Retrieval from semantic memory during a night without sleep

It has been demonstrated that retrieval performance from semantic memory varies during the day. Specifically, the retrieval of low- relative to high-dominance category members is slower in the morning compared to later in the day. It has been suggested that the effect is related to a circadian arousal rhythm, which steadily rises during the day and rapidly declines at night. This study examines retrieval from semantic memory during the night. Sixteen subjects performed a semantic classification task once every hour throughout one night without sleep. Classification latencies became progressively slower, and the time taken to retrieve low- relative to high-dominance category members increased from midnight to 4 a.m. The trend reversed between 4 and 7 a.m. The pattern of results closely parallels the hypothesised circadian arousal rhythm. It is suggested that the variation in retrieval performance as a function of time of day may be related to fluctuations in a circadian arousal rhythm.     

Kierkegaard's Social Theory

Despite recent attention on the social implications of his work, little has been done to articulate a substantive Kierkegaardian social theory. In this paper, I argue that Kierkegaard's A Literary Review describes four principles of social analysis. Together they reveal the social character of Kierkegaard's thought while presenting significant challenges for more traditional ‘social readings’ of his work.     

The association between auditory memory span and speech rate in children from kindergarten to sixth grade.

This study reexamined the association between speech rate and memory span in children from kindergarten to sixth grade (N = 152) in order to potentially account for the inconsistencies within the published literature on this topic. Some of the inconsistencies in past research may reflect the different methods adopted in assessing speech rate. In particular, repeating word triples may itself involve memory demands, contaminating the correlation between speech rate and memory span in younger children. Analyses using composite speech rate and memory span measures showed that speech rate for word triples shared variance with memory span that was independent of speech rate for single words. Moreover, speech rate for word triples was largely redundant with age in explaining additional variation in memory span once the effects of speech rate for single words were controlled.     

Accounting for the ‘tragedy’ in the Prisoner's Dilemma

The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) exhibits a ‘tragedy’ in this sense: if the players are fully informed and rational, they are condemned to a jointly dispreferred outcome. In this essay I address the following question: What feature of the PD's payoff structure is necessary and sufficient to produce the tragedy? In answering it I use the notion of a “trembling-hand equilibrium”. In the final section I discuss an implication of my argument, an implication which bears on the persistence of the problem posed by the PD.     

Wollaston's Early Critics

Some of the most forceful objections to William Wollaston's moral theory come from his early critics, namely, Thomas Bott (1688–1754), Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746), and John Clarke of Hull (1687–1734). These objections are little known, while the inferior objections of Hume, Bentham, and later prominent critics are familiar. This fact is regrettable. For instance, it impedes a robust understanding of eighteenth-century British ethics; also, it fosters a questionable view as to why Wollaston's theory, although at first well received, soon faded in esteem among philosophers. This paper gives Wollaston's early critics some of the attention they deserve. It reconstructs some of their objections to Wollaston's philosophy, addresses replies to those objections, and shows that despite some minor flaws, the objections succeed. A fact that becomes clear is that Wollaston's philosophy had suffered devastating criticism years before Hume wrote anything against it.     

Reasons,rational requirements,and the putative pseudo-question “Why be moral?”

In this paper, I challenge a well-known argument for the view that “Why be moral?” is a pseudo-question. I do so by refuting a component of that argument, a component that is not only crucial to the argument but important in its own right. That component concerns the status of moral reasons in replies to “Why be moral?”; consequently, this paper concerns reasons and rationality no less than it concerns morality. The work I devote to those topics shows not only that the argument I address is unsound, but that the conclusion of that argument is false. “Why be moral?” is no pseudo-question.     

Secularization and Aging in Britain: Does Family Formation Cause Greater Religiosity?

Using data from the British Election Studies and the British Household Panel Study, this research note examines how family formation factors, such as marriage and childrearing, affect church attendance in Britain. Debates in the United States have centered on how, first, apparent aging effects could be due to family formation or be evidence for cohort differences, and, second, how family formation effects are sex specific. This research note shows that sex-specific effects are also present in Britain, but more importantly that family formation alone cannot begin to account for differences between age groups in church attendance. Evidence presented here suggests that generational differences are actually responsible for both age disparities and the large declines over time in church attendance in Britain.     

Justifying Reasons, Motivating Reasons, and Agent Relativism in Ethics

According to agent relativism, each person's moral requirements are relative to her desires or interests. That is, whether a person morally ought to depends on what interests or desires she has. Some philosophers charge that the main argument for agent relativism trades on an ambiguity –specifically, an ambiguity in ``reason,' ``reasonfor action,' or a kindred term. This charge has been common, and widely thought to damage the case for agent relativism, since its appearance, in 1958, in a now classic paper by William Frankena. In what follows I examine the charge in detail, showing that insofar as it aims to discredit the argument for agent relativism, it fails in its purpose.