A Cross-Cultural Look at Assessment Center Practices: Survey Results from Western Europe and North America

No recent survey documents assessment center (AC) practices across several countries. Therefore, we analyse AC practices in a sample of 97 organisations from nine countries in Western Europe and North America. We report findings regarding job analysis, dimensions, exercises, additional diagnostic methods, use of technology, assessor characteristics, contents and methods of assessor training, observational systems, information provided to participants, evaluation of participants' reactions, data integration, characteristics of feedback, and features after the AC. Finally, we compare our results with prior findings to identify trends over time and point out features of ACs that could be improved.
Face aux défis que soulèvent les centres d'évaluation (AC) dans les organisations internationales, nous proposons un modèle qui rend compte des variations transculturelles dans ces pratiques, variations relevant de données individuelles (la motivation et la qualification des experts en resources humaines), de conditions culturelles (le « contrôle de l'incertitude >> et la « distance hiérarchique >>) et de réalités institutionnelles (des differences dans le niveau officiel de collectivisme et des divergences en ce qui concerne les normes légales et les lois régissant l'emploi). Ce modèle est exploité pour expliquer les différences dans la planification, l'exécution et l'évaluation des AC dans des organisations situées dans neuf pays d'Europe de l'ouest et d'Amérique du nord. Nous mettons aussi en evidence des tendances sur le long terme dans les pratiques des AC et discutons de l'amélioration de ces pratiques et de l'orientation des futures recherches dans ce domaine.     

Challenging “Early Competence”: a process oriented analysis of children's classifying

In some circumstances, children of 5 produce identical classifications to 10 year olds when asked to sort a collection of objects. This has been interpreted as meaning that the process of constructing classifications is very similar at 5 and 10 years. But this conclusion rests on a comparison of the product of children's sortings, rather than on a study of their activity in producing sortings. The present paper argues that the process of classifying is in fact very different for 5 and 10 year olds: whereas the older children treat the whole classification as a single unit composed of interrelated classes, the younger children proceed as though each class were independent of the others. At around 7 years, there is evidence for a transitional phase, in which children directly work on the relations between classes and so organize their initially “juxtaposed” procedures into more coherent systems. The tendency to work on the relations between elements in the process of classifying is not, however, simply an age-related phenomenon: evidence for a similar effect can be observed in children throughout the age range of 5 to 10 years, during the course of short experimental sessions. Furthermore, the effect is not merely a response to errors or difficulties: the tendency to work on classifying relations can be seen in 5-year-old children in a task in which they are already successful. It seems that children spontaneously discover and use information about their procedures and the relations between them. This process is an end in itself. It occurs whether or not its results yield more successful performance. The approach taken in this paper is not confined to one area of behavior. This analysis of children's classifying fits closely with work in a very different domain, i.e. Karmiloff-Smith's work on children's language and other representational systems. The analysis has implications for computer models of skill acquisition, as well as for psychological theories of development.     

Young Children's Theory of Mind and Emotion

Abstract

In three experiments, children aged 3 to 7 years were tested for their understanding of the impact of beliefs and desires on emotion. Children watched while animal characters were offered various types of container and then predicted their emotional reaction. In Experiment 1, the children (but not the characters) knew that the desirable contents of each container had been removed. The majority of 6-year-olds and a minority of 4-year-olds understood that the characters would be happy with the gift, given their mistaken belief about its contents. In Experiment 2, characters were given containers apparently containing an object they wanted but really containing an object they did not want, or vice versa. Predictions of emotion based on both the desire and the mistaken belief of the characters increased with age. In Experiment 3, characters were given closed containers that might or might not contain an item they wanted. Both 3-and 5-year-olds grasped that the characters' emotional reaction would depend on both their (unconfirmed) beliefs and desires about its content.

The experiments show that preschool children deploy a theory-like conception of mind in predicting emotional reactions. They understand that the emotional impact of a situation depends not on its objective features but on the beliefs and desires that are brought to it.     

An Investigation of the Contact Hypothesis of the Own-race Bias in Face Recognition

Although previous studies have demonstrated that faces of one's own race are recognized more accurately than are faces of other races, the theoretical basis of this effect is not clearly understood at present. The experiment reported in this paper tested the contact hypothesis of the own-race bias in face recognition using a cross-cultural design. Four groups of subjects were tested for their recognition of distinctive and typical own-race and other-race faces: (1) black Africans who had a high degree of contact with white faces, (2) black Africans who had little or no contact with white faces, (3) white Africans who had a high degree of contact with black faces, and (4) white Britons who had little contact with black faces. The results showed that although on the whole subjects recognized own-race faces more accurately and more confidently than they recognized other-race faces, the own-race bias in face recognition was significantly smaller among the high-contact subjects than it was among the low-contact subjects. Also, although high-contact black and white subjects showed significant main effects of distinctiveness in their recognition of faces of both races, low-contact black and white subjects showed significant main effects of distinctiveness only in their recognition of own-race faces. It is argued that these results support the contact hypothesis of the own-race bias in face recognition and Valentine's multidimensional space (MDS) framework of face encoding.