How Affect Shapes Risky Choice: Distorted Probability Weighting Versus Probability Neglect

People's choices between prospects with relatively affect‐rich outcomes (e.g., medical side effects) can diverge markedly from their choices between prospects with relatively affect‐poor outcomes (e.g., monetary losses). We investigate the cognitive mechanisms underlying this “affect gap” in risky choice. One possibility is that affect‐rich prospects give rise to more distortion in probability weighting. Another is that they lead to the neglect of probabilities. To pit these two possibilities against each other, we fitted cumulative prospect theory (CPT) to the choices of individual participants, separately for choices between options with affect‐rich outcomes (adverse medical side effects) and options with affect‐poor outcomes (monetary losses); additionally, we tested a simple model of probability neglect, the minimax rule. The results indicated a qualitative difference in cognitive mechanisms between the affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems. Specifically, in affect‐poor problems, the large majority of participants were best described by CPT; in affect‐rich problems, the proportion of participants best described by the minimax rule was substantially higher. The affect gap persisted even when affect‐rich outcomes were supplemented by numerical information, thus providing no support for the thesis that choices in affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems diverge because the information provided in the former is nonnumerical. Our findings suggest that the traditional expectation‐based framework for modeling risky decision making may not readily generalize to affect‐rich choices. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Processes and outcomes in prevention-focused time-limited groups for girls

Processes and outcomes in 8-week prevention-focused, school-based groups for preadolescent girls were assessed in a naturalistic study. Specifically, whether such groups would facilitate their social-emotional development and whether affiliative processes in the groups were related to outcome were explored. In addition to expecting the groups to be effective, it was hypothesized that affiliative processes would be directly related to outcome and, more particularly, that increased positive affiliative feelings from the group toward the individual would be more predictive of positive treatment outcome than increased positive feelings from the individual toward the group. While findings did not support these hypotheses linking process to outcome, ancillary analyses revealed that different patterns of affiliation over time (i.e., U-shape pattern versus inverted U-shape pattern) distinguished the high- versus low-outcome participants, respectively.     

Relations between 18-month-olds’ gaze pattern and target action performance: A deferred imitation study with eye tracking

Deferred imitation studies are used to assess infants’ declarative memory performance. These studies have found that deferred imitation performance improves with age, which is usually attributed to advancing memory capabilities. Imitation studies, however, are also used to assess infants’ action understanding. In this second research program it has been observed that infants around the age of one year imitate selectively, i.e., they imitate certain kinds of target actions and omit others. In contrast to this, two-year-olds usually imitate the model's exact actions. 18-month-olds imitate more exactly than one-year-olds, but more selectively than two-year-olds, a fact which makes this age group especially interesting, since the processes underlying selective vs. exact imitation are largely debated. The question, for example, if selective attention to certain kinds of target actions accounts for preferential imitation of these actions in young infants is still open. Additionally, relations between memory capabilities and selective imitation processes, as well as their role in shaping 18-month-olds’ neither completely selective, nor completely exact imitation have not been thoroughly investigated yet. The present study, therefore, assessed 18-month-olds’ gaze toward two types of actions (functional vs. arbitrary target actions) and the model's face during target action demonstration, as well as infants’ deferred imitation performance. Although infants’ fixation times to functional target actions were not longer than to arbitrary target actions, they imitated the functional target actions more frequently than the arbitrary ones. This suggests that selective imitation does not rely on selective gaze toward functional target actions during the demonstration phase. In addition, a post hoc analysis of interindividual differences suggested that infants’ attention to the model's social-communicative cues might play an important role in exact imitation, meaning the imitation of both functional and arbitrary target actions.     

The Seller's Sense: Buying–Selling Perspective Affects the Sensitivity to Expected Value Differences

Previous work comparing pricing decisions by buyers and sellers has primarily focused on the endowment effect, the phenomenon that selling prices exceed buying prices. Here, we examine whether pricing decisions by buyers and sellers also vary in sensitivity to differences between objects' expected values (EVs). Both a loss‐aversion account (which posits that losses are weighted more heavily than gains) and a loss‐attention account (which posits increased attention to a task when it involves possible losses) predict that pricing decisions by sellers should exhibit higher sensitivity. The latter, however, additionally predicts that this pattern should only emerge under certain conditions. In studies 1 and 2, we reanalyzed two published datasets in which participants priced monetary lotteries as sellers or buyers. It emerged that sellers showed greater EV sensitivity (defined as the rank correlation between the set price for each lottery and its EV) except in a condition with an extended deliberation time of 15 seconds. In study 3, the buyer–seller difference in EV sensitivity was replicated even when the pricing task was presented repeatedly, while in study 4, it was eliminated when buying and selling trials were randomly mixed. The reduction of the “seller's sense” in long deliberation and mixed trials settings supports an attentional resource‐based account of the differences between sellers and buyers in their EV sensitivity. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Aligning affordances of graphics with learning task requirements

Dynamic subject matter can be portrayed to learners in the form of either static or dynamic depictions. Two plausible bases for choosing a depiction format are alignment with the subject matter's dynamics, or the specific affordances a depiction provides for performing a particular learning output task. Experimental participants viewed an ordered set of eight images depicting key stages of a kangaroo hop presented in a dynamic, successive or simultaneous format. Control participants viewed no presentation. The output task required participants to rearrange a random sequence of the eight kangaroo images into the correct order of a kangaroo hop. Those who viewed the successive presentation were most successful in placing the images in their correct order while those in the dynamic condition were least successful. The results contradict the prevailing instructional design orthodoxy that the dynamic properties of a depiction should be aligned with the dynamic nature of the referent content. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Individual differences in metacontrast masking: A call for caution when interpreting group data

In this issue of Consciousness and Cognition, Bachmann (2010) comments on our study (Albrecht, Klapötke, & Mattler, 2010), which revealed two groups of observers with qualitative individual differences in metacontrast masking that are enhanced by perceptual learning. We are pleased that our study receives this attention and even more about Bachmann’s extremely positive comments. In this invited reply we argue that observers seem to be similar only at the beginning of the experiment but they have no choice as to which group to join. Findings strongly recommend to look at the data of individual subjects.     

The Future is Bright? Effects of Mood on Perception of the Future

Most people believe that the future will bring them more good things than bad, and therefore have high hopes for the future (MacLeod et al. Cogn Emot 10:69–85, 1996). However, many patients with mood disorders do not hold this positive belief about the future. At the extreme, low expectations of positive outcomes in the future can lead to feelings of hopelessness (O’Connor et al. Psychol Health Med 5:155–161, 2000). This paper aims to extend the literature on subjective probability of future events, using a mood induction paradigm to examine the effects of transient mood change on perceived likelihood of future events in a non-clinical community sample. Participants rated likelihood of future events from a standardized list and from their own lives. Ratings were made in both normal and experimentally-induced positive or negative mood. Results show that self-generated future events were perceived to be more likely than those from a standardized list, and that negative mood significantly biased perceived likelihood of other-generated future events. Participants rating standardized list events saw positive outcomes as less likely and negative outcomes as more likely in induced negative mood than they did in normal mood. Mood had no effect on ratings of self-generated events. Possible directions for future research are discussed.

On the psychology of the recognition heuristic: retrieval primacy as a key determinant of its use

The recognition heuristic is a prime example of a boundedly rational mind tool that rests on an evolved capacity, recognition, and exploits environmental structures. When originally proposed, it was conjectured that no other probabilistic cue reverses the recognition-based inference (D. G. Goldstein & G. Gigerenzer, 2002). More recent studies challenged this view and gave rise to the argument that recognition enters inferences just like any other probabilistic cue. By linking research on the heuristic with research on recognition memory, the authors argue that the retrieval of recognition information is not tantamount to the retrieval of other probabilistic cues. Specifically, the retrieval of subjective recognition precedes that of an objective probabilistic cue and occurs at little to no cognitive cost. This retrieval primacy gives rise to 2 predictions, both of which have been empirically supported: Inferences in line with the recognition heuristic (a) are made faster than inferences inconsistent with it and (b) are more prevalent under time pressure. Suspension of the heuristic, in contrast, requires additional time, and direct knowledge of the criterion variable, if available, can trigger such suspension.     

Neighborhood poverty and public policy: a 5-year follow-up of children's educational outcomes in the New York City moving to opportunity demonstration

Data from the Moving to Opportunity Program, a randomized mobility experiment in which a subset of low-income minority families living in public housing in high-poverty neighborhoods were given vouchers to move to low-poverty neighborhoods, were used to evaluate 1 policy approach for improving children's educational outcomes. Four hundred twenty-five New York City children were seen 2 1/2 and 5 years following relocation (mean age=14.64 years, SD=3.21 years). Analyses examining program effects on 5-year educational outcomes, accounting for 2 1/2-year outcomes, revealed that program effects on adolescent boys' achievement found at 2 1/2 years were not sustained at 5 years. Rather, male and female youths 14-20 years of age in low-poverty neighborhoods reported lower school grades and engagement relative to youths in high-poverty neighborhoods. From a policy standpoint, the complexity of enhancing low-income minority children's educational outcomes is underscored by the multiple dynamics involved--family, neighborhood, housing, and school.