Individual Differences in Delay Discounting: Differences are Quantitative with Gains,but Qualitative with Losses

Research on delay discounting and inter‐temporal choice has yielded significant insights into decision making. Although research has focused on delayed gains, the discounting of losses is potentially important in precisely those areas where the discounting of gains has proved informative (e.g., substance use and abuse). Participants in the current study completed both a questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed gains and an analogous questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed losses. For almost all participants, the likelihood of choosing the delayed gain decreased with increases in the wait until it would be received. In contrast, when losses (i.e., payments) were involved, different participants showed quite different patterns of choices. More specifically, although the majority of the participants became increasingly likely to choose to pay later as the delay was increased, some participants appeared to be debt averse, in that they were more likely to choose the immediate payment option when the delay was long than when it was brief. These debt‐averse participants also were more likely to choose to wait for a larger delayed gain than other participants and scored lower on Impulsiveness than those who showed the typical pattern of discounting delayed losses. Taken together, these results suggest that in the case of delayed gains, people differ only quantitatively (i.e., in how steeply they discount), whereas in the case of delayed losses, people differ qualitatively as well as quantitatively, contrary to the common assumption that a single impulsivity trait underlies choices between immediate and delayed outcomes. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Kant,Neo‐Kantians,and Transcendental Subjectivity

This article discusses an interpretation of Kant's conception of transcendental subjectivity, which manages to avoid many of the concerns that have been raised by analytic interpreters over this doctrine. It is an interpretation put forward by selected C19 and early C20 neo‐Kantian writers. The article starts out by offering a neo‐Kantian interpretation of the object as something that is constituted by the categories and that serves as a standard of truth within a theory of judgment (I). The second part explicates transcendental subjectivity as the system of categories, which is self‐referential and constitutes objects (II), in order to then evaluate this conception by means of a comparison with Hegel's absolute subject (III). Rather than delineating the differences between neo‐Kantian writers, the article systematically expounds a shared project, which consists in providing the ultimate foundation for judgments by means of an anti‐psychologist and non‐metaphysical interpretation of transcendental subjectivity.     

In the Face of Terrorism: Evidence that Belief in Literal Immortality Reduces Prejudice Under Terrorism Threat

Based on terror management theory, previous research has shown that terrorism threat increases prejudice against Muslims and is mediated by death‐related thoughts. Because this effect was found on a correlational level, it remains unclear whether terrorism threat increases prejudice against Muslims because of enhanced death‐related thoughts or the opposite: terrorism threat increases death‐related thoughts because of stronger prejudice against Muslims. To disentangle this shortcoming, we varied death‐related thoughts by systematically manipulating the belief in literal immortality. Using two studies, we found that participants exposed to terrorism pictures (vs. controls) had increased prejudice against both Muslims (Study 1) and immigrants (Study 2) when they were led to believe that literal immortality does not exist but not when they were led to believe that it does exist. Mediation analysis indicated that this effect was mediated by death‐related thoughts. This provides further evidence that terrorism threat increases prejudice because of death‐related thoughts.     

Hail the impossible: p-values, evidence, and likelihood

Significance testing based on p-values is standard in psychological research and teaching. Typically, research articles and textbooks present and use p as a measure of statistical evidence against the null hypothesis (the Fisherian interpretation), although using concepts and tools based on a completely different usage of p as a tool for controlling long-term decision errors (the Neyman-Pearson interpretation). There are four major problems with using p as a measure of evidence and these problems are often overlooked in the domain of psychology. First, p is uniformly distributed under the null hypothesis and can therefore never indicate evidence for the null. Second, p is conditioned solely on the null hypothesis and is therefore unsuited to quantify evidence, because evidence is always relative in the sense of being evidence for or against a hypothesis relative to another hypothesis. Third, p designates probability of obtaining evidence (given the null), rather than strength of evidence. Fourth, p depends on unobserved data and subjective intentions and therefore implies, given the evidential interpretation, that the evidential strength of observed data depends on things that did not happen and subjective intentions. In sum, using p in the Fisherian sense as a measure of statistical evidence is deeply problematic, both statistically and conceptually, while the Neyman-Pearson interpretation is not about evidence at all. In contrast, the likelihood ratio escapes the above problems and is recommended as a tool for psychologists to represent the statistical evidence conveyed by obtained data relative to two hypotheses.     

Empiricism,stances, and the problem of voluntarism

Classical empiricism leads to notorious problems having to do with the (at least prima facie) lack of an acceptable empiricist justification of empiricism itself. Bas van Fraassen claims that his idea of the “empirical stance” can deal with such problems. I argue, however, that this view entails a very problematic form of voluntarism which comes with the threat of latent irrationality and normative inadequacy. However, there is also a certain element of truth in such a voluntarism. The main difficulty consists in finding an acceptable form of voluntarism.     

What exactly are victim-sensitive persons sensitive to?

Research has repeatedly shown that people who are habitually sensitive towards unjust victimizations tend to behave uncooperatively and hostile under certain circumstances. But what exactly is the underlying motivation for such uncooperativeness? One explanation is that victim-sensitive individuals behave uncooperatively in order to retribute fateful disadvantages in the past; an alternative explanation is that victim-sensitive individuals behave uncooperatively in order to avoid being exploited in the future. Two experimental studies are presented in which participants were confronted with an unfavorable outcome that was either due to bad luck or to another person’s mean intentions. Findings from both studies suggest that victim-sensitive individuals are specifically sensitive towards mean intentions, but not to fateful disadvantages in general.     

Drugs as instruments from a developmental child and adolescent psychiatric perspective

Developmental, epidemiological, and neurobiological studies indicate that the adaptive and maladaptive functions, as well as immediate and long-term consequences of drug use, may vary by age. Early initiation seems to be associated with a reduced ability to use drugs purposely in a temporally stable, non-addictive manner. Prevention strategies should consider social environmental factors and aim to delay age at initiation.     

Highlighting relatedness promotes prosocial motives and behavior

According to self-determination theory, people have three basic psychological needs: relatedness, competence, and autonomy. Of these, the authors reasoned that relatedness need satisfaction is particularly important for promoting prosocial behavior because of the increased sense of connectedness to others that this engenders. In Experiment 1, the authors manipulated relatedness, autonomy, competence, or gave participants a neutral task, and found that highlighting relatedness led to higher interest in volunteering and intentions to volunteer relative to the other conditions. Experiment 2 found that writing about relatedness experiences promoted feelings of connectedness to others, which in turn predicted greater prosocial intentions. Experiment 3 found that relatedness manipulation participants donated significantly more money to charity than did participants given a neutral task. The results suggest that highlighting relatedness increases engagement in prosocial activities and are discussed in relation to the conflict and compatibility between individual and social outcomes.     

Of virtual victims and victimized virtues: differential effects of experienced aggression in video games on social cooperation

Two experimental studies were used to investigate how interacting with aggressive virtual characters in video games affects trust and cooperation of players. Study 1 demonstrates that experiencing virtual aggression from a victim's perspective can impair players' investments in a subsequent common goods dilemma situation. This effect is mediated by reduced expectations of trust in the cooperativeness of interaction partners. In Study 2 the same effect was replicated by using a different cooperation task and by investigating the moderating role of justice sensitivity from a victim's perspective as a dispositional factor. Participants transferred less money to an unknown partner in a trust game after exposure to aggressive nonplayer characters in a video game. This effect was stronger for people high in victim sensitivity. Results of both studies can be interpreted in line with the sensitivity to mean intentions model and add to the body of research on violent media effects.