The I of the storm-relations between self and conscious emotion experience: comment on Lambie and Marcel (2002)

J. A. Lambie and A. J. Marcel (2002) outlined a framework for understanding varieties of conscious emotion experience. In their analysis, the self plays an important role in conscious emotion experience. In this critique, however, the authors propose that Lambie and Marcel's presentation of the self needs further specification if it is to account for varieties of conflicted emotional experience, particularly those characteristic of dissociative states. The authors propose that a more elaborated self-construct is necessary to account for these phenomena involving either the "splitting off of significant self-related concerns or the existence of multiple self-constructs. These arguments are illustrated by clinical and subclinical case examples.     

Differentiating location- and distance-based processes in memory for time: An ERP study

Memory for the time of events may benefit from reconstructive, location-based, and distance-based processes, but these processes are difficult to dissociate with behavioral methods. Neuropsychological research has emphasized the contribution of prefrontal brain mechanisms to memory for time but has not clearly differentiated location- from distance-based processing. The present experiment recorded event-related brain potentials (ERPs) while subjects completed two different temporal memory tests, designed to emphasize either location- or distance-based processing. The subjects’ reports of locationbased versus distance-based strategies and the reaction time pattern validated our experimental manipulation. Late (800–1,800 msec) frontal ERP effects were related to location-based processing. The results provide support for a two-process theory of memory for time and suggest that frontal memory mechanisms are specifically related to reconstructive, location-based processing.     

Constraints on Analogical Mapping: A Comparison of Three Models

Three theories of analogy have been proposed that are supported by computational models and data from experiments on human analogical abilities. In this article we show how these theories can be unified within a common metatheoretical framework that distinguishes among levels of informational, behavioral, and hardware constraints. This framework clarifies the distinctions among three computational models in the literature: the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine (ACME), the Structure-Mapping Engine (SME), and the Incremental Analogy Machine (IAM). We then go on to develop a methodology for the comparative testing of these models. In two different manipulations of an analogical mapping task we compare the results of computational experiments with these models against the results of psychological experiments. In the first experiment we show that increasing the number of similar elements in two analogical domains decreases the response time taken to reach the correct mapping for an analogy problem. In the second psychological experiment we find that the order in which the elements of the two domains are presented has significant facilitative effects on the ease of analogical mapping. Of the three models, only IAM embodies behavioral constraints and predicts both of these results. Finally, the immediate implications of these results for analogy research are discussed, along with the wider implications the research has for cognitive science methodology.     

Face Naming in Dementia: A Reply to Hodges and Greene (1998)

A case study by Brennen, David, Fluchaire, and Pellat (1996) reported the case of a patient who could occasionally name celebrities with very low concurrent levels of semantic access, which is difficult to reconcile with current models of face identification. Hodges and Greene (1998) attribute Brennen et al.'s case study to artifactual explanations and provide new data, which, they claim, is evidence against the theory of naming without semantics. This reply demonstrates that Hodges and Greene's arguments are unconvincing and that aspects of Hodges and Greene's data in fact provide support for Brennen et al.'s conclusions. It is also argued that in cases of dementia direct naming has been reported for other stimuli domains as well.     

Recognizing Unfamiliar Faces: The Effects of Distinctiveness and View

Three experiments are reported in which the effects of viewpoint on the recognition of distinctive and typical faces were explored. Specifically, we investigated whether generalization across views would be better for distinctive faces than for typical faces. In Experiment 1 the time to match different views of the same typical faces and the same distinctive faces was dependent on the difference between the views shown. In contrast, the accuracy and latency of correct responses on trials in which two different faces were presented were independent of viewpoint if the faces were distinctive but were view-dependent if the faces were typical. In Experiment 2 we tested participants'recognition memory for unfamiliar faces that had been studied at a single three-quarter view. Participants were presented with all face views during test. Finally, in Experiment 3, participants were tested on their recognition of unfamiliar faces that had been studied at all views. In both Experiments 2 and 3 we found an effect of distinctiveness and viewpoint but no interaction between these factors. The results are discussed in terms of a model of face representation based on inter-item similarity in which the representations are view specific.     

The Adjustment Process of Ex-Buddhist Monks to Life After the Monastery

This study explores the adjustment process of five Western ex-Buddhist monks to life after the monastery, using an in depth case study approach and thematic analysis. Participants discussed their initial experience of leaving, the process of creating a new life and their relationship with the past. The findings indicated that while each case was unique, significant common themes emerged as features of the adjustment process. The adjustment had been multi-dimensional, challenging, difficult, confusing, complex and profound for the participants. They had to contend with issues of grief, delayed development, missing out on life experiences, difficulties with intimacy, money, identity, depression, anxiety and confusion. This was combined with the hope and promise of many newly found freedoms involved in establishing a new life and identity. Parallels are drawn to the experience of Catholic priests and nuns who have departed their Orders, Vietnam veterans, ex-cult members and individuals who have left total institutions where their identity and daily lives were highly prescribed. The adjustment experience of ex-Buddhist monks extends the literature on Buddhist monks and provides an example of a life transition of interest to the helping professions because of its potential relevance to a range of major transitions for which clients may seek assistance. Tim Mapel is a lecturer in the Bachelor of Applied Social Sciences degree at the Eastern Institute of Technology in New Zealand. He has a Master’s degree in counseling and works with individuals, couples and groups. He has a passion for the practice of mindfulness and for facilitating a sense of aliveness in people’s lives. He is an advanced Psychodrama trainee and spent 12 years living as an ordained Buddhist monk. Originally from Boston, USA he has lived in the UK, Switzerland, and now considers New Zealand home.     

Levels of specificity of autobiographical memories and of biographical memories of the deceased in bereaved individuals with and without complicated grief

Traumatized individuals experiencing posttraumatic stress have difficulty retrieving specific autobiographical memories to cue words on the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; J. M. G. Williams & K. Broadbent, 1986). This may represent a generalized, functional avoidance of the personal past. However, such individuals also often report specific intrusive memories of their trauma in the day-to-day. This raises the possibility that memories tied to the source of the person's distress are immune to this putative avoidance process. This was investigated in bereaved individuals with complicated grief (CG) who reported intrusive, specific memories from the life of their deceased loved one, and matched bereaved controls without CG. Participants performed the AMT and two Biographical Memory Tests (BMTs), cueing memories from the life of the deceased (BMT-Deceased) and from a living significant other (BMT-Living). To negative word cues, the CG group showed reduced specificity for the AMT and BMT-Living, relative to controls, but this effect was reversed on the BMT-Deceased. These data support the proposal that memories tied to the source of an individual's distress are immune to the processes that underlie the standard reduced specificity effect.     

A recurrent connectionist model of group biases

Major biases and stereotypes in group judgments are reviewed and modeled from a recurrent connectionist perspective. These biases are in the areas of group impression formation (illusory correlation), group differentiation (accentuation), stereotype change (dispersed vs. concentrated distribution of inconsistent information), and group homogeneity. All these phenomena are illustrated with well-known experiments, and simulated with an autoassociative network architecture with linear activation update and delta learning algorithm for adjusting the connection weights. All the biases were successfully reproduced in the simulations. The discussion centers on how the particular simulation specifications compare with other models of group biases and how they may be used to develop novel hypotheses for testing the connectionist modeling approach and, more generally, for improving theorizing in the field of social biases and stereotype change.