Orientation of attention to nonconsciously recognised famous faces

The nonconscious orientation of attention to famous faces was investigated using masked 17 ms stimulus exposure. Each trial presented a simultaneous pair of one famous and one unfamiliar face, matched on physical characteristics, one each in left visual field (LVF) and right visual field (RVF). These were followed by a dot probe in either LVF or RVF to which participants made a speeded two-alternative forced-choice discrimination response. Participants subsequently evaluated the affective valence (good/evil) of the famous persons on a 7-point scale. Higher accuracy of dot probe discrimination in the same visual field (VF) as the famous face suggested that attention was oriented towards faces of persons evaluated “good”, but a reverse orientation effect was observed for those evaluated “evil”. The awareness check presented the same face pairs under the same conditions, and participants were at chance in a task of selecting the famous face in each pair. The results suggest that famous faces can be identified without awareness, and that attention is attracted by the faces of famous persons not regarded as “evil”.     

Face Naming in Dementia: A Reply to Hodges and Greene (1998)

A case study by Brennen, David, Fluchaire, and Pellat (1996) reported the case of a patient who could occasionally name celebrities with very low concurrent levels of semantic access, which is difficult to reconcile with current models of face identification. Hodges and Greene (1998) attribute Brennen et al.'s case study to artifactual explanations and provide new data, which, they claim, is evidence against the "theory of naming without semantics". This reply demonstrates that Hodges and Greene's arguments are unconvincing and that aspects of Hodges and Greene's data in fact provide support for Brennen et al.'s conclusions. It is also argued that in cases of dementia direct naming has been reported for other stimuli domains as well.     

Putting the Burden of Proof in Its Place: When Are Differential Allocations Legitimate?

It is widely assumed that legitimate differential allocations of the burden of proof are ubiquitous: that in all cases in which opposing views are being debated, one side has the responsibility of proving their claim and if they fail, the opposing view wins by default. We argue that the cases in which one party has the burden of proof are exceptions. In general, participants in reasoned discourse are all required to provide reasons for the claims they make. We distinguish between truth‐directed and non‐truth‐directed discourse, argue that the paradigm contexts in which there are legitimate differential allocations of the burden of proof (law and formal debate) are non‐truth‐directed, and suggest that in truth‐directed contexts, except in certain special cases, differential allocation of the burden of proof is not warranted.     

The Effects of the Family Bereavement Program to Reduce Suicide Ideation and/or Attempts of Parentally Bereaved Children Six and Fifteen Years Later

Findings concerning the long‐term effects of the Family Bereavement Program (FBP) to reduce suicide ideation and/or attempts of parentally bereaved children and adolescents are presented. Parental death is a significant risk factor for suicide among offspring (Guldin et al., 2015). This study is a long‐term follow‐up of 244 children and adolescents who had participated in a randomized trial of the FBP, examining the intervention effects on suicide ideation and/or attempts as assessed through multiple sources. Results indicate a significant effect of the FBP to reduce suicide ideation and/or attempts at the 6‐ and 15‐year follow‐up evaluation. The findings support the potential benefits of further research on “upstream” suicide prevention.     

Naming Faces: The Effects of Facial Distinctiveness and Surname Frequency

The effects of the frequency of a surname in the population and of the distinctiveness of a face on the latency to name famous faces were explored. Distinctive faces were named more quickly than were typical faces. Celebrities with low-frequency surnames were named faster than celebrities with high-frequency surnames, but only if their faces were distinctive. Subsequent experiments showed that the effect of surname frequency could not be attributed to differences in the articulatory onsets of the surnames and was not present in a task that did not require a naming response. Experiments in which surnames were taught to previously unfamiliar faces showed that familiar surnames (e.g. the surnames of celebrities) were produced more rapidly than were unfamiliar surnames. If familiar surnames were taught, no effect of surname frequency was observed. It is concluded that lexical access to peoples' names is frequency sensitive—surnames shared by few individuals are accessed faster than are high-frequency surnames. However, when learning names to unfamiliar faces, familiar surnames (i.e. the surnames of people already known to the subject) are learned and accessed more quickly than unfamiliar surnames.