Control by association: Transfer of implicitly primed attentional states across linked stimuli

Although cognitive control has traditionally been viewed in opposition to associative learning, recent studies show that people can learn to link particular stimuli with specific cognitive control states (e.g., high attentional selectivity). Here, we tested whether such learned stimulus-control associations can transfer across paired-associates. In the Stimulus-Stimulus (S-S) Association phase, specific face or house images repeatedly preceded the presentation of particular scene stimuli, creating paired face/house-scene associates in memory. The Stimulus-Control (S-C) Association phase then associated these scenes with different attentional control states by probabilistically biasing specific scenes to mostly precede either congruent or incongruent trials in a Stroop task. Finally, in the Stimulus-Control Transfer (S-CT) phase, the faces and houses from the S-S phase preceded Stroop trials but were not predictive of congruency, testing whether stimulus-control associations would transfer from scenes to their associated face/house stimuli. In Experiments 1 and 3, we found that learned implicit stimulus-control associations could transfer across closely linked cues, and in Experiment 2, we showed that this transfer depended on the memory associations formed in the S-S phase. While this form of transfer learning has previously been demonstrated for stimulus-reward associations, the present study provides the first evidence for the associative transfer of stimulus-control associations across arbitrarily linked stimuli. This work demonstrates how people can learn to implicitly adapt their processing strategies in a flexible context-dependent manner and establishes a novel learning mechanism supporting the generalization of cognitive control.     

Feedback increases benefits but not costs of retrieval practice: Retrieval-induced forgetting is strength independent

We examined how the provision of feedback affected two separate effects of retrieval practice: strengthening of practiced information and forgetting of related, unpracticed information. Feedback substantially increased recall of retrieval-practiced items. This unsurprising result shows once again that restudy opportunities boost the benefits of testing. In contrast, retrieval-induced forgetting was unaffected by the manipulation and occurred in equal size with or without feedback. These findings demonstrate strength independence of retrieval-induced forgetting and thus support a theoretical account assuming that an inhibitory mechanism causes retrieval-induced forgetting. According to this theory, inhibition resolves competition that arises during retrieval attempts but is unrelated to the consequences of retrieval practice concerning practiced items. The present results match these assumptions and contradict the theoretical alternative that blocking by strengthened information might explain retrieval-induced forgetting. We discuss our findings against the background of previous studies.     

Becoming uniquely human? Comparing chimpanzee to human infancy

Does comparing behavioral development between chimpanzees and humans during infancy hold the key to understanding what is uniquely human? Recent work shows that while many behaviors emerge at similar ages in chimpanzees, human infants develop behavioral traits underpinning our prosocial and ultra-cooperative nature at a much accelerated rate.     

The role of inhibitory processes in part-list cuing

Providing a subset of studied items as retrieval cues can have detrimental effects on recall of the remaining items. In 2 experiments, the authors examined such part-list cuing impairment in a repeated testing situation. Participants studied exemplars from several semantic categories and were given 2 successive cued-recall tests separated by a distractor task of several minutes. Part-list cues were provided in the 1st test but not the 2nd. Noncue item recall was tested with the studied category cues (same probes) in the 1st test, but novel, unstudied retrieval cues (independent probes) in the 2nd test. The authors found detrimental effects of part-list cues in both the 1st (same-probe) test and the 2nd (independent-probe) test. These results show that part-list cuing impairment can be lasting and is not eliminated with independent probes. The findings support the view that the impairment was caused by retrieval inhibition.     

Article retracted,but the message lives on

The retraction of an original article aims to ensure that readers are alerted to the fact that the findings are not trustworthy. However, the present research suggests that individuals still believe in the findings of an article even though they were later told that the data were fabricated and that the article was retracted. Participants in a debriefing condition and a no-debriefing condition learned about the scientific finding of an empirical article, whereas participants in a control condition did not. Afterward, participants in the debriefing condition were told that the article had been retracted because of fabricated data. Results showed that participants in the debriefing condition were less likely to believe in the findings than participants in the no-debriefing condition but were more likely to believe in the findings than participants in the control condition, suggesting that individuals do adjust their beliefs in the perceived truth of a scientific finding after debriefing—but insufficiently. Mediational analyses revealed that the availability of generated causal arguments underlies belief perseverance. These results suggest that a retraction note of an empirical article in a scientific journal is not sufficient to ensure that readers of the original article no longer believe in the article’s conclusions.     

The road to the unconscious self not taken: Discrepancies between self‐ and observer‐inferences about implicit dispositions from nonverbal behavioural cues

To what extent can individuals gain insight into their own or another person's implicit dispositions' We investigated whether self‐perceivers versus neutral observers can detect implicit dispositions from nonverbal behavioural cues contained in video feedback (cue validity) and whether these cues are in turn used as a valid basis for explicit dispositional inferences (cue utilization). Across three studies in the domains of extraversion and anxiety we consistently obtained reliable cue validity and cue utilization for neutral observers but not for self‐perceivers. An additional measure of state inferences in Study 3 showed that one reason for the lack of mediation in self‐perceivers is their reluctance to use their state inferences as a basis for more general trait inferences. We conclude that people have a ‘blind spot’ with respect to the nonverbal behavioural manifestations of their unconscious selves, even though neutral observers may readily detect and utilize this information for dispositional inferences. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Functional hemispheric differences for the categorization of global and local information in naturalistic stimuli

Up to now functional hemispheric asymmetries for global/local processing have mainly been investigated with hierarchical letters as stimuli. In the present study, three experiments were conducted to examine whether corresponding visual-field (VF) effects can also be obtained with more naturalistic stimuli. To this end, images of animals with a pattern placed on their body were displayed as stimuli. The task for the global level and for the local level was to categorize the animals and the patterns, respectively. As a result, VF-effects were also found for these stimuli and tasks. It is concluded that the hemispheric differences observed for hierarchical letters also hold for naturalistic stimuli.     

Is Phosphorus Hesperus?

It is argued that philosophers who adopt the perdurance theory of persistence and who subscribe to the principle of Unrestricted Mereological Composition (UMC) are in a position to regard “Phosphorus is Hesperus” as false.