Performing a secondary executive task with affective stimuli interferes with decision making under risk conditions

Previous studies demonstrated that executive functions are crucial for advantageous decision making under risk and that therefore decision making is disrupted when working memory capacity is demanded while working on a decision task. While some studies also showed that emotions can affect decision making under risk, it is unclear how affective processing and executive functions predict decision-making performance in interaction. The current experimental study used a between-subjects design to examine whether affective pictures (positive and negative pictures compared to neutral pictures), included in a parallel executive task (working memory 2-back task), have an impact on decision making under risk as assessed by the Game of Dice Task (GDT). Moreover, the performance GDT plus 2-back task was compared to the performance in the GDT without any additional task (GDT solely). The results show that the performance in the GDT differed between groups (positive, negative, neutral, and GDT solely). The groups with affective pictures, especially those with positive pictures in the 2-back task, showed more disadvantageous decisions in the GDT than the groups with neutral pictures and the group performing the GDT without any additional task. However, executive functions moderated the effect of the affective pictures. Regardless of affective influence, subjects with good executive functions performed advantageously in the GDT. These findings support the assumption that executive functions and emotional processing interact in predicting decision making under risk.     

Article retracted,but the message lives on

The retraction of an original article aims to ensure that readers are alerted to the fact that the findings are not trustworthy. However, the present research suggests that individuals still believe in the findings of an article even though they were later told that the data were fabricated and that the article was retracted. Participants in a debriefing condition and a no-debriefing condition learned about the scientific finding of an empirical article, whereas participants in a control condition did not. Afterward, participants in the debriefing condition were told that the article had been retracted because of fabricated data. Results showed that participants in the debriefing condition were less likely to believe in the findings than participants in the no-debriefing condition but were more likely to believe in the findings than participants in the control condition, suggesting that individuals do adjust their beliefs in the perceived truth of a scientific finding after debriefing—but insufficiently. Mediational analyses revealed that the availability of generated causal arguments underlies belief perseverance. These results suggest that a retraction note of an empirical article in a scientific journal is not sufficient to ensure that readers of the original article no longer believe in the article’s conclusions.     

Interference within hands: Retrieval-induced forgetting of left and right hand movements

We examined retrieval-induced forgetting of motor sequences that were categorized by the effectors (left or right hand) involved in their execution. This left–right categorization was independent from input locations or input devices. In addition, the acquired motor sequences were arbitrarily assigned to left and right. Participants learned twelve sequential joystick movements as responses to letter stimuli. Half of the sequences pertained to the left, half to the right hand. Subsequent retrieval-practice of half the items of one hand induced forgetting for the non-retrieved rest of the items of that hand in a final recall test. This finding demonstrates that the hands were used to organize the memory storage of motor sequences in a way that gave rise to later interference between commonly stored items, that is, linked to the same hand.     

Becoming uniquely human? Comparing chimpanzee to human infancy

Does comparing behavioral development between chimpanzees and humans during infancy hold the key to understanding what is uniquely human? Recent work shows that while many behaviors emerge at similar ages in chimpanzees, human infants develop behavioral traits underpinning our prosocial and ultra-cooperative nature at a much accelerated rate.     

Near, yet so far: the effect of pictorial cues on spatial attention

Distinct cognitive and neural mechanisms underlie perception and action in near (within-reach) and far (outside-reach) space. Objects in far space can be brought into the brain's near-space through tool-use. We determined whether a near object can be pushed into far space by changing the pictorial context in which it occurs. Participants (n = 372) made relative length judgements for lines presented in near space, but superimposed over photographs of near and far objects. The left segment of the line was overestimated in the baseline and near-context conditions whereas the right was overestimated in the far-context. The change from leftward to rightward overestimation is the same when lines are physically shifted from near to far space. Because participants did not have to do anything in relation to the photograph, the results suggest that simply viewing images with a near/far context can cause a shift of attention along the distal/proximal axis, which may reflect differential activation of the ventral/dorsal visual streams.     

A robust classic

In the present research, we argue for the robustness of illusory correlations (ICs, Hamilton & Gifford, 1976) regarding two boundary conditions suggested in previous research. First, we argue that ICs are maintained under extended experience. Using simulations, we derive conflicting predictions. Whereas noise-based accounts predict ICs to be maintained (Fielder, 2000; Smith, 1991), a prominent account based on discrepancy-reducing feedback learning predicts ICs to disappear (Van Rooy et al., 2003). An experiment involving 320 observations with majority and minority members supports the claim that ICs are maintained. Second, we show that actively using the stereotype to make predictions that are met with reward and punishment does not eliminate the bias. In addition, participants' operant reactions afford a novel online measure of ICs. In sum, our findings highlight the robustness of ICs that can be explained as a result of unbiased but noisy learning.     

Playing prosocial video games increases the accessibility of prosocial thoughts

Past research has provided abundant evidence that playing violent video games increases aggressive tendencies. In contrast, evidence on possible positive effects of video game exposure on prosocial tendencies has been relatively sparse. The present research tested and found support for the hypothesis that exposure to prosocial video games increases the accessibility of prosocial thoughts. These results provide support to the predictive validity of the General Learning Model (Buckley & Anderson, 2006) for the effects of exposure to prosocial media on social tendencies. Thus, depending on the content of the video game, playing video games can harm but may also benefit social relations.     

Methodology in aesthetics: the case of musical expressivity

A central method within analytic philosophy has been to construct thought experiments in order to subject philosophical theories to intuitive evaluation. According to a widely held view, philosophical intuitions provide an evidential basis for arguments against such theories, thus rendering the discussion rational. This method has been the predominant way to approach theories formulated as conditional or biconditional statements. In this paper, we examine selected theories of musical expressivity presented in such logical forms, analyzing the possibilities for constructing thought experiments against them. We will argue that philosophical intuitions are not available for the evaluation of the types of counterarguments that would need to be constructed. Instead, the evaluation of these theories, to the extent that it can succeed at all, will centrally rely on inferential, non-immediate access to our subjective musical experiences. Furthermore, attempted thought experiments lose their methodological function because no proper distinction can be drawn between the persons figuring in the thought-experimental scenario and the evaluator of the scenario. Consequently, some of the central contributions to what is generally understood to be analytic philosophy of art are shown to represent a form of aesthetic criticism, offering much less basis for rational argumentation than is often thought.