Relations between 18-month-olds’ gaze pattern and target action performance: A deferred imitation study with eye tracking

Deferred imitation studies are used to assess infants’ declarative memory performance. These studies have found that deferred imitation performance improves with age, which is usually attributed to advancing memory capabilities. Imitation studies, however, are also used to assess infants’ action understanding. In this second research program it has been observed that infants around the age of one year imitate selectively, i.e., they imitate certain kinds of target actions and omit others. In contrast to this, two-year-olds usually imitate the model's exact actions. 18-month-olds imitate more exactly than one-year-olds, but more selectively than two-year-olds, a fact which makes this age group especially interesting, since the processes underlying selective vs. exact imitation are largely debated. The question, for example, if selective attention to certain kinds of target actions accounts for preferential imitation of these actions in young infants is still open. Additionally, relations between memory capabilities and selective imitation processes, as well as their role in shaping 18-month-olds’ neither completely selective, nor completely exact imitation have not been thoroughly investigated yet. The present study, therefore, assessed 18-month-olds’ gaze toward two types of actions (functional vs. arbitrary target actions) and the model's face during target action demonstration, as well as infants’ deferred imitation performance. Although infants’ fixation times to functional target actions were not longer than to arbitrary target actions, they imitated the functional target actions more frequently than the arbitrary ones. This suggests that selective imitation does not rely on selective gaze toward functional target actions during the demonstration phase. In addition, a post hoc analysis of interindividual differences suggested that infants’ attention to the model's social-communicative cues might play an important role in exact imitation, meaning the imitation of both functional and arbitrary target actions.     

The Seller's Sense: Buying–Selling Perspective Affects the Sensitivity to Expected Value Differences

Previous work comparing pricing decisions by buyers and sellers has primarily focused on the endowment effect, the phenomenon that selling prices exceed buying prices. Here, we examine whether pricing decisions by buyers and sellers also vary in sensitivity to differences between objects' expected values (EVs). Both a loss‐aversion account (which posits that losses are weighted more heavily than gains) and a loss‐attention account (which posits increased attention to a task when it involves possible losses) predict that pricing decisions by sellers should exhibit higher sensitivity. The latter, however, additionally predicts that this pattern should only emerge under certain conditions. In studies 1 and 2, we reanalyzed two published datasets in which participants priced monetary lotteries as sellers or buyers. It emerged that sellers showed greater EV sensitivity (defined as the rank correlation between the set price for each lottery and its EV) except in a condition with an extended deliberation time of 15 seconds. In study 3, the buyer–seller difference in EV sensitivity was replicated even when the pricing task was presented repeatedly, while in study 4, it was eliminated when buying and selling trials were randomly mixed. The reduction of the “seller's sense” in long deliberation and mixed trials settings supports an attentional resource‐based account of the differences between sellers and buyers in their EV sensitivity. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Aligning affordances of graphics with learning task requirements

Dynamic subject matter can be portrayed to learners in the form of either static or dynamic depictions. Two plausible bases for choosing a depiction format are alignment with the subject matter's dynamics, or the specific affordances a depiction provides for performing a particular learning output task. Experimental participants viewed an ordered set of eight images depicting key stages of a kangaroo hop presented in a dynamic, successive or simultaneous format. Control participants viewed no presentation. The output task required participants to rearrange a random sequence of the eight kangaroo images into the correct order of a kangaroo hop. Those who viewed the successive presentation were most successful in placing the images in their correct order while those in the dynamic condition were least successful. The results contradict the prevailing instructional design orthodoxy that the dynamic properties of a depiction should be aligned with the dynamic nature of the referent content. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Individual differences in metacontrast masking: A call for caution when interpreting group data

In this issue of Consciousness and Cognition, Bachmann (2010) comments on our study (Albrecht, Klapötke, & Mattler, 2010), which revealed two groups of observers with qualitative individual differences in metacontrast masking that are enhanced by perceptual learning. We are pleased that our study receives this attention and even more about Bachmann’s extremely positive comments. In this invited reply we argue that observers seem to be similar only at the beginning of the experiment but they have no choice as to which group to join. Findings strongly recommend to look at the data of individual subjects.     

The Future is Bright? Effects of Mood on Perception of the Future

Most people believe that the future will bring them more good things than bad, and therefore have high hopes for the future (MacLeod et al. Cogn Emot 10:69–85, 1996). However, many patients with mood disorders do not hold this positive belief about the future. At the extreme, low expectations of positive outcomes in the future can lead to feelings of hopelessness (O’Connor et al. Psychol Health Med 5:155–161, 2000). This paper aims to extend the literature on subjective probability of future events, using a mood induction paradigm to examine the effects of transient mood change on perceived likelihood of future events in a non-clinical community sample. Participants rated likelihood of future events from a standardized list and from their own lives. Ratings were made in both normal and experimentally-induced positive or negative mood. Results show that self-generated future events were perceived to be more likely than those from a standardized list, and that negative mood significantly biased perceived likelihood of other-generated future events. Participants rating standardized list events saw positive outcomes as less likely and negative outcomes as more likely in induced negative mood than they did in normal mood. Mood had no effect on ratings of self-generated events. Possible directions for future research are discussed.

General or specific? The memory–experience gap for individuals diagnosed with a major depressive disorder or a social phobia diagnosis,and individuals without such diagnoses

ABSTRACT

Psychological treatment and assessment necessarily rely on patients’ recall. Yet several empirical studies have documented a gap between memory and real-life experience (i.e., memory–experience gap; MeG). We investigated and compared the MeG of sadness, social anxiety, happiness, and physical activity for participants diagnosed with a major depressive disorder (MDD), a social phobia (SP), and participants without such diagnoses (CG). The study included 118 participants diagnosed with a MDD, 47 with a SP, and 119 CG. Using event-sampling methods (ESM), participants were asked via smartphone to report their experiences throughout a week and then to recall those again retrospectively at the end of the study week. Results indicate significant differences in the MeG with respect to the experience that was salient to them (e.g., MDD group – sadness; SP group – social anxiety; CG group – happiness). Furthermore, all groups showed a MeG for physical activity and, the results indicate significant group differences in the magnitude of the MeGs.

This study demonstrated the presence of a MeG in individuals in a MDD, SP, and CG group and in positive and negative affective experiences. Differential patterns across the samples contribute to a better understanding of this gap and its implications.     

Defocused attention in depressed mood: evidence from source monitoring

The authors suggest that depressed mood is associated with a defocused mode of attention, allowing irrelevant information to be noticed and processed more than in nondepressed states. Working on a source monitoring task, subclinically depressed college students selected with the Beck Depression Inventory (A. T. Beck, 1967; D. Kammer, 1983) had better memory for irrelevant stimulus aspects than nondepressed control students. However, depressed students' performance on the relevant stimulus aspects was unimpaired. These results are in conflict with a capacity reduction view of depressed mood and support the hypothesized altered, defocused mode, in which attentional resources are more evenly allocated across various aspects of the materials. The results are discussed within the framework of adaptive functions of emotional states.     

Loglinear Rasch models for the analysis of stability and change

Loglinear unidimensional and multidimensional Rasch models are considered for the analysis of repeated observations of polytomous indicators with ordered response categories. Reparameterizations and parameter restrictions are provided which facilitate specification of a variety of hypotheses about latent processes of change. Models of purely quantitative change in latent traits are proposed as well as models including structural change. A conditional likelihood ratio test is presented for the comparison of unidimensional and multiple scales Rasch models. In the context of longitudinal research, this renders possible the statistical test of homogeneity of change against subject-specific change in latent traits. Applications to two empirical data sets illustrate the use of the models.The author is greatly indebted to Ulf Böckenholt, Rolf Langeheine, and several anonymous reviewers for many helpful suggestions.     

On the psychology of the recognition heuristic: retrieval primacy as a key determinant of its use

The recognition heuristic is a prime example of a boundedly rational mind tool that rests on an evolved capacity, recognition, and exploits environmental structures. When originally proposed, it was conjectured that no other probabilistic cue reverses the recognition-based inference (D. G. Goldstein & G. Gigerenzer, 2002). More recent studies challenged this view and gave rise to the argument that recognition enters inferences just like any other probabilistic cue. By linking research on the heuristic with research on recognition memory, the authors argue that the retrieval of recognition information is not tantamount to the retrieval of other probabilistic cues. Specifically, the retrieval of subjective recognition precedes that of an objective probabilistic cue and occurs at little to no cognitive cost. This retrieval primacy gives rise to 2 predictions, both of which have been empirically supported: Inferences in line with the recognition heuristic (a) are made faster than inferences inconsistent with it and (b) are more prevalent under time pressure. Suspension of the heuristic, in contrast, requires additional time, and direct knowledge of the criterion variable, if available, can trigger such suspension.