Immunity to functional fixedness in young children

In thecandle problem (Duncker, 1945), subjects must attach a candle to a vertical surface, using only a box of tacks and a book of matches. Subjects exhibitfunctional fixedness by failing, or being slow, to make use of one object (the tack box) as a support, rather than as a container, in their solutions. This failure to produce alternate functions is measured against improved performance when the tack box is presented empty rather than full of tacks (i.e., not preutilized as a container). Using an analogous task, we show that functional fixedness can be demonstrated in older children (6- and 7-year-olds); they are significantly slower to use a box as a support when its containment function has been demonstrated than when it has not. However, younger children (5-year-olds) are immune to this effect, showing no advantage when the standard function is not demonstrated. Moreover, their performance under conditions of preutilization is better than that of both older groups. These results are interpreted in terms of children’s developing intuitions about function and the effects of past experience on problem solving.     

The structure of goal contents across 15 cultures

The authors investigated the structure of goal contents in a group of 1,854 undergraduates from 15 cultures around the world. Results suggested that the 11 types of goals the authors assessed were consistently organized in a circumplex fashion across the 15 cultures. The circumplex was well described by positioning 2 primary dimensions underlying the goals: intrinsic (e.g., self-acceptance, affiliation) versus extrinsic (e.g., financial success, image) and self-transcendent (e.g., spirituality) versus physical (e.g., hedonism). The circumplex model of goal contents was also quite similar in both wealthier and poorer nations, although there were some slight cross-cultural variations. The relevance of these results for several theories of motivation and personality are discussed.     

The training and transfer of real-world perceptual expertise

A hallmark of perceptual expertise is that experts classify objects at a more specific, subordinate level of abstraction than novices. To what extent does subordinate-level learning contribute to the transfer of perceptual expertise to novel exemplars and novel categories? In this study, participants learned to classify 10 varieties of wading birds and 10 varieties of owls at either the subordinate, species (e.g., "great blue crown heron,"eastern screech owl") or the family ("wading bird,"owl") level of abstraction. During training, the amount of visual exposure was equated such that participants received an equal number of learning trials for wading birds and owls. Pre- and posttraining performance was measured in a same/different discrimination task in which participants judged whether pairs of bird stimuli belonged to the same or different species. Participants trained in species-level discrimination demonstrated greater transfer to novel exemplars and novel species categories than participants trained in family-level discrimination. These findings suggest that perceptual categorization, not perceptual exposure per se, is important for the development and generalization of visual expertise.     

Is developing scientific thinking all about learning to control variables?

Academically low-performing urban sixth graders engaged in inquiry activity received a suggestion that they focus their investigation on the role of a single factor. This suggestion had significant effects on their use of a superficially dissimilar strategy--controlling the variation of other factors. This latter strategy has received the lion's share of attention in research on the development of scientific reasoning. These results have implications, we propose, for what undergoes development with respect to scientific thinking and how this development can best be facilitated.     

Functional fixedness in a technologically sparse culture

Problem solving can be inefficient when the solution requires subjects to generate an atypical function for an object and the object's typical function has been primed. Subjects become "fixed" on the design function of the object, and problem solving suffers relative to control conditions in which the object's function is not demonstrated. In the current study, such functional fixedness was demonstrated in a sample of adolescents (mean age of 16 years) among the Shuar of Ecuadorian Amazonia, whose technologically sparse culture provides limited access to large numbers of artifacts with highly specialized functions. This result suggests that design function may universally be the core property of artifact concepts in human semantic memory.     

Strength of visual percept generated by famous faces perceived without awareness: effects of affective valence, response latency, and visual field

Participants who were unable to detect familiarity from masked 17 ms faces (Stone and Valentine, 2004 and Stone and Valentine, in press-b) did report a vague, partial visual percept. Two experiments investigated the relative strength of the visual percept generated by famous and unfamiliar faces, using masked 17 ms exposure. Each trial presented simultaneously a famous and an unfamiliar face, one face in LVF and the other in RVF. In one task, participants responded according to which of the faces generated the stronger visual percept, and in the other task, they attempted an explicit familiarity decision. The relative strength of the visual percept of the famous face compared to the unfamiliar face was moderated by response latency and participants' attitude towards the famous person. There was also an interaction of visual field with response latency, suggesting that the right hemisphere can generate a visual percept differentiating famous from unfamiliar faces more rapidly than the left hemisphere. Participants were at chance in the explicit familiarity decision, confirming the absence of awareness of facial familiarity.     

A laboratory school comparison of mixed amphetamine salts extended release (Adderall XR) and atomoxetine (Strattera) in school-aged children with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder

Mixed amphetamine salts extended release (MAS XR; Adderall XR) and atomoxetine (Strattera) were compared in children 6 to 12 years old with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) combined or hyperactive/impulsive type in a randomized, double-blind, multicenter, parallel-group, forced-dose-escalation laboratory school study. Primary efficacy measure was the SKAMP (Swanson, Kotkin, Agler, M-Flynn, and Pelham) behavioral rating scale. Changes in mean SKAMP deportment scores from baseline were significantly greater for MAS XR (n = 102) than for atomoxetine (n = 101) overall (-0.56 and -0.13, respectively; p < .0001) and at each week (p < .001). Adverse events were similar for both treatment groups. The extended time course of action and greater therapeutic efficacy of MAS XR suggests that it is more effective than atomoxetine in children with ADHD.     

The wagon-wheel illusion in continuous light

The fact that a perceptual experience akin to the familiar wagon-wheel illusion in movies and on TV can occur in the absence of stroboscopic presentation is intriguing because of its relevance to visuo-temporal parsing. The wagon-wheel effect in continuous light has also been the source of considerable misunderstanding and dispute, as is apparent in a series of recent papers. Here we review this potentially confusing evidence and suggest how it should be interpreted.     

Are there interactions among dysfunctional beliefs in obsessive compulsive disorder?

Contemporary cognitive models of obsessive-compulsive disorder emphasize the importance of various types of dysfunctional beliefs, such as beliefs about inflated responsibility, perfectionism and the importance of controlling one's thoughts. These beliefs have been conceptualized as main effects, each influencing obsessive-compulsive symptoms independent of the contributions of other beliefs. It is not known whether beliefs interact with one another in their influence on obsessive-compulsive symptoms. To investigate this issue, data from 248 obsessive-compulsive disorder patients were analyzed. Dependent variables were the factor scores on the 4 Padua Inventory subscales. Predictor variables were the factor scores from the 3 factors (inflated responsibility, perfectionism and controlling one's thoughts) of the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire and their 2- and 3-way interactions. Regression analyses revealed significant main effects; in almost all analyses one or more of inflated responsibility, perfectionism, and controlling one's thoughts factors predicted scores on the Padua factors even after controlling for general distress. There was no evidence that beliefs interact in their effects on obsessive-compulsive symptoms, thereby providing a relatively unusual instance in which a simpler explanation (main effects only) is just as powerful as a more complex model.