting task performance. Theoretically, the results support the contextual cueing mechanism of delay-execute tasks. Considering safety-critical domains, multitasking, interruptions and context changes can contribute to forgetting of tasks.     

No advantage for remembering horizontal over vertical spatial locations learned from a single viewpoint

Previous behavioral and neurophysiological research has shown better memory for horizontal than for vertical locations. In these studies, participants navigated toward these locations. In the present study we investigated whether the orientation of the spatial plane per se was responsible for this difference. We thus had participants learn locations visually from a single perspective and retrieve them from multiple viewpoints. In three experiments, participants studied colored tags on a horizontally or vertically oriented board within a virtual room and recalled these locations with different layout orientations (Exp. 1) or from different room-based perspectives (Exps. 2 and 3). All experiments revealed evidence for equal recall performance in horizontal and vertical memory. In addition, the patterns for recall from different test orientations were rather similar. Consequently, our results suggest that memory is qualitatively similar for both vertical and horizontal two-dimensional locations, given that these locations are learned from a single viewpoint. Thus, prior differences in spatial memory may have originated from the structure of the space or the fact that participants navigated through it. Additionally, the strong performance advantages for perspective shifts (Exps. 2 and 3) relative to layout rotations (Exp. 1) suggest that configurational judgments are not only based on memory of the relations between target objects, but also encompass the relations between target objects and the surrounding room—for example, in the form of a memorized view.     

Experiencing organisms: from mineness to subject of experience

Many philosophers hold that phenomenally conscious experiences involve a sense of mineness, since experiences like pain or hunger are immediately presented as mine. What can be said about this mineness, and does acceptance of this feature commit us to the existence of a subject or self? If yes, how should we characterize this subject? This paper considers the possibility that, (1) to the extent that we accept this feature, it provides us with a minimal notion of a subject of experience, and that (2) the phenomenological subject of experience, as it is represented in conscious experience, is the organism. While many philosophers agree that the metaphysical subject of experience is the animal, this claim is much less widespread, maybe even counterintuitive. The argument for this claim alludes to the structure of phenomenal consciousness and to recent work in cognitive science concerning the embodied character of consciousness and cognition. To illustrate the problems of current controversies, not only several recent rejections of a subject of experience are critically discussed, but also Hume’s famous rejection of a subject is criticized making use of epistemological aspects from Kant’s philosophy of mind. The final section situates the present discussion in the context of recently popular predictive coding accounts of perception and perceptual experience.