Antagonistic modulatory influences of negative affect on cognitive control: Reduced and enhanced interference resolution capability after the induction of fear and sadness

The present behavioral study investigated the influence of negative affect on the neural mechanisms of cognitive control. We expected to find evidence for an antagonistic modulation of cognition by threat-relevant and threat-irrelevant negative affect (i.e. fear and sadness) that should promote bottom-up monitoring and top-down selection, respectively. Subjects performed one of three conflict tasks (Stroop, Flanker, or Simon) that tap distinct control mechanisms of conflict resolution, comprising specific attentional and motor control processes. On each task trial, target stimuli were preceded by a face stimulus exhibiting a fearful, sad, or neutral expression, providing three affect conditions. Our data provides strong evidence for substantially increased selection (attentional and motor selection) after priming of threat-irrelevant negative affect (sadness). Deviating from the results of previous studies, our analysis did not consistently yield increased monitoring after fear priming. We discuss these findings with respect to the effectiveness of different experimental affect priming procedures (i.e. stimuli) and the role of the task context, among others.     

Papineau’s Theoretical Rationality and the Anthropological Difference

A common view in philosophy is that the way human beings reason is not only gradually better, but that our way of reasoning is fundamentally distinctive. Findings in the psychology of reasoning challenge the traditional view according to which human beings reason in accordance with the laws of logic and probability theory, but rather suggest that human reasoning consists in the application of domain specific rules of thumb similar to those that we ascribe to some intelligent non-human animals as well. However, this view on human reasoning is unable to explain human accomplishments like technological innovations or scientific progress. David Papineau offers a theory of human theoretical rationality that is consistent with the psychological view on human reasoning but that can also explain how humans sometimes are able to transcend the limitations of their biologically quick and dirty modes of thought and thereby reach a high level of accuracy. Papineau claims that the abilities that constitute theoretical rationality are unique to the human species and thus, that human reasoning is fundamentally distinctive after all. In this paper I am going to discuss to what extent these abilities in fact are unique to our species and whether this theoretical rationality can be called an anthropological difference.     

Subjective, Autonomic, and Endocrine Reactivity during Social Stress in Children with Social Phobia

Reports of exaggerated anxiety and physiological hyperreactivity to social-evaluative situations are characteristic of childhood social phobia (SP). However, laboratory research on subjective, autonomic and endocrine functioning in childhood SP is scarce, inconsistent and limited by small sample sizes, limited breadth of measurements, and the use of non-standardized stressor tasks. We exposed 8–12-year-old children with DSM-IV SP (n = 41) and matched healthy control children (HC; n = 40) to the Trier Social Stress Test for Children (TSST-C) while measuring subjective anxiety, heart rate (HR) and salivary alpha-amylase (sAA) as well as salivary cortisol. The SP children showed heightened reactivity to the TSST-C on subjective anxiety compared to the HC children but not a heightened reactivity in HR, sAA or cortisol. However, the SP children showed chronically elevated HR levels throughout the whole laboratory session. Whereas subjective anxiety seems to respond specifically to social-evaluative stress in childhood SP, HR levels may be chronically elevated suggesting a more generalized autonomic hyperreactivity.     

Judging body weight from faces: the height-weight illusion

Being able to exploit features of the human face to predict health and fitness can serve as an evolutionary advantage. Surface features such as facial symmetry, averageness, and skin colour are known to influence attractiveness. We sought to determine whether observers are able to extract more complex features, namely body weight. If possible, it could be used as a predictor for health and fitness. For instance, facial adiposity could be taken to indicate a cardiovascular challenge or proneness to infections. Observers seem to be able to glean body weight information from frontal views of a face. Is weight estimation robust across different viewing angles? We showed that participants strongly overestimated body weight for faces photographed from a lower vantage point while underestimating it for faces photographed from a higher vantage point. The perspective distortions of simple facial measures (e.g., width-to-height ratio) that accompany changes in vantage point do not suffice to predict body weight. Instead, more complex patterns must be involved in the height-weight illusion.     

When contributions make a difference: Explaining order effects in responsibility attribution

In two experiments, we established an order effect in responsibility attributions. In line with Spellman (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 126: 323-348, 1997), who proposed that a person's perceived causal contribution varies with the degree to which it changes the probability of the eventual outcome, Experiment 1 showed that in a team challenge in which the players contribute sequentially, the last player's blame or credit is attenuated if the team's result has already been determined prior to her acting. Experiment 2 illustrated that this attenuation effect does not overgeneralize to situations in which the experienced order of events does not map onto the objective order of events; the level of the last person's performance is only discounted if that person knew that the result was already determined. Furthermore, Experiment 1 demonstrated that responsibility attributions remain sensitive to differences in performance, even if the outcome is already determined. We suggest a theoretical extension of Spellman's model, according to which participants' responsibility attributions are determined not only by whether a contribution made a difference in the actual situation, but also by whether it would have made a difference had things turned out somewhat differently.     

Phenomenal consciousness, attention and accessibility

This article re-examines Ned Block??s (1997, 2007) conceptual distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. His argument that we can have phenomenally conscious representations without being able to cognitively access them is criticized as not being supported by evidence. Instead, an alternative interpretation of the relevant empirical data is offered which leaves the link between phenomenology and accessibility intact. Moreover, it is shown that Block??s claim that phenomenology and accessibility have different neural substrates is highly problematic in light of empirical evidence. Finally, his claim that there can be phenomenology without cognitive accessibility is at odds with his endorsement of the 'same-order-theory' of consciousness.     

Preferences and illusions in quantified spatial relational reasoning

The following presents the results of an investigation of strategies and preferences in human reasoning about quantified spatial relational assertions. An empirical study revealed a clear preference effect for specific models: The initially constructed model depends on the number of mental model operations. The participants' strategies can be classified as follows: (1) Models with grouped elements are preferred; (2) Models are constructed according to a parsimonious representation strategy. Systematic reasoning errors and illusions can be identified with logical connectors (AND: 86 % valid initial models; XOR: 47 %; Wilcoxon z = 4.6; p < .001). Error rates were smallest when using two universal quantifiers (All-All), they increase significantly when using one (Some-All; All-Some) and again using none (Some-Some) (Page's L = 436; z = 3.40 p < .001). Although the different assertions allowed for multiple situations, the difficulty can be traced back to specific quantifiers and logical connectors.     

Persuasive Effects of Fictional Narratives Increase Over Time

Fact-related information contained in fictional narratives may induce substantial changes in readers' real-world beliefs. Current models of persuasion through fiction assume that these effects occur because readers are psychologically transported into the fictional world of the narrative. Contrary to general dual-process models of persuasion, models of persuasion through fiction also imply that persuasive effects of fictional narratives are persistent and even increase over time (absolute sleeper effect). In an experiment designed to test this prediction, 81 participants read either a fictional story that contained true as well as false assertions about real-world topics or a control story. There were large short-term persuasive effects of false information, and these effects were even larger for a group with a 2-week assessment delay. Belief certainty was weakened immediately after reading but returned to baseline level after 2 weeks, indicating that beliefs acquired by reading fictional narratives are integrated into real-world knowledge.     

Transportation and Need for Affect in Narrative Persuasion: A Mediated Moderation Model

Two experiments investigated the idea that individual differences in need for affect are critical for narrative persuasion. Need for affect, that is, the disposition to approach emotions, was assumed to facilitate the experience of being transported into the mental world of the narrative. An intense experience of transportation, in turn, should enhance the persuasive impact of narrative information on readers' beliefs. A mediated moderation analysis was used to test these assumptions. In both experiments (N = 314), need for affect (approach) and transportation moderated the persuasive effects of a fictional narrative compared to a belief-irrelevant control story (Experiment 1) and the persuasive effects of a story with high emotional content compared to a story with low emotional content (Experiment 2). The moderator effects of need for affect were shown to be mediated by the moderator effects of transportation. In sum, the magnitude of a person's need for affect determines whether and to what extent the person experiences transportation into the story world and is persuaded by the information presented in the narrative.