Testing the factor structure of the beliefs about language learning inventory

This preliminary study examined the factor structure of the Beliefs About Language Learning Inventory in two samples of about 750 college students of English as a foreign language in Taiwan. Results of confirmatory factor analysis lend partial support to Horwitz's theoretical five-factor belief model. Subsequent exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of data show that a four-factor model represented by only 12 items performed better than other models both theoretically and empirically. This model consists of two dimensions already theorized in the inventory: Difficulty of Language Learning and Foreign Language Aptitude, and two newly interpreted dimensions, Importance of Spoken Language and Analytical Approaches to Language Learning. Although this four-factor model could be replicated in an independent sample, the factors are not reliable, suggesting the need to search for a more representative set of beliefs to tap specific aspects of language learning.     

Teaching cognates in isolation and context: a practical note on Montelongo, et al. (2009)

The use of cognates in teaching word identification and vocabulary meaning is an underused resource in the teaching of English-language learners, especially for learners whose language is similar to English, e.g., Spanish. A recent study by Montelongo, Hernandez, Herter, and Hernandez reported that the effect of initial consonants was strong for recognizing words in isolation. In addition, they pointed out that cognates containing suffixes identical between English and Spanish were more quickly recognized than cognates containing similar but not identical suffixes. Further, they stated teachers would do well to take these differences into account when employing a cognate strategy with their Latino English-language learners. The purpose of this response is to discuss how different types of cognates and their various meanings may be examined by educators and students when employing cognates as a strategy in learning English.     

Moore’s Paradox is not just another pragmatic paradox

One version of Moore’s Paradox is the challenge to account for the absurdity of beliefs purportedly expressed by someone who asserts sentences of the form ‘p & I do not believe that p’ (‘Moorean sentences’). The absurdity of these beliefs is philosophically puzzling, given that Moorean sentences (i) are contingent and often true; and (ii) express contents that are unproblematic when presented in the third-person. In this paper I critically examine the most popular proposed solution to these two puzzles, according to which Moorean beliefs are absurd because Moorean sentences are instances of pragmatic paradox; that is to say, the propositions they express are necessarily false-when-believed. My conclusion is that while a Moorean belief is a pragmatic paradox, it is not just another pragmatic paradox, because this diagnosis does not explain all the puzzling features of Moorean beliefs. In particularly, while this analysis is plausible in relation to the puzzle posed by characteristic (i) of Moorean sentences, I argue that it fails to account for (ii). I do so in the course of an attempt to formulate the definition of a pragmatic paradox in more precise formal terms, in order to see whether the definition is satisfied by Moorean sentences, but not by their third-person transpositions. For only an account which can do so could address (ii) adequately. After rejecting a number of attempted formalizations, I arrive at a definition which delivers the right results. The problem with this definition, however, is that it has to be couched in first-person terms, making an essential use of ‘I’. Thus the problem of accounting for first-/third-person asymmetry recurs at a higher order, which shows that the Pragmatic Paradox Resolution fails to identify the source of such asymmetry highlighted by Moore’s Paradox.     

Design-Based Guidelines for the Semantic Perception of Emergency Signs

The current study applies semantic differential to explore the semantic perception of emergency signs, in an attempt to analyze the meanings of emergency signs in regard to the psychological exigencies of the general public. The results indicate that problems concerning recognition accuracy have been observed, but also that the evaluation of the semantic meaning of the signs is positive. However, a number of emotional factors also emerge, indicating that if improvements should be made to the existing emergency signs, it would better facilitate evacuation in the event of an emergency. As for the design guidelines, the emergency signs should be readily recognizable and have a single meaning. Multiple symbolic meanings should be eliminated. Concrete design guidelines include: (a) safety movement, (b) clarity, and (c) safety. To avoid confusion in sign recognition, in addition to the improvements made based on the abovementioned guidelines, educational promotional activities carried out by the government would also prove very beneficial.     

ETHICAL BLIND-SPOTS: WHY SOCRATES WAS NOT A COSMOPOLITAN

Though Socrates can easily look like a cosmopolitan in moral and political theory, a closer reading of the relevant texts shows that, in the most important sense of the term as we now use it, he turns out – disappointingly, perhaps – not to be. The reasons why not are instructive and important, both for readers of Plato and for political theorists; they have to do with the phenomenon that I shall call ethical blind-spots .     

Comparing two perceived characteristics of autobiographical memory: Memory detail and accessibility

Four samples of participants recalled autobiographical memories. While some evidence emerged from regression analyses suggesting that judgements of the amount of detail contained in each memory and judgements of the ease with which events could be recalled were partially independent, the analyses generally showed that these judgements were similarly predicted by various event characteristics (age, typicality, self-importance, emotional intensity at event occurrence, rehearsal types). Co-occurrence frequency data yielded similar conclusions, showing that while ease ratings and detail ratings occasionally diverged, they were more often consistent with each other. Finally, the data also suggested that events that prompted emotional ambivalence were not judged to be more easily recalled, or to contain more detail, than non-ambivalent events.     

Influence of recollection and plausibility on age-related deficits in associative memory

Age-related declines in associative memory are proposed to result from deficits in older adults’ ability to recollect the past. The present experiment investigated the ability of older adults to compensate for deficits in recollecting the past by using plausibility. Participants studied a list of word pairs that shared category or rhyme relations. To measure the processes used during the recognition memory test, participants provided self-reported explanations for their memory judgements. Older adults relied primarily on plausibility, and the younger adults relied on both plausibility and recollection. Older adults experienced both positive and negative consequences as a result of using a knowledge-based strategy to compensate for their decreased ability to recollect the past. Specifically, they were just as capable as younger adults at recognising previously studied items and correctly rejecting distractors that were inconsistent with the rule provided at study. However, they falsely recognised distractors that were consistent with that rule more often than younger adults.     

The effects of local and global processing orientation on eyewitness identification performance

Recent work has demonstrated that performance on a simultaneous target-present photographic line-up can be enhanced by prior global processing orientation, and hindered by prior local processing orientation induced by processing Navon letter stimuli. A series of studies explore the generality of this processing bias effect using either videotaped scenarios or live interactions. Five experiments demonstrate that these effects are seen across a range of test stimuli, test formats, and test instructions. These data inform the processes engaged in by witnesses when making line-up identifications and indicate that it may be possible to improve the accuracy of witnesses making such judgements.     

Investigating the Role of Instructional Focus in Incidental Pattern Learning

The authors used a novel dual-component training procedure that combined a serial reaction time task and an artificial grammar learning task to investigate the role of instructional focus in incidental pattern learning. In Experiment 1, participants either memorized letter strings as a primary task and reacted to the stimuli locations as a secondary task or vice versa. In Experiment 2, participants were given the same dual-component stimuli but performed only one of the two training tasks. Instructional focus affected the amount of learning and the likelihood of acquiring explicit knowledge of the underlying pattern. However, the effect of instructional focus varied for the different types of stimuli. These results are discussed in terms of the role of focused attention in incidental learning.     

A Measuring Device for the Galvanic Reflex

Twenty words were scaled according to their reinforcing value. Ss rated the words according to whether they would like or dislike to have a respected person say the word after S performed a task. A frequency table was compiled which indicated the number of times each word was chosen. Items in the frequency table with a high numerical value were denoted as liked and positive; items with a low numerical value were denoted as disliked and negative. One each of the positive, negative, and neutral reinforcers was used in a verbal conditioning experiment. After “I-We” sentences, Ss—depending upon the group to which they were assigned—were given orally one of the three reinforcing words by the E. The positive reinforcer produced a rapid progressive increase in the rate of responding; the negative reinforcer, a successive decreasing rate of responding; the neutral reinforcer produced at first an increasing rate of responding, then a decreasing reinforcing characteristic. Comparison of the initial set of I-We sentences revealed that conditioning did occur in the direction the numerical values indicated.