Perspectivism as a Way of Knowing in the Zhuangzi

A perspectivist theory is usually taken to mean that (1) our knowledge of the world is inevitably shaped by our particular perspectives, (2) any one of these perspectives is as good as any other, and (3) any claims to objective or authoritative knowledge are consequently without ground. Recent scholarship on Nietzsche, however, has challenged the prevalent view that the philosopher holds (2) and (3), arguing instead that his perspectivism aims at attaining a greater level of objectivity. In this essay, I attempt a structurally similar reinterpretation of Zhuangzi’s perspectivism. I argue that while the Chinese thinker sees all knowledge as perspective-dependent, he thinks that some perspectives are broader and more accurate than others. He utilizes shifts in perspective precisely in order to attain these superior perspectives, which constitute what he calls da zhi 大知, or “greater knowledge.” Whereas Nietzsche sees his perspectivism as methodologically continuous with the sciences, Zhuangzi’s “greater knowledge” has the goal of ensuring our survival and well-being in the everyday world.     

Compositionality: A Connectionist Variation on a Classical Theme

Connectionism has been attacked on the grounds that it does not employ compositionally structured representations (e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). This article develops the response that Connectionist models can, and in fact sometimes do, employ compositionally structured representations without, thereby, simply implementing a Classical “Language of Thought.” Focusing on the mode of combination employed in constructing representations, it distinguishes concatenative compositionality, essential to the Classical approach, from a merely functional counterpart increasingly common in Connectionist research. On the basis of this distinction it is possible to demonstrate that Connectionist representations can be compositional without being Classical, and further, that Fodor and Pylyshyn's supposedly conclusive arguments in favor of the Classical approach do not in fact support that approach over the Connectionist alternative (as opposed to an “ossociotionist” straw man).     

Conditions under which function information attenuates name extension via shape

Children often extend names to novel artifacts on the basis of overall shape rather than core properties (e.g., function). This bias is claimed to reflect the fact that nonrandom structure is a reliable cue to an object having a specific designed function. In this article, we show that information about an object's design (i.e., about its creator's intentions) is neither necessary nor sufficient for children to override the shape bias. Children extend names on the basis of any information specifying the artifact's function (e.g., information about design, current use, or possible use), especially when this information is made salient when candidate objects for extension are introduced. Possible mechanisms via which children come to rely less on easily observable cues (e.g., shape) and more on core properties (e.g., function) are discussed.     

Automatic and effortful processing of self-statements in depression

Clark and Beck (1999) and Williams et al. (1997) have come up with quite different conclusions regarding which cognitive processes are most affected by negative self-schemata and negative knowledge structures. In order to increase the understanding of differences in effortful and automatic processing in depression, we compared never depressed (ND), previously depressed (PD) and clinically depressed (CD) individuals on free recall, recognition and fabrication of positive and negative self-statements. The results showed that: (i) overall NDs and PDs recalled more positive self-statements than CDs, whereas CDs correctly recognized more negative self-statements than NDs and PDs; and (ii) CDs and PDs fabricated more negative than positive self-statements, whereas no difference was obtained for NDs. The results seem to be in line with Clark and Beck's suggestions. However, there are several aspects of the present findings that make the picture more complicated.     

Categorical and dimensional reports of experienced affect to emotion-inducing pictures in depression

Self-reported affect to positive and negative emotional pictures was contrasted in people with major depressive disorder (MDD) and never-depressed control participants (n = 25 in each group). The results revealed significant differences in response to positive images (reduced arousal, less pleasant valence, decreased happiness, increased sadness) in MDD but no clear group differences in response to negative stimuli. Extending earlier findings of reduced responsiveness to positive, but not negative, stimuli in MDD (D. M. Sloan, M. E. Strauss, S. W. Quirk, & M. Satajovik, 1997; D. M. Sloan, M. E. Strauss, & K. L. Wisner, 2001), the data indicate that blunted response to positive stimuli is found when both categorical and dimensional ratings are elicited. Further, the data replicate earlier findings of elevated sadness reports to positive stimuli (J. Rottenberg, K. L. Kasch, J. J. Gross, & I. H. Gotlib, 2002), which may reflect broader difficulties in regulating emotions in MDD.     

"It's magic!" The effects of presentation modality on children's event memory, suggestibility, and confidence judgments

The current study investigated the influence of presentation modality (live, video, and slide show) on children's memory, suggestibility, recognition, and metamemorial monitoring processes. A total of 270 children in three age groups (5- and 6-year-olds, 7- and 8-year-olds, and 9- and 10-year-olds) watched a magic show and were questioned about it 1 week later. The live show yielded more correct answers to nonleading questions, higher resistance to misleading questions, and better recognition memory than did the video condition, which in turn resulted in better performance than did the slide show. Although presentation modality raised the general level of memory performance, the effects were equally strong in all age groups and did not affect memory phenomena such as the size of the misinformation effect and confidence judgments.     

The roles of inducer size and distance in the Ebbinghaus illusion (Titchener circles)

Although the Ebbinghaus illusion is commonly used as an example of a simple size-contrast effect, previous studies have emphasised its complexity by identifying many factors that potentially influence the magnitude of the illusion. Here, in a series of three experiments, we attempt to simplify this complexity. In each trial, subjects saw a display comprising, on one side, a target stimulus surrounded by inducers and, on the other, an isolated probe stimulus. Their task was to indicate whether the probe appeared larger or smaller than the target. Probe size was adjusted with a one-up, one-down staircase procedure to find the point of subjective equality between probe and target. From these experiments, we argue that the apparent effects of inducer size are often confounded by the relative completeness of the inducing surround and that factors such as the similarity of the inducers and target are secondary. We suggest a simple model that can explain most of the data in terms of just two primary and independent factors: the relative size of the inducers and target, and the distance between the inducers and the target. The balance between these two factors determines whether the size of the target is underestimated or overestimated.     

Accuracy of familiarity decisions to famous faces perceived without awareness depends on attitude to the target person and on response latency

Stone and Valentine (2004) presented masked 17 ms faces in simultaneous pairs of one famous and one unfamiliar face. Accuracy in selecting the famous face was higher when the famous person was regarded as "good" or liked than when regarded as "evil" or disliked. Experiment 1 attempted to replicate this phenomenon, but produced a different pattern of results. Experiment 2 investigated alternative explanations and found evidence supporting only the effect of response latency: responses made soon after stimulus onset were more accurate to liked than to disliked faces, whereas responses made after a longer delay were equally accurate to disliked faces. It appears that the effect of negative valence was corrected within the space of a few hundred milliseconds. Experiment 3, using an affective priming paradigm, supported the concept that an early-arising effect of valence is corrected if it is misleading to the directed task.     

The categorical structure of semantic memory for famous people: a new approach using release from proactive interference

Memory for familiar people is essential to understand their identity and guide social interaction. Nevertheless, we know surprisingly little about the structure of such memory. Previous research has assumed that semantic memory for people has a categorical structure, but recently it was proposed that memory for people consists only of associations and lacks any categorical structure. Four experiments are reported that use a novel approach by adapting the 'release from proactive interference' (RPI) methodology for use with lists of famous names. Proactive interference occurs when items presented on successive trials are drawn from the same category. Recall can improve following a change to a different category. Sets of names were selected relating to aspects previously demonstrated, on the basis of reaction time data, to form a category (occupation) and a property (nationality) of celebrities (Johnston & Bruce, 1990). RPI was observed for a change at both levels of representation but was only present without explicitly cueing the change of set when the stimuli differed at the category level. At the property level, RPI was only evident when change of set was explicitly cued. RPI was absent at the set change in a novel, ad hoc distinction suggesting that the effect reflected the underlying memory structure.