A comparison of prebunking and debunking interventions for implied versus explicit misinformation

Psychological research has offered valuable insights into how to combat misinformation. The studies conducted to date, however, have three limitations. First, pre-emptive (“prebunking”) and retroactive (“debunking”) interventions have mostly been examined in parallel, and thus it is unclear which of these two predominant approaches is more effective. Second, there has been a focus on misinformation that is explicitly false, but implied misinformation that uses literally true information to mislead is common in the real world. Finally, studies have relied mainly on questionnaire measures of reasoning, neglecting behavioural impacts of misinformation and interventions. To offer incremental progress towards addressing these three issues, we conducted an experiment (N = 735) involving misinformation on fair trade. We contrasted the effectiveness of prebunking versus debunking and the impacts of implied versus explicit misinformation, and incorporated novel measures assessing consumer behaviours (i.e., willingness-to-pay; information seeking; online misinformation promotion) in addition to standard questionnaire measures. In general, both prebunking and debunking reduced misinformation reliance. We also found that individuals tended to rely more on explicit than implied misinformation both with and without interventions.     

How does mindfulness-based cognitive therapy work?

Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) is an efficacious psychosocial intervention for recurrent depression ( [Kuyken et?al., 2008], [Ma and Teasdale, 2004] and [Teasdale et?al., 2000]). To date, no compelling research addresses MBCT’s mechanisms of change. This study determines whether MBCT’s treatment effects are mediated by enhancement of mindfulness and self-compassion across treatment, and/or by alterations in post-treatment cognitive reactivity. The study was embedded in a randomized controlled trial comparing MBCT with maintenance antidepressants (mADM) with 15-month follow-up (Kuyken et al., 2008). Mindfulness and self-compassion were assessed before and after MBCT treatment (or at equivalent time points in the mADM group). Post-treatment reactivity was assessed one month after the MBCT group sessions or at the equivalent time point in the mADM group. One hundred and twenty-three patients with ≥3 prior depressive episodes, and successfully treated with antidepressants, were randomized either to mADM or MBCT. The MBCT arm involved participation in MBCT, a group-based psychosocial intervention that teaches mindfulness skills, and discontinuation of ADM. The mADM arm involved maintenance on a therapeutic ADM dose for the duration of follow-up. Interviewer-administered outcome measures assessed depressive symptoms and relapse/recurrence across 15-month follow-up. Mindfulness and self-compassion were measured using self-report questionnaire. Cognitive reactivity was operationalized as change in depressive thinking during a laboratory mood induction.MBCT’s effects were mediated by enhancement of mindfulness and self-compassion across treatment. MBCT also changed the nature of the relationship between post-treatment cognitive reactivity and outcome. Greater reactivity predicted worse outcome for mADM participants but this relationship was not evident in the MBCT group.MBCT’s treatment effects are mediated by augmented self-compassion and mindfulness, along with a decoupling of the relationship between reactivity of depressive thinking and poor outcome. This decoupling is associated with the cultivation of self-compassion across treatment.     

Frames of reference in spatial span

In four experiments, a computerized Corsi-like paradigm was used to assess which of the many reference frames are used in visuospatial short-term memory. By varying the relative orientation (slanted +/-45° or in an upright position) of the head and the displays, we modulate the utility of the allocentric, egocentric (eye- and head-centred), and template-centred reference frames. The results of all experiments showed the crucial importance of the gravitational allocentric reference frames while using visuospatial short-term memory to retain a spatial sequence of elements. The results also provide some support for a mental rotation process involved in recognition following angular displacement of a multi-item display.     

Decreased approach motivation in depression

The present study examined relations between choice preference and reaction time to emotionally valenced words, dysphoric symptoms (BDI), and dysfunctional attitudes (DAS) in clinically depressed (CD; n= 61), previously depressed (PD; n= 42), and never depressed controls (ND; n= 46). The results showed: (1) NDs and PDs exhibited a choice preference for the relatively more positive words and differed significantly from CDs; (2) PDs and CDs exhibited longer reaction time and differed significantly from NDs; and (3) BDI and DAS were positively associated with reaction time to positively valenced words, whereas no associations were found for reaction time to negatively valenced words. The increased reaction time, in PDs and CDs, is discussed as a possible vulnerability factor to depression, which may be related to decreased approach motivation.     

Inflated and contradictory category naming deficits in Alzheimer's disease?

Although some studies have documented category-specific deficits in patients with Alzheimer's disease, others have not. One possible reason is that where control groups have been used in previous studies, they have performed at ceiling; and this may spuriously affect the incidence and type of deficit reported (especially with common statistical techniques such as z-scores). We examined this issue in 18 Alzheimer's patients and 26 elderly controls, who named two picture sets: a simple set that typically produces ceiling effects (Set 1) and one that produces a normal distribution in controls (Set 2). Sets 1 and 2 produced inconsistent and even contradictory deficits in the same patients. The results also show that ceiling effects may inflate the number of living thing deficits and hence, distort the reported ratio of living to nonliving cases.     

Psychopathy: what apology making tells us about moral agency

Psychopathy is often used to settle disputes about the nature of moral judgment. The “trolley problem” is a familiar scenario in which psychopathy is used as a test case. Where a convergence in response to the trolley problem is registered between psychopathic subjects and non-psychopathic (normal) subjects, it is assumed that this convergence indicates that the capacity for making moral judgments is unimpaired in psychopathy. This, in turn, is taken to have implications for the dispute between motivation internalists and motivation externalists, for instance. In what follows, we want to do two things: firstly, we set out to question the assumption that convergence is informative of the capacity for moral judgment in psychopathy. Next, we consider a distinct feature of psychopathy which we think provides strong grounds for holding that the capacity for moral judgment is seriously impaired in psychopathic subjects. The feature in question is the psychopathic subject’s inability to make sincere apologies. Our central claim will be this: convergence in response to trolley problems does not tell us very much about the psychopathic subject’s capacity to make moral judgments, but his inability to make sincere apologies does provide us with strong grounds for holding that this capacity is seriously impaired in psychopathy.     

Normative Reasons Contextualism

This article argues for the view that statements about normative reasons are context‐sensitive. Specifically, they are sensitive to a contextual parameter specifying a relevant person's or group's body of information. The argument for normative reasons contextualism starts from the context‐sensitivity of the normative “ought” and the further premise that reasons must be aligned with oughts. It is incoherent, I maintain, to suppose that someone normatively ought to φ but has most reason not to φ. So given that oughts depend on context, a parallel view about normative reasons is needed. It is shown that the resulting view solves notorious puzzles involving apparently conflicting but equally plausible claims about reasons. These puzzles arise especially in cases where agents have limited information or false beliefs. In these cases, we feel torn between reasons claims that take into account the limitations of the agent's perspective and apparently conflicting claims that are made from a more objective point of view. The contextualist account developed here accommodates both objectivist and subjectivist intuitions. It shows that all of the claims in question can be true, provided that they are relativized to different values of the relevant information parameter. Also, contextualism yields a fruitful approach to the debate about having reasons and the alleged failure of the so‐called “factoring account”.     

The Relationship Between Automatic Thoughts and Irrational Beliefs Predicting Anxiety and Depression

Cognitive behavioral approaches differ in their views on core cognitions and their hypothesized role in the etiology of depression and anxiety. The present study provides empirical evidence regarding the relationship between irrational beliefs and components of automatic thoughts and their role in the etiology of depression and anxiety. The present study utilized newer and improved questionnaires to assess components of irrational belief. Based on prior research by Safren et al. (Cogn Ther Res 24(3):327–344, 2000), a three-factor structure of the combined automatic thought questionnaires were utilized to measure components of automatic thoughts as they relate to depression and anxiety. Factor analytical methods were utilized to confirm the factor structure of the irrational beliefs and automatic thoughts components. Advanced path modeling was utilized to model the relationship between irrational beliefs and automatic thoughts in predicting anxiety and depression. The study used a sample of N = 542 undergraduate psychology students during stressful exam times. Results indicated that the irrational belief Demandingness represents a primary factor, followed by the secondary irrational beliefs as proposed by Rational Emotive Behavioral Theory. Selfdowning beliefs were fully mediated by depressive automatic thoughts in the case of depressive affect. Low frustration tolerance contributed unique variance to anxious and depressive affect that was not fully mediated by automatic thoughts. Results from the present study add empirical evidence that irrational beliefs indeed represent core and intermediary beliefs that lead to specific automatic thoughts, which is congruent with cognitive behavioral theory as proposed by Rational Emotive Behavioral Therapy.