Mobilizing cause supporters through group‐based interaction

Collective action expresses group‐based identities, formed by supporters seeking to further particular social causes. While the development of groups linked to action necessitates interaction among supporters, little research has examined how these groups form. Utilizing responses of supporters who participated in 1 of 29 action‐planning sessions, this research presents an initial attempt to identify the ingredients important to this process. It shows that to the extent that the actions agreed on in the course of group interactions were seen as capable of making a difference (action efficacy), and worthy of public expression (action voice), supporters’ group‐based identification was enhanced. This in turn increased their willingness to engage in collective action. Practical implications and avenues for future research to understand the mobilization process are discussed.     

Eyes on the Prize? Evidence of Diminishing Attention to Experienced and Foregone Outcomes in Repeated Experiential Choice

Recently, there has been increased interest in decisions‐from‐experience (where decision makers learn from observing the outcomes of previous choices), which provide valuable insights into the learning and preference construction processes underlying many daily decisions. Several process models have been developed to capture these processes, and while such models often fit the data well, many assume that the decision maker is a vigilant observer, processing each outcome. In two studies, we provide a critical test of this assumption using eye tracking to record directed visual attention when participants choose repeatedly among two options, each time being shown the outcome for their chosen option and for the foregone option. Consistently, we find that the vigilance assumption is not supported, with decision makers often not attending to outcome information. Moreover, (in)attention to outcomes is predictable, with vigilance decreasing as more choices are made, and being greater for obtained than for foregone outcomes, and when options deliver only gains as opposed to losses or a mixture of gains and losses. Furthermore, we find that this variation in attentional allocation plays a central role in the apparent indecisiveness (inconsistency) in choice, with increased attention to foregone outcomes predicting switches to that option on the next choice. Together, these findings highlight the value of eye tracking in investigations of decisions‐from‐experience, providing novel insight into the cognitive processes underlying them. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Convergence of Virtual Reality and Social Networks: Threats to Privacy and Autonomy

The rapid evolution of information, communication and entertainment technologies will transform the lives of citizens and ultimately transform society. This paper focuses on ethical issues associated with the likely convergence of virtual realities (VR) and social networks (SNs), hereafter VRSNs. We examine a scenario in which a significant segment of the world’s population has a presence in a VRSN. Given the pace of technological development and the popularity of these new forms of social interaction, this scenario is plausible. However, it brings with it ethical problems. Two central ethical issues are addressed: those of privacy and those of autonomy. VRSNs pose threats to both privacy and autonomy. The threats to privacy can be broadly categorized as threats to informational privacy, threats to physical privacy, and threats to associational privacy. Each of these threats is further subdivided. The threats to autonomy can be broadly categorized as threats to freedom, to knowledge and to authenticity. Again, these three threats are divided into subcategories. Having categorized the main threats posed by VRSNs, a number of recommendations are provided so that policy-makers, developers, and users can make the best possible use of VRSNs.     

In Defense of Sensitivity

The sensitivity condition on knowledge says that one knows that P only if one would not believe that P if P were false. Difficulties for this condition are now well documented. Keith DeRose has recently suggested a revised sensitivity condition that is designed to avoid some of these difficulties. We argue, however, that there are decisive objections to DeRose’s revised condition. Yet rather than simply abandoning his proposed condition, we uncover a rationale for its adoption, a rationale which suggests a further revision that avoids our objections as well as others. The payoff is considerable: along the way to our revision, we learn lessons about the epistemic significance of certain explanatory relations, about how we ought to envisage epistemic closure principles, and about the epistemic significance of methods of belief formation.     

Interindividual‐intergroup discontinuity as a joint function of acting as a group and interacting with a group

An experiment assessed the prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) choices of a set of three persons who interacted with another supposed set of three persons. There were four conditions: (1) group‐on‐group (both three‐person sets constrained by a majority vote), (2) group‐on‐one (only own three‐person set constrained by a majority vote), (3) one‐on‐group (only other three‐person set constrained by a majority vote), (4) one‐on‐one (neither three‐person set constrained by a majority vote). The four conditions were compared with three orthogonal contrasts. Consistent with the assumption that interindividual interactions are less competitive than interactions involving groups, the first contrast indicated that there were fewer competitive choices in the one‐on‐one condition than in the other three conditions pooled. Consistent with the assumption that competitiveness can flow either from acting as a group or interacting with a group, the second contrast found no significant difference between the group‐on‐one and one‐on‐group conditions. Finally, consistent with the assumption that the interindividual‐intergroup discontinuity effect is a joint function of acting as a group and interacting with a group, the third contrast revealed that there were more competitive choices in the group‐on‐group condition than in the one‐on‐group and group‐on‐one conditions pooled. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reduced specificity of autobiographical memory and depression: the role of executive control

It has been widely established that depressed mood states and clinical depression, as well as a range of other psychiatric disorders, are associated with a relative difficulty in accessing specific autobiographical information in response to emotion-related cue words on an Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; J. M. G. Williams & K. Broadbent, 1986). In 8 studies the authors examined the extent to which this relationship is a function of impaired executive control associated with these mood states and clinical disorders. Studies 1-4 demonstrated that performance on the AMT is associated with performance on measures of executive control, independent of depressed mood. Furthermore, Study 1 showed that executive control (as measured by verbal fluency) mediated the relationship between both depressed mood and a clinical diagnosis of eating disorder and AMT performance. Using a stratified sample in Study 5, the authors confirmed the positive association between depressed mood and impaired performance on the AMT. Studies 6-8 involved experimental manipulations of the parameters of the AMT designed to further indicate that reduced executive control is to a significant extent driving the relationship between depressed mood and AMT performance. The potential role of executive control in accounting for other aspects of the AMT literature is discussed.     

The categorical structure of knowledge for famous people (and a novel application of Centre-Surround theory)

Knowledge of familiar people is essential to guide social interaction, yet there is uncertainty about whether semantic knowledge for people is stored in a categorical structure as for objects. Four priming experiments using hard-to-perceive primes investigated whether occupation forms a category connecting famous persons in semantic memory. Primes were famous faces exposed for 17ms with masking, resulting in severely restricted awareness and thus precluding expectancy-based priming effects. Targets were consciously perceptible famous faces (Experiments 1-3), famous names (Experiment 3), or occupations (Experiment 4) representing either the same or different occupation to the prime. Significant priming demonstrated the operation of automatic processes, including spreading activation, among persons sharing a common occupation; this supports the categorical view. The direction of priming (faster/slower responses to same-occupation than different-occupation targets) was dependent on prime-target stimulus onset asynchrony (Experiments 1-3) and type of target (Experiment 4). This pattern of results is attributed to the Centre-Surround mechanism proposed by Carr and Dagenbach [Carr, T. H., & Dagenbach, D. (1990). Semantic priming and repetition priming from masked words: evidence for a centre-surround attentional mechanism in perceptual recognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 16, 341-350]. These results support (a) the categorical structure of semantic knowledge for famous people and (b) the application of the Centre-Surround mechanism to the domain of person recognition.