An Internet-Based Compassion-Focused Intervention for Increased Self-Criticism: A Randomized Controlled Trial

Increased levels of self-criticism and a lack of self-compassion have been associated with the development and maintenance of a range of psychological disorders. In the current study, we tested the efficacy of an online version of a compassion-focused intervention, mindfulness-based compassionate living (MBCL), with guidance on request. A total of 122 self-referred participants with increased levels of self-criticism were randomly assigned to care as usual (CAU) or the intervention group (CAU + online intervention). Primary endpoints were self-reported depressive, anxiety and distress symptoms (DASS-21) and self-compassion (SCS) at 8 weeks. Secondary endpoints were self-criticism, mindfulness, satisfaction with life, fear of self-compassion, self-esteem, and existential shame. At posttreatment, the intervention group showed significant changes with medium to large effect sizes compared to the control group regarding primary outcomes (Cohen’s d: 0.79 [DASS] and -1.21 [SCS]) and secondary outcomes (Cohen’s ds: between 0.40 and 0.94 in favor of the intervention group). The effects in the intervention group were maintained at 6-months postrandomization. Adherence measures (number of completed modules, self-reported number of completed exercises per week) predicted postintervention scores for self-compassion but not for depressive, anxiety, and distress symptoms in the intervention group. The current study shows the efficacy of an online intervention with a transdiagnostic intervention target on a broad range of measures, including depressive and anxiety symptoms and self-compassion.     

Becoming who you are: An integrative review of self‐determination theory and personality systems interactions theory

One of the enduring missions of personality science is to unravel what it takes to become a fully functioning person. In the present article, the authors address this matter from the perspectives of self‐determination theory (SDT) and personality systems interactions (PSI) theory. SDT (a) is rooted in humanistic psychology; (b) has emphasized a first‐person perspective on motivation and personality; (c) posits that the person, supported by the social environment, naturally moves toward growth through the satisfaction of basic psychological needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. PSI theory (a) is rooted in German volition psychology; (b) has emphasized a third‐person perspective on motivation and personality; and (c) posits that a fully functioning person can form and enact difficult intentions and integrate new experiences, and that such competencies are facilitated by affect regulation. The authors review empirical support for SDT and PSI theory, their convergences and divergences, and how the theories bear on recent empirical research on internalization, vitality, and achievement flow. The authors conclude that SDT and PSI theory offer complementary insights into developing a person's full potential.     

Beyond fear: rapid spatial orienting toward positive emotional stimuli

There is much empirical evidence for modulation of attention by negative -- particularly fear-relevant -- emotional stimuli. This modulation is often explained in terms of a fear module. Appraisal theories of emotion posit a more general mechanism, predicting attention capture by stimuli that are relevant for the needs and goals of the organism, regardless of valence. To examine the brain-activation patterns underlying attentional modulation, we recorded event-related potentials from 20 subjects performing a dot-probe task in which the cues were fear-inducing and nurturance-inducing stimuli (i.e., anger faces and baby faces). Highly similar validity modulation was found for the P1 time-locked to target onset, indicating early attentional capture by both positive and negative emotional stimuli. Topographic segmentation analysis and source localization indicate that the same amplification process is involved whether attention orienting is triggered by negative, fear-relevant stimuli or positive, nurturance-relevant stimuli. These results confirm that biological relevance, and not exclusively fear, produces an automatic spatial orienting toward the location of a stimulus.     

Mergers and group status: the impact of high,low and equal group status on identification and satisfaction with a company merger,experienced controllability,group identity and group cohesion

Although mergers are seen as tools to enhance business in today's global marketplace, they have had a low success rate, possibly because the focus has been on financial and legal issues rather than on the human factors involved. In this respect, focusing on the social psychological variables, social identity theory can provide an explanation for the failure of most mergers. An experiment based on this theory involving mergers between two workgroups was conducted to investigate the effects of merger‐related status on participants' psychological responses to the mergers. Thirty‐six small groups were assigned to three different status groups (high, low and equal status groups) using the minimal group paradigm. Most negative responses to the merger—in terms of identification with the merger group, satisfaction with the merger, common in‐group identity, group cohesion and controllability—were given by the members of the low status groups. Contrary to expectations, status was not related to the performance of the groups. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Experiencing Things Together: What Is The Problem?

Suppose someone hears a loud noise and at the same time sees a yellow flash. It seems hard to deny that the person can experience loudness and yellowness together. However, since loudness is experienced by the auditory sense whereas yellowness is experienced by the visual sense it also seems hard to explain how – given the difference between the senses – loudness and yellowness could possibly be experienced together. What is the solution to this problem? I start with some short remarks about what is not the problem (Section 2) and continue to argue that, given one sense of “experiencing two qualities together”, there is no philosophical problem at all (Section 3). An objection against this (Section 4) says that all this only concerns one kind of consciousness, “access consciousness”, while what is relevant here is a different kind of consciousness, namely “phenomenal consciousness”. I answer this objection by presenting another aspect of the unity of consciousness (Section 5). This case raises puzzling further questions (Section 6) but it can help to answer the objection presented in Section 4. I will end with some brief general speculation in a Kantian spirit (Section 7). The main upshot of this paper is a deflationary one: Where we thought to be confronted with a serious philosophical problem there really is none. What will emerge through the argument is a graded and functional view of the unity of consciousness.     

The role of inhibitory processes in part-list cuing

Providing a subset of studied items as retrieval cues can have detrimental effects on recall of the remaining items. In 2 experiments, the authors examined such part-list cuing impairment in a repeated testing situation. Participants studied exemplars from several semantic categories and were given 2 successive cued-recall tests separated by a distractor task of several minutes. Part-list cues were provided in the 1st test but not the 2nd. Noncue item recall was tested with the studied category cues (same probes) in the 1st test, but novel, unstudied retrieval cues (independent probes) in the 2nd test. The authors found detrimental effects of part-list cues in both the 1st (same-probe) test and the 2nd (independent-probe) test. These results show that part-list cuing impairment can be lasting and is not eliminated with independent probes. The findings support the view that the impairment was caused by retrieval inhibition.     

Information sampling and group decision making: the effects of an advocacy decision procedure and task experience

Group discussions tend to focus on information that was previously known by all members (shared information) rather than information known by only 1 member (unshared information). If the shared information implies a suboptimal alternative, this sampling bias is associated with inaccurate group decisions. The present study examines the impact of 2 factors on information exchange and decision quality: (a) an advocacy group decision procedure versus unstructured discussion and (b) task experience. Results show that advocacy groups discussed both more shared and unshared information than free-discussion groups. Further, with increasing experience, more unshared information was mentioned in advocacy groups. In contrast, there was no such increase in unstructured discussions. Yet advocacy groups did not significantly improve their decision quality with experience.     

Dissociable parietal systems for primacy and subsequent memory effects

The frequently observed superior memory for the first items on a list is referred to as primacy. The aetiology of this effect in terms of cognitive processes and their neural substrate is subject to an ongoing debate. However, the brain areas generally involved in successful encoding are well described by subsequent memory studies in which activity during encoding is correlated with memory performance. We employed an object-location association paradigm to differentiate the neural correlate of the primacy from the subsequent memory effect. Activity in the intraparietal sulcus predicted memory performance across all encoding positions. Increased activity in the inferior parietal lobe and angular gyrus resulted exclusively in a more efficient encoding of the first item presented. These areas are part of the ventral frontoparietal network involved in stimulus driven attention. Our results implicate the relatively elevated attention to the first item probably due to its contextual distinctiveness, as a major contributor to the primacy effect.     

Crossmodal integration of emotional information from face and voice in the infant brain

We examined 7-month-old infants' processing of emotionally congruent and incongruent face-voice pairs using ERP measures. Infants watched facial expressions (happy or angry) and, after a delay of 400 ms, heard a word spoken with a prosody that was either emotionally congruent or incongruent with the face being presented. The ERP data revealed that the amplitude of a negative component and a subsequent positive component in infants' ERPs varied as a function of crossmodal emotional congruity. An emotionally incongruent prosody elicited a larger negative component in infants' ERPs than did an emotionally congruent prosody. Conversely, the amplitude of infants' positive component was larger to emotionally congruent than to incongruent prosody. Previous work has shown that an attenuation of the negative component and an enhancement of the later positive component in infants' ERPs reflect the recognition of an item. Thus, the current findings suggest that 7-month-olds integrate emotional information across modalities and recognize common affect in the face and voice.     

How to resist temptation: the effects of external control versus autonomy support on self-regulatory dynamics

Abstract The purpose of the present study (N=80 undergraduate students) was to examine two issues: First, does external control lead to an increase in resistance to temptation more than the use of autonomy support? Second, what are the long‐term effects of these types of educational style? Based on the Personality Systems Interaction (PSI) theory, external control was expected to increase resistance to temptation for those participants who lack initiative and self‐motivation (i.e., state‐oriented participants). Consistent with expectations, resistance to temptation was greater for state‐oriented participants with externally controlled instructions than for individuals who received autonomy‐supportive instructions. This was reflected by their performance on a visual discrimination task during distracter, compared to baseline, episodes. However, external control had negative long‐term effects on state‐oriented participants as indexed by alienation from their own preferences in free‐choice behavior. Action‐oriented participants were less influenced by experimental conditions.