Cognitive approaches to posttraumatic stress disorder: the evolution of multirepresentational theorizing

The evolution of multirepresentational cognitive theorizing in psychopathology is illustrated by detailed discussion and analysis of a number of prototypical models of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Network and schema theories, which focus on a single, explicit aspect/format of mental representation, are compared with theories that focus on 2 or more explicit representational elements. The author argues that the latter theories provide a more complete account of PTSD data, though are not without their problems. Specifically, it is proposed that at least 3 separate representational elements-associative networks, verbal/propositional representations, and schemas-are required to generate a comprehensive cognitive theory of PTSD. The argument that the development of multirepresentational cognitive theory in PTSD is a paradigm case for the development of similar theories in other forms of psychopathology is elaborated, and a brief agenda is proposed promoting 2 levels of theorizing-deep, formal theory alongside more localized, applied theory.     

Bottom-up and top-down control in visual search

Previous research suggests that the allocation of attention is largely controlled either in a stimulus-driven or in a goal-driven manner. To date, few studies have systematically manipulated variables affecting stimulus-driven and goal-driven selection independently in order to investigate how both manners of control interrelate and affect performance in visual search. In the present study observers were presented with search displays consisting of an array of line segments rotated at various orientations. The task of observers was to indicate the presence or absence of a vertical line segment (the target) presented amongst a series of nontargets and possibly one distractor. By varying the absolute differences in orientation between the target, nontargets, and distractors, relative target-distractor salience and target-distractor similarity were independently manipulated to investigate the contribution of stimulus-driven and goal-driven control. The major result was that relative target-distractor salience and target-distractor similarity affected search performance independently. Performance was better in cases where the irrelevant distractor was not a salient item in the search display and did not look similar to the target. The results are discussed in terms of models of attentional control.     

Core mechanisms in "theory of mind"

Our ability to understand the thoughts and feelings of other people does not initially develop as a theory but as a mechanism. The "theory of mind" mechanism (ToMM) is part of the core architecture of the human brain, and is specialized for learning about mental states. Impaired development of this mechanism can have drastic effects on social learning, seen most strikingly in the autistic spectrum disorders. ToMM kick-starts belief-desire attribution but effective reasoning about belief contents depends on a process of selection by inhibition. This selection process (SP) develops slowly through the preschool period and well beyond. By modeling the ToMM-SP as mechanisms of selective attention, we have uncovered new empirical phenomena. We propose that early "theory of mind" is a modular-heuristic process of domain-specific learning.     

Negative self-imagery in social anxiety contaminates social interactions

Patients with social phobia report experiencing negative images of themselves performing poorly when in feared social situations. The present study investigates whether such negative self-imagery (based on memory of past social situations) contaminates social interactions. High socially anxious volunteers participated in two conversations with another volunteer (conversational partner). During one conversation, the socially anxious volunteers held in mind a negative self-image, and during the other they held in mind a less negative (control) self-image. As predicted, when holding the negative image the socially anxious volunteers felt more anxious, reported using more safety behaviours, believed that they performed more poorly, and showed greater overestimation of how poorly they came across (relative to ratings by the conversational partner). Conversational partners rated the socially anxious volunteers' performance as poorer in the negative image condition. Furthermore, the conversation was contaminated since both groups of participants rated its quality as poorer in the negative image condition.     

Cultivating expertise in informal reasoning.

People generally develop some degree of competence in general informal reasoning and argument skills, but how do they go beyond this to attain higher expertise? Ericsson has proposed that high-level expertise in a variety of domains is cultivated through a specific type of practice, referred to as "deliberate practice." Applying this framework yields the empirical hypothesis that high-level expertise in informal reasoning is the outcome of extensive, deliberate practice. This paper reports results from two studies evaluating the hypothesis. University student participants completed 12 weeks of deliberate practice in informal reasoning. Quantity of practice was recorded by computer, and additionally assessed via self-report. The hypothesis was supported: Students in both studies showed a large improvement, and practice, as measured by computer, was related to amount of improvement in informal reasoning. These findings support adopting a deliberate practice approach when attempting to teach or learn expertise in informal reasoning.     

Switching between spatial stimulus-response mappings: a developmental study of cognitive flexibility

Four different age groups (8-9-year-olds, 11-12-year-olds, 13-15-year-olds and young adults) performed a spatial rule-switch task in which the sorting rule had to be detected on the basis of feedback or on the basis of switch cues. Performance errors were examined on the basis of a recently introduced method of error scoring for the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST; Barcelo & Knight, 2002). This method allowed us to differentiate between errors due to failure-to-maintain-set (distraction errors) and errors due to failure-to-switch-set (perseverative errors). The anticipated age differences in performance errors were most pronounced for perseverative errors between 8-9 years and 11-12 years, but for distraction errors adult levels were not reached until 13-15 years. These findings were interpreted to support the notion that set switching and set maintenance follow distinct developmental trajectories.     

Gender and culture differences in emotion

In this article, the authors report a secondary analysis on a cross-cultural dataset on gender differences in 6 emotions, collected in 37 countries all over the world. The aim was to test the universality of the gender-specific pattern found in studies with Western respondents, namely that men report more powerful emotions (e.g., anger), whereas women report more powerless emotions (e.g., sadness, fear). The authors expected the strength of these gender differences to depend on women's status and roles in their respective countries, as operationalized by the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM; United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report 2002). Overall, the gender-specific pattern of women reporting to experience and express more powerless emotions and men more powerful emotions was replicated, and only some interactions with the GEM were found.     

Work group diversity and group performance: an integrative model and research agenda

Research on the relationship between work group diversity and performance has yielded inconsistent results. To address this problem, the authors propose the categorization-elaboration model (CEM), which reconceptualizes and integrates information/decision making and social categorization perspectives on work-group diversity and performance. The CEM incorporates mediator and moderator variables that typically have been ignored in diversity research and incorporates the view that information/decision making and social categorization processes interact such that intergroup biases flowing from social categorization disrupt the elaboration (in-depth processing) of task-relevant information and perspectives. In addition, the authors propose that attempts to link the positive and negative effects of diversity to specific types of diversity should be abandoned in favor of the assumption that all dimensions of diversity may have positive as well as negative effects. The ways in which these propositions may set the agenda for future research in diversity are discussed.