Decisions from experience: Why small samples?

In many decisions we cannot consult explicit statistics telling us about the risks involved in our actions. In lieu of such data, we can arrive at an understanding of our dicey options by sampling from them. The size of the samples that we take determines, ceteris paribus, how good our choices will be. Studies of decisions from experience have observed that people tend to rely on relatively small samples from payoff distributions, and small samples are at times rendered even smaller because of recency. We suggest one contributing and previously unnoticed reason for reliance on frugal search: Small samples amplify the difference between the expected earnings associated with the payoff distributions, thus making the options more distinct and choice easier. We describe the magnitude of this amplification effect, and the potential costs that it exacts, and we empirically test four of its implications.     

An investigation of differential reinforcement of alternative behavior without extinction

We manipulated relative reinforcement for problem behavior and appropriate behavior using differential reinforcement of alternative behavior (DRA) without an extinction component. Seven children with developmental disabilities participated. We manipulated duration (Experiment 1), quality (Experiment 2), delay (Experiment 3), or a combination of each (Experiment 4), such that reinforcement favored appropriate behavior rather than problem behavior even though problem behavior still produced reinforcement. Results of Experiments 1 to 3 showed that behavior was often sensitive to manipulations of duration, quality, and delay in isolation, but the largest and most consistent behavior change was observed when several dimensions of reinforcement were combined to favor appropriate behavior (Experiment 4). Results suggest strategies for reducing problem behavior and increasing appropriate behavior without extinction.     

EFFECTS OF TREATMENT INTEGRITY FAILURES DURING DIFFERENTIAL REINFORCEMENT OF ALTERNATIVE BEHAVIOR: A TRANSLATIONAL MODEL

Differential reinforcement of alternative behavior (DRA) is used frequently as a treatment for problem behavior. Previous studies on treatment integrity failures during DRA suggest that the intervention is robust, but research has not yet investigated the effects of different types of integrity failures. We examined the effects of two types of integrity failures on DRA, starting with a human operant procedure and extending the results to children with disabilities in a school setting. Human operant results (Experiment 1) showed that conditions involving reinforcement for problem behavior were more detrimental than failing to reinforce appropriate behavior alone, and that condition order affected the results. Experiments 2 and 3 replicated the effects of combined errors and sequence effects during actual treatment implementation.     

Conditioned reinforcement and response strength

Stimuli associated with primary reinforcers appear themselves to acquire the capacity to strengthen behavior. This paper reviews research on the strengthening effects of conditioned reinforcers within the context of contemporary quantitative choice theories and behavioral momentum theory. Based partially on the finding that variations in parameters of conditioned reinforcement appear not to affect response strength as measured by resistance to change, long-standing assertions that conditioned reinforcers do not strengthen behavior in a reinforcement-like fashion are considered. A signposts or means-to-an-end account is explored and appears to provide a plausible alternative interpretation of the effects of stimuli associated with primary reinforcers. Related suggestions that primary reinforcers also might not have their effects via a strengthening process are explored and found to be worthy of serious consideration.     

Inaccurate self-knowledge formation as a result of automatic behavior

Four studies tested a post-priming misattribution process whereby a primed goal automatically influences people's behavior, but because people are unaware of that influence, they misattribute their behavior to some other internal state. People who were primed with a goal were more likely to choose an activity that was relevant to that goal, but did not recognize that the prime had influenced their choices. Instead, people used more accessible and plausible reasons to explain their behavior. The goals were seeking romantic interaction (Studies 1 and 2), helping (Study 3) and earning money (Study 4). People made choices related to these goals but misattributed the choices to temporary preferences (Studies 1 and 3) and more permanent dispositions (Studies 2 and 4). The misattribution had downstream effects, leading to choice behavior consistent with the erroneous self-knowledge. We suggest that automatic behavior can lead to a confabulated self-knowledge with behavioral consequences.     

Distributed recognition of natural songs by European starlings

Individual vocal recognition behaviors in songbirds provide an excellent framework for the investigation of comparative psychological and neurobiological mechanisms that support the perception and cognition of complex acoustic communication signals. To this end, the complex songs of European starlings have been studied extensively. Yet, several basic parameters of starling individual vocal recognition have not been assessed. Here we investigate the temporal extent of song information acquired by starlings during vocal recognition learning. We trained two groups of starlings using standard operant conditioning techniques to recognize several songs from two conspecific male singers. In the first experiment we tested their ability to maintain accurate recognition when presented with (1) random sequences of 1–12 motifs (stereotyped song components) drawn from the training songs, and (2) 0.1–12-s excerpts of continuous song drawn from the training songs. We found that song recognition improved monotonically as more vocal material is provided. In the second experiment, we systematically substituted continuous, varying length regions of white noise for portions of the training songs and again examined recognition accuracy. Recognition remained above chance levels for all noise substitutions tested (up to 91% of the training stimulus) although all but the smallest substitutions led to some decrement in song recognition. Overall, above chance recognition could be obtained with surprisingly few motifs, short excerpts of song, and in the absence of large portions of the training songs. These results suggest that starlings acquire a representation of song during individual vocal recognition learning that is robust to perturbations and distributed broadly over large portions of these complex acoustic sequences.     

Teaching cognates in isolation and context: a practical note on Montelongo, et al. (2009)

The use of cognates in teaching word identification and vocabulary meaning is an underused resource in the teaching of English-language learners, especially for learners whose language is similar to English, e.g., Spanish. A recent study by Montelongo, Hernandez, Herter, and Hernandez reported that the effect of initial consonants was strong for recognizing words in isolation. In addition, they pointed out that cognates containing suffixes identical between English and Spanish were more quickly recognized than cognates containing similar but not identical suffixes. Further, they stated teachers would do well to take these differences into account when employing a cognate strategy with their Latino English-language learners. The purpose of this response is to discuss how different types of cognates and their various meanings may be examined by educators and students when employing cognates as a strategy in learning English.     

Moore’s Paradox is not just another pragmatic paradox

One version of Moore’s Paradox is the challenge to account for the absurdity of beliefs purportedly expressed by someone who asserts sentences of the form ‘p & I do not believe that p’ (‘Moorean sentences’). The absurdity of these beliefs is philosophically puzzling, given that Moorean sentences (i) are contingent and often true; and (ii) express contents that are unproblematic when presented in the third-person. In this paper I critically examine the most popular proposed solution to these two puzzles, according to which Moorean beliefs are absurd because Moorean sentences are instances of pragmatic paradox; that is to say, the propositions they express are necessarily false-when-believed. My conclusion is that while a Moorean belief is a pragmatic paradox, it is not just another pragmatic paradox, because this diagnosis does not explain all the puzzling features of Moorean beliefs. In particularly, while this analysis is plausible in relation to the puzzle posed by characteristic (i) of Moorean sentences, I argue that it fails to account for (ii). I do so in the course of an attempt to formulate the definition of a pragmatic paradox in more precise formal terms, in order to see whether the definition is satisfied by Moorean sentences, but not by their third-person transpositions. For only an account which can do so could address (ii) adequately. After rejecting a number of attempted formalizations, I arrive at a definition which delivers the right results. The problem with this definition, however, is that it has to be couched in first-person terms, making an essential use of ‘I’. Thus the problem of accounting for first-/third-person asymmetry recurs at a higher order, which shows that the Pragmatic Paradox Resolution fails to identify the source of such asymmetry highlighted by Moore’s Paradox.     

ETHICAL BLIND-SPOTS: WHY SOCRATES WAS NOT A COSMOPOLITAN

Though Socrates can easily look like a cosmopolitan in moral and political theory, a closer reading of the relevant texts shows that, in the most important sense of the term as we now use it, he turns out – disappointingly, perhaps – not to be. The reasons why not are instructive and important, both for readers of Plato and for political theorists; they have to do with the phenomenon that I shall call ethical blind-spots .     

Desgabets on Cartesian Minds

George Berkeley maintains both anti-abstractionism (that abstract ideas are impossible) and idealism (that physical objects and their qualities are mind-dependent). Some scholars (including Atherton, Bolton, and Pappas) have argued, in different ways, that Berkeley uses anti-abstractionism as a premise in a simple argument for idealism. In this paper, I argue that the relation between anti-abstractionism and idealism in Berkeley's metaphysics is more complex than these scholars acknowledge. Berkeley distinguishes between two kinds of abstraction, singling abstraction and generalizing abstraction. He then rests his case for idealism, not on the denial of the possibility of generalizing abstraction, but rather on the denial of the possibility of singling abstraction. Moreover, Berkeley's argument does not rest on a blanket rejection of all forms of singling abstraction. Rather, the fundamental anti-abstractionist assumption, for his purposes, is the claim that primary qualities cannot be mentally singled out from secondary qualities. Crucially, the claim that the existence of physical objects cannot be mentally singled out from their being perceived is not a premise in, but rather a consequence of, Berkeley's argument for idealism. Berkeley's argument therefore avoids circularity inasmuch as it appeals to the impossibility of singly abstracting one idea in order to establish the impossibility of singly abstracting another.