Self-discrepancy and suicidal ideation

The purpose of this study was to determine whether certain self-discrepancies predicted the extent to which individuals experienced suicidal ideation. The Selves Questionnaire (an idiographic measure of self-beliefs) was administered to 152 undergraduate participants, who also completed measures of hopelessness, depression, and suicidal ideation. Three kinds of self-discrepancies were associated with suicidal ideation: actual:ideal, actual:ought, and actual:ideal:future. Covariance structure analyses indicated a best-fitting model suggesting that, actual:ideal and actual:ideal:future self-discrepancies contribute to hopelessness, which in turn contributes to depression and suicidal ideation. The findings suggest that self-discrepancy, as a form of negative self-evaluation, may contribute to an individual's risk for suicidal ideation. Moreover, the findings point to an integration of self-discrepancy theory with hopelessness theory.     

Psychological Help‐Seeking Intention Among College Students Across Three Problem Areas

The theory of planned behavior (TPB) was used to understand psychological help‐seeking intention for 3 common concerns: anxiety or depression, career choice concerns, and alcohol or drug use. Eight hundred eighty‐nine university students completed surveys for the TPB variables plus belief in personal efficacy and control to solve the problems. Path analysis demonstrated path invariance, indicating that the importance of TPB variables do not vary based on concern in the decision‐making process.     

Kant on Construction,Apriority, and the Moral Relevance of Universalization

This paper introduces a referential reading of Kant’s practical project, according to which maxims are made morally permissible by their correspondence to objects, though not the ontic objects of Kant’s theoretical project but deontic objects (what ought to be). It illustrates this model by showing how the content of the Formula of Universal Law might be determined by what our capacity of practical reason can stand in a referential relation to, rather than by facts about what kind of beings we are (viz., uncaused causes). This solves the neglected puzzle of why there are passages in Kant’s works suggesting robust analogies between mathematics and ethics, since to universalize a maxim is to test a priori whether a practical object with that particular content can be constructed. An apparent problem with this hypothesis is that the medium of practical sensibility (feeling) does not play a role analogous to the medium of theoretical sensibility (intuition). In response I distinguish two separate Kantian accounts of mathematical apriority. The thesis that maxim universalization is a species of construction, and thus a priori, turns out to be consistent with the account of apriority that informs Kant’s understanding of actual mathematical practice.     

Love and Benevolence in Hutcheson's and Hume's Theories of the Passions

In this paper I consider two related issues raised by Aristotle's treatment of hearing and sounds. The first concerns the kinds of changes Aristotle takes to occur, in both perceptual medium and sense organs, when a perceiver hears a sounding object. The second issue concerns Aristotle's views on the nature and location of the proper objects of auditory perception. I argue that Aristotle's views on these topics are not what they have sometimes been taken to be, and that when rightly understood they compare favourably in many respects with leading contemporary accounts.     

Locke and the Primary Signification of Words: An Approach to Word Meaning

Locke's claim that the primary signification of (most) words is an idea, or complex of ideas, has received different interpretations. I support the majority view that Locke's notion of primary signification can be construed in terms of linguistic meaning. But this reading has been seen as making Locke's account vulnerable to various criticisms, of which I consider two. First, it appears to make the account vulnerable to the charge that an idea cannot play the role that a word meaning should play. I argue that the role Locke actually gives to signified ideas is not susceptible to this criticism. Second, it appears to make Locke guilty of at least some degree of semantic idealism. I argue that Locke is not guilty of this and that he makes a proper distinction between the non-referential relation that holds between a word and its primary signification and the referential relation that holds between a word and things the word is used to speak about.     

Selective effects of errorful generation on recognition memory: the role of motivation and surprise

ABSTRACT

The current research examined the effects of errorful generation on memory, focusing particularly on the roles of motivation and surprise. In two experiments, participants were first presented with photographs of faces and were asked to associate four facts with each photograph. On Generate trials, the participants guessed two of the facts (Guess targets) before those correct facts, and another two correct facts (Study targets), were revealed. On the remaining Read trials, all four facts were presented without a guessing stage. In Experiment 1, participants also ranked their motivation to know the answers before they were revealed, or their surprise on learning the true answers. Guess targets were subsequently better recognised than the concurrently presented, non-guessed Study targets. Guess targets were also better recognised than Read targets, and recognition of Study and Read targets did not differ. Errorful generation also increased self-reported motivation, but not surprise. Experiment 2 showed that the results of Experiment 1 can outlive a 20-minute delay, and that they generalise to a more challenging recognition test. Together, the results suggest that errorful generation improves memory specifically for the guessed fact, and this may be linked to an increase in motivation to learn that fact.     

Effects of study list composition on the word frequency effect and metacognitive attributions in recognition memory

In two experiments, study-list composition was manipulated and its impact was observed on metacognitive judgements associated with recognition hits (Hs) and false alarms (FAs). Both studies involved recognition of high-frequency (HF) and low-frequency (LF) words, and focused on the FA portion of the word frequency effect. Our hypothesis was that participants can actively reject items that are distinctive from the study list, and that this effect may be strong enough to overcome the FA word frequency effect. Experiment 1 manipulated list composition with a conjunctive rule and Experiment 2 varied it by having participants study either HF or LF items prior to a test consisting of words of both frequencies. In each study H rate, FA rate, and metacognitive attributions underlying recognition decisions were investigated. In both studies, participants reported rejecting test items predominantly through a process of active rejection, which was more often reported for LF items. This effect was strong enough to reverse the FA portion of the word frequency effect in Experiment 2, but not Experiment 1. The results are discussed in terms of metacognitive rejection mechanisms in recognition memory.     

Reply to John Turri

Abstract

In this article I develop Heidegger’s phenomenology of poetry, showing that it may provide grounds for rejecting claims that he lapses into linguistic idealism. Proceeding via an analysis of the three concepts of language operative in the philosopher’s work, I demonstrate how poetic language challenges language’s designative and world‐disclosive functions. The experience with poetic language, which disrupts Dasein’s absorption by emerging out of equipmentality in the mode of the broken tool, brings Dasein to wonder at the world’s existence in such a way that doubt about its reality cannot enter the picture.     

In Defence of ‘Partially Clad’ Bare Particulars

In a recent article in this journal, Richard Brian Davis argues that ‘bare particulars [as defended by J. P. Moreland] face several serious shortcomings’[2003: 547]. I argue that Davis's two principal criticisms fall flat.