I Can't Relax! You're Driving me Quasi!

Robust Realists think that there are irreducible, non‐natural, and mind‐independent moral properties. Quasi‐Realists and Relaxed Realists think the same, but interpret these commitments differently. Robust Realists interpret them as metaphysical commitments, to be defended by metaphysical argument. Quasi‐Realists and Relaxed Realists say that they can only be interpreted as moral commitments. These theories thus pose a serious threat to Robust Realism, for they apparently undermine the very possibility of articulating the robust metaphysical commitments of this theory. I clarify and respond to this threat, showing that there is in fact space to develop and defend a robust moral ontology.     

An index of bewilderment

Stuart F. Spicker (ed.). The Philosophy of the Body: Rejections of Cartesian Dualism. Chicago, Illinois: Quadrangle Books, 1970. Pp. viii, 367. Not indexed. $2.95 (paper).