FROM ANGELS TO ALIENS: HUMANKIND'S ONGOING ENCOUNTERS WITH,AND EVOLVING INTERPRETATIONS OF, THE GENUINE CELESTIAL UNKNOWN

Throughout history, people have observed aerial events that appeared extraordinary and anomalous. In earlier eras, these were often interpreted through a lens that invoked special classes of divine beings, such as angels (who, compared with gods, are regarded as more likely to interact with humans). Today, in our ostensibly secular scientific age, there is a tendency to assume such observers were mistaken, and that with the benefit of modern knowledge, these events can be “debunked” and attributed to conventional naturalistic explanations. However, recent years have seen a burgeoning interest and even concern over the issue of unidentified aerial phenomena. Through the lens of our “space age,” these are sometimes interpreted using notions such as extraterrestrial agents. Ultimately though, this article suggests that both categories of explanation, from angels to aliens, may be the perennial human quest to render comprehensible, through the prism of prevailing beliefs and traditions, an ongoing encounter with celestial phenomena that remain genuinely unknown but deeply significant.     

Interpretation of ambiguous emotional information in clinically anxious children and adolescents

Cognitive theories of anxiety based on adult data predict that individuals vulnerable to anxiety should show threat - related interpretations of ambiguous material and it is proposed that this is an important maintaining factor in anxiety disorders. In the present study, interpretation of ambiguous emotional/neutral information was examined in child and adolescent anxious patients. Two groups of participants, anxious patients (n = 17) and healthy controls (n = 40), were presented with a series of homographs, each with a threatening and a neutral interpretation. For each homograph, the participants were asked to construct a sentence using the homograph. Anxious children and adolescents produced significantly more sentences consistent with threatening homograph interpretations and less consistent with neutral interpretations than did normal controls. Regression analyses revealed no relationship between age and this interpretive bias. Preliminary developmental and theoretical implications are discussed.     

The Validation of a Five-Item Screening Scale for Personality Disorders in Dutch-Speaking Community Adolescents and Adults

In Section III of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – fifth edition (DSM-5), an Alternative Model for Personality Disorders (AMPD) is proposed, including a criterion for personality functioning impairment (Criterion A) to assess severity of personality pathology. The present study examined the structure, reliability, and convergent validity of the Dutch version of a five-item screening scale for Criterion A—the Five-Item Screening Scale for Personality Disorders (FISSPD; Skodol et al., in Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment, 2, 4-22, 2011)—in a community sample of 1,477 adolescents and 546 adults. To assess convergent validity, identity and personality (pathology) questionnaires were completed by adolescents and adults. Confirmatory factor analysis yielded a single factor structure for the FISSPD, which proved to be (partially) invariant across age and gender. Adequate reliability coefficients were obtained for the FISSPD. In both the adolescent and adult sample, significant correlations were found between the FISSPD and consolidated identity (negative) and disturbed identity/lack of identity (positive). In the adult sample, the FISSPD showed significant correlations with several personality disorders (and especially with the borderline personality disorder), maladaptive personality traits (Criterion B of the AMPD), and general personality impairment. In the adolescent sample, the FISSPD was positively correlated with borderline personality disorder characteristics. Furthermore, significant correlations were found with the Big-Five personality traits in the adolescent sample: the FISSPD correlated significantly positive with neuroticism, and negative with extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. In sum, the present study supports the reliability and validity of the FISSPD to screen for (severity of) personality pathology.

     

Orientation of attention to nonconsciously recognised famous faces

The nonconscious orientation of attention to famous faces was investigated using masked 17 ms stimulus exposure. Each trial presented a simultaneous pair of one famous and one unfamiliar face, matched on physical characteristics, one each in left visual field (LVF) and right visual field (RVF). These were followed by a dot probe in either LVF or RVF to which participants made a speeded two-alternative forced-choice discrimination response. Participants subsequently evaluated the affective valence (good/evil) of the famous persons on a 7-point scale. Higher accuracy of dot probe discrimination in the same visual field (VF) as the famous face suggested that attention was oriented towards faces of persons evaluated “good”, but a reverse orientation effect was observed for those evaluated “evil”. The awareness check presented the same face pairs under the same conditions, and participants were at chance in a task of selecting the famous face in each pair. The results suggest that famous faces can be identified without awareness, and that attention is attracted by the faces of famous persons not regarded as “evil”.     

Putting the Burden of Proof in Its Place: When Are Differential Allocations Legitimate?

It is widely assumed that legitimate differential allocations of the burden of proof are ubiquitous: that in all cases in which opposing views are being debated, one side has the responsibility of proving their claim and if they fail, the opposing view wins by default. We argue that the cases in which one party has the burden of proof are exceptions. In general, participants in reasoned discourse are all required to provide reasons for the claims they make. We distinguish between truth‐directed and non‐truth‐directed discourse, argue that the paradigm contexts in which there are legitimate differential allocations of the burden of proof (law and formal debate) are non‐truth‐directed, and suggest that in truth‐directed contexts, except in certain special cases, differential allocation of the burden of proof is not warranted.