"It's magic!" The effects of presentation modality on children's event memory, suggestibility, and confidence judgments

The current study investigated the influence of presentation modality (live, video, and slide show) on children's memory, suggestibility, recognition, and metamemorial monitoring processes. A total of 270 children in three age groups (5- and 6-year-olds, 7- and 8-year-olds, and 9- and 10-year-olds) watched a magic show and were questioned about it 1 week later. The live show yielded more correct answers to nonleading questions, higher resistance to misleading questions, and better recognition memory than did the video condition, which in turn resulted in better performance than did the slide show. Although presentation modality raised the general level of memory performance, the effects were equally strong in all age groups and did not affect memory phenomena such as the size of the misinformation effect and confidence judgments.     

The roles of inducer size and distance in the Ebbinghaus illusion (Titchener circles)

Although the Ebbinghaus illusion is commonly used as an example of a simple size-contrast effect, previous studies have emphasised its complexity by identifying many factors that potentially influence the magnitude of the illusion. Here, in a series of three experiments, we attempt to simplify this complexity. In each trial, subjects saw a display comprising, on one side, a target stimulus surrounded by inducers and, on the other, an isolated probe stimulus. Their task was to indicate whether the probe appeared larger or smaller than the target. Probe size was adjusted with a one-up, one-down staircase procedure to find the point of subjective equality between probe and target. From these experiments, we argue that the apparent effects of inducer size are often confounded by the relative completeness of the inducing surround and that factors such as the similarity of the inducers and target are secondary. We suggest a simple model that can explain most of the data in terms of just two primary and independent factors: the relative size of the inducers and target, and the distance between the inducers and the target. The balance between these two factors determines whether the size of the target is underestimated or overestimated.     

Accuracy of familiarity decisions to famous faces perceived without awareness depends on attitude to the target person and on response latency

Stone and Valentine (2004) presented masked 17 ms faces in simultaneous pairs of one famous and one unfamiliar face. Accuracy in selecting the famous face was higher when the famous person was regarded as "good" or liked than when regarded as "evil" or disliked. Experiment 1 attempted to replicate this phenomenon, but produced a different pattern of results. Experiment 2 investigated alternative explanations and found evidence supporting only the effect of response latency: responses made soon after stimulus onset were more accurate to liked than to disliked faces, whereas responses made after a longer delay were equally accurate to disliked faces. It appears that the effect of negative valence was corrected within the space of a few hundred milliseconds. Experiment 3, using an affective priming paradigm, supported the concept that an early-arising effect of valence is corrected if it is misleading to the directed task.     

The categorical structure of semantic memory for famous people: a new approach using release from proactive interference

Memory for familiar people is essential to understand their identity and guide social interaction. Nevertheless, we know surprisingly little about the structure of such memory. Previous research has assumed that semantic memory for people has a categorical structure, but recently it was proposed that memory for people consists only of associations and lacks any categorical structure. Four experiments are reported that use a novel approach by adapting the 'release from proactive interference' (RPI) methodology for use with lists of famous names. Proactive interference occurs when items presented on successive trials are drawn from the same category. Recall can improve following a change to a different category. Sets of names were selected relating to aspects previously demonstrated, on the basis of reaction time data, to form a category (occupation) and a property (nationality) of celebrities (Johnston & Bruce, 1990). RPI was observed for a change at both levels of representation but was only present without explicitly cueing the change of set when the stimuli differed at the category level. At the property level, RPI was only evident when change of set was explicitly cued. RPI was absent at the set change in a novel, ad hoc distinction suggesting that the effect reflected the underlying memory structure.     

Why are average faces attractive? The effect of view and averageness on the attractiveness of female faces

Images of faces manipulated to make their shapes closer to the average are perceived as more attractive. The influences of symmetry and averageness are often confounded in studies based on full-face views of faces. Two experiments are reported that compared the effect of manipulating the averageness of female faces in profile and full-face views. Use of a profile view allows a face to be ”morphed“ toward an average shape without creating an image that becomes more symmetrical. Faces morphed toward the average were perceived as more attractive in both views, but the effect was significantly stronger for full-face views. Both full-face and profile views morphed away from the average shape were perceived as less attractive. It is concluded that the effect of averageness is independent of any effect of symmetry on the perceived attractiveness of female faces.     

Better the devil you know? Nonconscious processing of identity and affect of famous faces

The nonconscious recognition of facial identity was investigated in two experiments featuring brief (17-msec) masked stimulus presentation to prevent conscious recognition. Faces were presented in simultaneous pairs of one famous face and one unfamiliar face, and participants attempted to select the famous face. Subsequently, participants rated the famous persons as ”good“ or ”evil“ (Experiment 1) or liked or disliked (Experiment 2). In Experiments 1 and 2, responses were less accurate to faces of persons rated evil/disliked than to faces of persons rated good/liked, and faces of persons rated evil/disliked were selected significantly below chance. Experiment 2 showed the effect in a within-items analysis: A famous face was selected less often by participants who disliked the person than by participants who liked the person, and the former were selected below chance accuracy. The within-items analysis rules out possible confounding factors based on variations in physical characteristics of the stimulus faces and confirms that the effects are due to participants’ attitudes toward the famous persons. The results suggest that facial identity is recognized preconsciously, and that responses may be based on affect rather than familiarity.     

Basic-level visual similarity and category specificity

The role of visual crowding in category deficits has been widely discussed (e.g.,;; ). Most studies have measured overlap at the superordinate level (compare different examples of 'animal') rather than at the basic level (compare different examples of 'dog'). In this study, we therefore derived two measures of basic-level overlap for a range of categories. The first was a computational measure generated by a self-organising neural network trained to process pictures of living and non-living things; the second was a rating of perceived visual similarity generated by human subjects to the item names. The computational measure indicated that the pattern of crowded/uncrowded does not honour a living/non-living distinction. Nevertheless, different superordinates showed varied degrees of basic-level overlap, suggesting that specific token choice affects some superordinates more than others e.g., individual fruit and vegetable tokens show greater variability than any other items, while tools and vehicles produce more reliable or overlapping basic-level visual representations. Finally, subject ratings correlated significantly with the computational measures indicating that the neural model represents structural properties of the objects that are psychologically meaningful.     

Acquiring an understanding of design: evidence from children's insight problem solving

The human ability to make tools and use them to solve problems may not be zoologically unique, but it is certainly extraordinary. Yet little is known about the conceptual machinery that makes humans so competent at making and using tools. Do adults and children have concepts specialized for understanding human-made artifacts? If so, are these concepts deployed in attempts to solve novel problems? Here we present new data, derived from problem-solving experiments, which support the following. (i) The structure of the child's concept of artifact function changes profoundly between ages 5 and 7. At age 5, the child's conceptual machinery defines the function of an artifact as any goal a user might have; by age 7, its function is defined by the artifact's typical or intended use. (ii) This conceptual shift has a striking effect on problem-solving performance, i.e. the child's concept of artifact function appears to be deployed in problem solving. (iii) This effect on problem solving is not caused by differences in the amount of knowledge that children have about the typical use of a particular tool; it is mediated by the structure of the child's artifact concept (which organizes and deploys the child's knowledge). In two studies, children between 5 and 7 years of age were matched for their knowledge of what a particular artifact "is for", and then given a problem that can only be solved if that tool is used for an atypical purpose. All children performed well in a baseline condition. But when they were primed by a demonstration of the artifact's typical function, 5-year-old children solved the problem much faster than 6-7-year-old children. Because all children knew what the tools were for, differences in knowledge alone cannot explain the results. We argue that the older children were slower to solve the problem when the typical function was primed because (i) their artifact concept plays a role in problem solving, and (ii) intended purpose is central to their concept of artifact function, but not to that of the younger children.     

Beyond the group mind: a quantitative review of the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect

This quantitative review of 130 comparisons of interindividual and intergroup interactions in the context of mixed-motive situations reveals that intergroup interactions are generally more competitive than interindividual interactions. The authors identify 4 moderators of this interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect, each based on the theoretical perspective that the discontinuity effect flows from greater fear and greed in intergroup relative to interindividual interactions. Results reveal that each moderator shares a unique association with the magnitude of the discontinuity effect. The discontinuity effect is larger when (a) participants interact with an opponent whose behavior is unconstrained by the experimenter or constrained by the experimenter to be cooperative rather than constrained by the experimenter to be reciprocal, (b) group members make a group decision rather than individual decisions, (c) unconstrained communication between participants is present rather than absent, and (d) conflict of interest is severe rather than mild.