Coherence shifts in probabilistic inference tasks

The fast‐and‐frugal heuristics approach to probabilistic inference assumes that individuals often employ simple heuristics to integrate cue information that commonly function in a non‐reciprocal fashion. Specifically, the subjective validity of a certain cue remains stable during the application of a heuristic and is not changed by the presence or absence of another cue. The parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) model, in contrast, predicts that information is processed in a reciprocal fashion. Specifically, it assumes that subjective cue validities interactively affect each other and are modified to coherently support the favored choice. Corresponding to the model's simulation, we predicted the direction and the size of such coherence shifts. Cue validities were measured before, after (Experiment 1), and during judgment (Experiments 2 and 3). Coherence shifts were found in environments involving real‐world cue knowledge (weather forecasts) and in a domain for which the application of fast‐and‐frugal heuristics has been demonstrated (city‐size tasks). The results indicate that subjective cue validities are not fixed parameters, but that they are interactively changed to form coherent representations of the task. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ästhetische Produktion als Zugang zum Zeitgefühl traumatisierter Patienten

Starting from Victor Hugo’s “La forme, c’est le fond qui remonte à la surface” I deliberate the question of applying this aesthetic principle to the individually varying experience of time. As an example of realization in the area of the arts, the work “The Clock” by the American Christian Marklay is evoked and its playful treatment of time retraced. Taking the five features mentioned in Ulrike Kadi?s article, in particular the disruption of the sequence of the narrative, disappearance of the subject and a production close to psychosis into account, I illustrate using clinical examples how conscious and unconscious aspects of time surface in the form of clinical symptoms that seek realization. The willingness to decipher these symptoms by way of resonance in an incremental, sometimes protracted process, places psychoanalytical understanding of the symptoms in tense contrast to a rapidly categorizing direct access to medical manuals.     

Autobiographical reasoning: arguing and narrating from a biographical perspective

Autobiographical reasoning is the activity of creating relations between different parts of one's past, present, and future life and one's personality and development. It embeds personal memories in a culturally, temporally, causally, and thematically coherent life story. Prototypical autobiographical arguments are presented. Culture and socializing interactions shape the development of autobiographical reasoning especially in late childhood and adolescence. Situated at the intersection of cognitive and narrative development and autobiographical memory, autobiographical reasoning contributes to the development of personality and identity, is instrumental in efforts to cope with life events, and helps to create a shared history.     

Understanding conjunction effects in probability judgments: the role of implicit mental models

Subjective probability judgments often violate a normative principle in that the conjunction of two events is judged to be more likely than the probability of either of the two events occurring separately. Most previous explanations of these conjunction effects have assumed that probability judgments depend on some psychological relation (e.g. representativeness) between the constituents mentioned explicitly in the stimulus information. In contrast, the present approach highlights the fundamental role of implicitly inferred information. Participants are assumed to transform the explicit stimulus information into implicit mental models in their attempt to make sense of the experimental task. Probability judgments should then reflect the degree of activation of such a mental model in memory given a set of propositions, rather than the quantitative fit or likelihood of the propositions themselves. Two studies are reported which provide converging evidence for the proposed mental model approach. In the first study, using graded conjunctions of one to five propositions, probability judgments are shown to vary as a function of the activation of a mental model rather than the likelihood of the component events. In a second study, a priming procedure is employed to activate mental models that either fit an event conjunction or do not, leading to an increase or decrease of conjunction effects in probability judgment. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.