Selective effects of errorful generation on recognition memory: the role of motivation and surprise

ABSTRACT

The current research examined the effects of errorful generation on memory, focusing particularly on the roles of motivation and surprise. In two experiments, participants were first presented with photographs of faces and were asked to associate four facts with each photograph. On Generate trials, the participants guessed two of the facts (Guess targets) before those correct facts, and another two correct facts (Study targets), were revealed. On the remaining Read trials, all four facts were presented without a guessing stage. In Experiment 1, participants also ranked their motivation to know the answers before they were revealed, or their surprise on learning the true answers. Guess targets were subsequently better recognised than the concurrently presented, non-guessed Study targets. Guess targets were also better recognised than Read targets, and recognition of Study and Read targets did not differ. Errorful generation also increased self-reported motivation, but not surprise. Experiment 2 showed that the results of Experiment 1 can outlive a 20-minute delay, and that they generalise to a more challenging recognition test. Together, the results suggest that errorful generation improves memory specifically for the guessed fact, and this may be linked to an increase in motivation to learn that fact.     

Effects of study list composition on the word frequency effect and metacognitive attributions in recognition memory

In two experiments, study-list composition was manipulated and its impact was observed on metacognitive judgements associated with recognition hits (Hs) and false alarms (FAs). Both studies involved recognition of high-frequency (HF) and low-frequency (LF) words, and focused on the FA portion of the word frequency effect. Our hypothesis was that participants can actively reject items that are distinctive from the study list, and that this effect may be strong enough to overcome the FA word frequency effect. Experiment 1 manipulated list composition with a conjunctive rule and Experiment 2 varied it by having participants study either HF or LF items prior to a test consisting of words of both frequencies. In each study H rate, FA rate, and metacognitive attributions underlying recognition decisions were investigated. In both studies, participants reported rejecting test items predominantly through a process of active rejection, which was more often reported for LF items. This effect was strong enough to reverse the FA portion of the word frequency effect in Experiment 2, but not Experiment 1. The results are discussed in terms of metacognitive rejection mechanisms in recognition memory.     

Reply to John Turri

Abstract

In this article I develop Heidegger’s phenomenology of poetry, showing that it may provide grounds for rejecting claims that he lapses into linguistic idealism. Proceeding via an analysis of the three concepts of language operative in the philosopher’s work, I demonstrate how poetic language challenges language’s designative and world‐disclosive functions. The experience with poetic language, which disrupts Dasein’s absorption by emerging out of equipmentality in the mode of the broken tool, brings Dasein to wonder at the world’s existence in such a way that doubt about its reality cannot enter the picture.     

Closure and context

The aim of this paper is to explain why imaginativeness is valuable. Recent discussions of imaginativeness or creativity (which I regard as the same property) have paid relatively little attention to this important question. My discussion has three parts. First, I elucidate the concept of imaginativeness by providing three conditions a product or act must satisfy in order to be imaginative. This account enables us to explain, among other things, why imaginativeness is associated with inspiration, why it is associated with the faculty of imagination, and why it is relative to persons and to contexts. Second, in the light of this account, I say what the imaginativeness of persons is. Philosophical discussions of the imaginativeness of persons usually treat it as a capacity. In fact, it is a tendency or disposition of a certain kind. Third, I give reasons why the imaginativeness of persons has the value it does. I begin by saying what the basic facts about its value are. When a person's imaginativeness is valuable, it is either (i) a good thing about a person, (ii) good for the person, or (iii) good for others. I provide explanations of each of these facts. I conclude by addressing the difficult question of whether a person's imaginativeness is non-instrumentally good for her. On Romantic and Romantic-inspired views, imaginativeness is non-instrumentally good for a person because of its connection with self-realization. I reject this claim. However, I argue that, often, imaginativeness is indeed non-instrumentally good for the imaginative person.     

Recovery of Lost Transfer Effects

Tracking tasks known to facilitate or interfere with one another were investigated under various sequences of alternation. Double and treble alternating sequences of 2 tasks were used. 6 groups of 12 Ss practiced for 20 10-sec. trials, with 50-sec. intertrial intervals. Trend analyses were employed in comparing the results of the double and treble alternating sequences with the single alternating sequence and postshift trials of the previous study (Laszlo & Pritchard, 1969). The results showed that facilitation or interference lost with single alternation was recovered with double or treble alternating sequences. Rate and degree of recovery appeared to depend upon the degree of transfer between tasks and strategies employed by S. These results were discussed in terms of motor program consolidation.     

In Defence of ‘Partially Clad’ Bare Particulars

In a recent article in this journal, Richard Brian Davis argues that ‘bare particulars [as defended by J. P. Moreland] face several serious shortcomings’[2003: 547]. I argue that Davis's two principal criticisms fall flat.     

Effects of Mothers' Locus of Control for Child Improvement in a Developmentally Delayed Sample

A potentially important variable that has received little attention in the literature is the locus of control (LOC) a caregiver holds for child improvement, including its influence on the caregiver's treatment compliance and on actual child improvement. In this study, 131 mother-child dyads were assessed across 1 year, to evaluate the utility of the LOC construct in a practice setting. Children were approximately 4 years old at the first assessment, and all of them had been diagnosed with a developmental disability. Mothers' compliance with treatment (mothers' attendance at sessions; teachers' ratings of mothers' support and knowledge) was tracked, and measures of child development status and mothers' locus of control were administered. Statistical results indicated that mothers' locus of control was not significantly correlated with children's gains in development over the year. The mothers' beliefs about whether the child or chance would be responsible for improvement were associated with lower compliance with treatment, whereas the mothers' beliefs that child improvement was attributable to professional intervention were associated with enhanced involvement in treatment.     

I. Professor Narveson's utilitarianism

Collingwood's theory of presuppositions has never been taken very seriously. But critics have completely overlooked its significance as a theory or model of inquiry intimately tied to certain aspects of discourse in a context of investigation. Viewed this way, Collingwood's theory is on very strong ground, especially when it is reconstructed with the aid of a formal language. The reconstruction shows what is essential to the theory and what is not, allowing us to disregard those of Collingwood's extravagant claims which have frustrated an understanding of his theory's real strength. The reconstruction also provides a general framework within which recent discussion of presuppositions can be unified.     

Effects on Face Recognition of Spatial-Frequency Information Contained in Inspection and Test Stimuli

Researchers often assume a critical band of spatial frequencies is required for face recognition. Also, many studies have not measured the contrast required for recognition. On Day 1, observers viewed high-pass-filtered (HP), low-pass-filtered (LP), or unfiltered (UF) faces. On Day 2, they viewed a variety of faces, some of which were LP filtered, HP filtered, and UF. Observers adjusted contrast until they achieved both detection and recognition. Observers were most accurate and sensitive when filtered faces agreed in spatial-frequency content across days. Faces differing in spatial-frequency content were least well recognized. Unfiltered faces always fell between the 2 extremes. Observers generally used less contrast to recognize unfiltered than filtered faces. Correspondence of information between inspection and testing seemed more important than any particular range of frequencies.     

Contextual Interference in Movements of the Same Class: Differential Effects on Program and Parameter Learning

Contextual interference effects in motor learning usually were not found when the tasks to be learned presumably required the same generalized motor program (GMP) and differed only with regard to the movement parameters (see Lee, Wulf, & Schmidt, 1992; Magill & Hall, 1990). Thus, tasks requiring different motor programs (e.g., different relative timings) seemed to be a prerequisite for random practice to be more effective than blocked practice. However, the previous studies (that did not find random/blocked differences) used global error measures that confounded errors in relative timing and errors in absolute timing. In the present study, subjects practiced three movement patterns that had the same relative timing (requiring the same GMP) but different overall durations (requiring different parameters). Errors in relative timing and in absolute timing were assessed separately. The results indicate that random practice is more effective for the learning of relative timing (GMP learning) and less effective for the learning of absolute timing (parameter learning) than blocked practice. Preliminary ideas as to the reasons for this effect are discussed.