Toward a social psychophysiology of vagally mediated heart rate variability: Concepts and methods in self‐regulation,emotion, and interpersonal processes

Theory and research on self‐regulation, emotional adjustment, and interpersonal processes focus increasingly on parasympathetic functioning, using measures of vagally mediated heart rate variability (vmHRV) or respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA). This review describes models of vmHRV in these areas, and issues in measurement and analysis. We propose a framework organizing theory and research as examining (a) vmHRV as an individual difference or a situational response, and (b) resting, reactive, or recovery levels. Evidence supports interpretation of individual differences in resting vmHRV as a broad biomarker for adaptive functioning, but its specificity and underlying mechanisms require elaboration. Individual differences in vagal reactivity (i.e., trait‐like differences in vmHRV decreases during challenge or stress) are less commonly studied in adults and results are mixed. Many stressors and challenges evoke temporary decreases in vmHRV, and in some research self‐regulatory effort evokes increases. In a smaller literature, positive interpersonal experiences and some restorative processes increase resting vmHRV, whereas depletion of self‐regulatory capacity through related effort decreases it. Greater attention to conceptual distinctions regarding vmHRV constructs and several methodological issues will strengthen future research. Importantly, researchers should exercise caution in equating vmHRV with specific psychosocial constructs, especially in the absence of converging assessments and precise experimental manipulations.     

The Knowledge Argument and Objectivity

In this paper I argue that Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument is better considered not as an argument against physicalism, but as an argument that objective theories must be incomplete. I argue that despite the apparent diversity of responses to the knowledge argument, they all boil down to a response according to which genuine epistemic gains are made when an individual has an experience. I call this the acquaintance response. I then argue that this response violates an intuitive stricture on the objectivity of theories. Therefore, the knowledge argument does show that objective theories cannot provide a complete understanding of the world. The result, however, is that both objective dualism and objective physicalism are refuted by the argument. In the end it is suggested that the notion of “subjective physicalism” is one that should be pursued.     

How Wittgenstein Defeated Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment

In 1913 Wittgenstein raised an objection to Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment that eventually led Russell to abandon his theory. As he put it in the Tractatus, the objection was that “the correct explanation of the form of the proposition, ‘A makes the judgement p’, must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell’s theory does not satisfy this requirement,” (5.5422). This objection has been widely interpreted to concern type restrictions on the constituents of judgment. I argue that this interpretation is mistaken and that Wittgenstein’s objection is in fact a form of the problem of the unity of the proposition.     

THE USE OF REBT PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES IN LEADERSHIP TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

Training, coaching, and consulting with people in leadership roles can be a primary consulting function for clinicians. In this paper, the authors describe their model of leadership, and what they believe to be the central personality or character components of leadership necessary for producing extraordinary results. Throughout they will show where and how REBT skills can make a significant contribution.     

Explication Defended

How can formal methods be applied to philosophical problems that involve informal concepts of ordinary language? Carnap answered this question by describing a methodology that he called “explication." Strawson objected that explication changes the subject and does not address the original philosophical problem; this paper shows that Carnap’s response to that objection was inadequate and offers a better response. More recent criticisms of explication by Boniolo and Eagle are shown to rest on misunderstandings of the nature of explication. It is concluded that explication is an appropriate methodology for formal philosophy.     

Cracking the mirror: on Kierkegaard’s concerns about friendship

In this article, I offer a brief account of some of Kierkegaard’s key concerns about friendship: its “preferential” nature and its being a form of self-love. Kierkegaard’s endorsement of the ancient idea of the friend as “second self” involves a common but misguided assumption: that friendship depends largely upon likeness between friends. This focus obscures a vitally important element, highlighted by the so-called “drawing” view of friendship. Once this is emphasized, we can see a significant aspect - though by no means all - of Kierkegaard’s worry as misplaced. However, the “drawing” view also enables us to begin to see what a “Kierkegaardian” friendship might look like.     

“Primary Relations” In a New Foundational Axiomatic Framework

The new system of axioms we propose is based on the foundational theory of De Giorgi et al. Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Preprints di Matematica 26: 1 (1996) slightly modified. In that paper (which is dedicated to a new axiomatic framework for mathematics, informatics and logic) the authors use two kinds of primitive notions: relations and qualities. Since their system is based on the distribution paradigm, they start from distinction. We propose to shift the perspective and to start from unity and then from within unity to pass to distinction; to this end we apply ideas of Lesniewski, Nijhoff International Philosophy Series 44 (1992). We introduce only one kind of entity as a primitive notion, namely relations, and treat qualities as articulations of relations. The new concept of “primary relation” permits the introduction of a dynamic, non-standard form of identity, which we hope will find application in various fields where self-referential structures are required.