Too good to be true? Psychological responses to uncommon options in risk–reward environments

Risks and rewards, or payoffs and probabilities, are inversely related in many choice environments. We investigated people's psychological responses to uncommon combinations of risk and reward that deviate from learned regularities (e.g., options that offer a high payoff with an unusually high probability) as they evaluated risky options. In two experiments (N = 183), participants first priced monetary gambles drawn from environments in which risks and rewards were negatively correlated, positively correlated, or uncorrelated. In later trials, they evaluated gambles with uncommon combinations of risk and reward—that is, options that deviated from the respective environment's risk–reward structure. Pricing, response times, and (in Experiment 2) pupil dilation were recorded. In both experiments, participants took more time when responding to uncommon compared to foreseeable options or when the same options were presented in an uncorrelated risk–reward environment. This result was most pronounced when the uncommon gambles offered higher expected values compared to the other gambles in the set. Moreover, these uncommon, high‐value options were associated with an increase in pupil size. These results suggest that people's evaluations of risky options are based not only on the options' payoffs and probabilities but also on the extent to which they fit the risk–reward structure of the environment.     

Lexical integration across saccades in reading

Summary Eye movements were recorded during sentence reading to examine the integration of parafoveal text across fixations. Four viewing conditions were used, each affording full view of the directly fixated word: no preview of the spatially adjacent parafoveal word; preview of its beginning trigram; preview of its beginning four letters; or preview of all its constituent letters. The magnitude of parafoveal-preview benefits (the difference between the no-preview condition and the different parafoveal-preview conditions) was examined as a function of the size of the saccade to the parafoveal target and as a function of the subsequent fixation location at the previewed target. The results revealed no effects of saccade size on parafoveal-preview benefits, but large effects of fixation position during the initial target fixation. Furthermore, parafoveal previews were used during the initial target fixation and during subsequent intratarget refixations. The results support a lexical-text-integration hypothesis which posits that lexical information is integrated across interword fixations and intraword refixations.     

Prospects behind bars: Analyzing decisions under risk in a prison population

Criminal activity often involves considerable risks. It is therefore not surprising that criminals have been speculated to differ from noncriminals in risk attitude. Yet, few data exist to support this assumption. Moreover, the psychological underpinnings of differences in risk attitude are currently little understood. We presented prisoners and controls with sets of risky decision tasks and modeled their responses using cumulative prospect theory (CPT). The two groups showed several differences. Prisoners were more risk seeking than nonprisoners in lotteries involving losses, but they were less risk seeking in lotteries involving high-probability gains. Bestfitting CPT parameters indicated a reduced sensitivity to outcomes, for both gains and losses, and a stronger loss aversion among prisoners. In addition, prisoners showed a diminished sensitivity to the probability of gains. Our results contribute to a better understanding of prisoners’ risk attitudes and the underlying mechanisms that distinguish prisoners from nonprisoners and may thus help improve interventions designed to prevent crime.     

Us and them: Mood effects on ingroup projection

Mood states affect judgments in general and intergroup judgments in particular. The aim of the present research was to show that ingroup projection is influenced by affective states in a similar way as ingroup bias. Varying mood states and relevance of the intergroup situation orthogonally, the results supported the hypotheses that positive mood in conjunction with low relevance and negative mood in conjunction with high relevance elicit higher levels of biased prototypicality perceptions compared to the other conditions of the design. Given substantial evidence from previous research that mood in conjunction with perceived relevance moderates motivated versus heuristic processing, we propose that the present results correspond with motivation‐ versus cognition‐based ingroup projection and suggest different processes underlying the phenomenon of relative ingroup prototypicality. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How do people judge risks: Availability heuristic, affect heuristic, or both?

How does the public reckon which risks to be concerned about? The availability heuristic and the affect heuristic are key accounts of how laypeople judge risks. Yet, these two accounts have never been systematically tested against each other, nor have their predictive powers been examined across different measures of the public's risk perception. In two studies, we gauged risk perception in student samples by employing three measures (frequency, value of a statistical life, and perceived risk) and by using a homogeneous (cancer) and a classic set of heterogeneous causes of death. Based on these judgments of risk, we tested precise models of the availability heuristic and the affect heuristic and different definitions of availability and affect. Overall, availability-by-recall, a heuristic that exploits people's direct experience of occurrences of risks in their social network, conformed to people's responses best. We also found direct experience to carry a high degree of ecological validity (and one that clearly surpasses that of affective information). However, the relative impact of affective information (as compared to availability) proved more pronounced in value-of-a-statistical-life and perceived-risk judgments than in risk-frequency judgments. Encounters with risks in the media, in contrast, played a negligible role in people's judgments. Going beyond the assumption of exclusive reliance on either availability or affect, we also found evidence for mechanisms that combine both, either sequentially or in a composite fashion. We conclude with a discussion of policy implications of our results, including how to foster people's risk calibration and the success of education campaigns. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Cognitive models of risky choice: parameter stability and predictive accuracy of prospect theory

In the behavioral sciences, a popular approach to describe and predict behavior is cognitive modeling with adjustable parameters (i.e., which can be fitted to data). Modeling with adjustable parameters allows, among other things, measuring differences between people. At the same time, parameter estimation also bears the risk of overfitting. Are individual differences as measured by model parameters stable enough to improve the ability to predict behavior as compared to modeling without adjustable parameters? We examined this issue in cumulative prospect theory (CPT), arguably the most widely used framework to model decisions under risk. Specifically, we examined (a) the temporal stability of CPT’s parameters; and (b) how well different implementations of CPT, varying in the number of adjustable parameters, predict individual choice relative to models with no adjustable parameters (such as CPT with fixed parameters, expected value theory, and various heuristics). We presented participants with risky choice problems and fitted CPT to each individual’s choices in two separate sessions (which were 1 week apart). All parameters were correlated across time, in particular when using a simple implementation of CPT. CPT allowing for individual variability in parameter values predicted individual choice better than CPT with fixed parameters, expected value theory, and the heuristics. CPT’s parameters thus seem to pick up stable individual differences that need to be considered when predicting risky choice.     

Dispositional mindfulness moderates the relation between neuroticism and depressive symptoms

Negative emotional reactivity as measured by neuroticism has been shown to be an important risk factor for the development of depressive symptoms. This study investigated whether the ability to be mindful can protect against the negative effects of this temperamental vulnerability. An English community sample of N = 144 individuals who had completed a neuroticism questionnaire six years previously were assessed for current depressive symptoms and dispositional levels of mindfulness at points of assessment approximately one year apart. Dispositional mindfulness moderated the relation between neuroticism and current depressive symptoms: Neuroticism was significantly related to depression in those with low to medium levels of dispositional mindfulness but not in those with relatively high levels of mindfulness. Further analyzes focusing on particular mindfulness skills indicated that this effect was carried mostly by the ability to describe inner experience. The results suggest that dispositional mindfulness and particularly the ability to describe inner experience are helpful in dealing with negative emotional reactivity in a way that reduces the likelihood of depressive symptoms to develop.     

„Rocken statt Ritzen“

Background

Non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) starts in adolescence and decreases during young adulthood. Despite a high prevalence among adolescents only a few therapeutic interventions directly addressing adolescents exist.

Aim

By connecting music therapy with elements from behavioral therapy an attempt was made to create a therapeutic program which is attractive to adolescents.

Material and methods

A pilot trial of the program “Stop cutting - rock!” was conducted with 12 adolescent females with a mean age of 15.15 years (standard deviation SD ±1.34). The study aimed to compare the frequency of NSSI throughout the treatment phase as well as a pre-post comparison of depression scores.

Results

The results showed a trend towards a decreasing frequency of NSSI. Depression scores decreased significantly between the assessment before therapy and at a 3-month follow-up after the end of the therapy.

Conclusion

The positive feedback concerning music therapeutic elements points to the attractiveness of the approach. By integrating multimodal therapeutic strategies it seems possible to create an individually tailored intervention for adolescents with NSSI.     

Metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements: the role of perceived differences in item recognition

This research investigated the hypothesis that metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements are based on the recognition or nonrecognition of an event together with perceived or expected differences in the recognizability of events from different sources. The hypothesis was tested with a multinomial source-monitoring model that allowed separation of source-guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items. Experiments 1A and 1B manipulated the number of item presentations as relevant source information and revealed differential guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items, with a bias to attribute unrecognized items to the source associated with poor item recognition. Experiments 2A and 2B replicated the findings with a manipulation of presentation time and extended the analysis to subjective differences in item recognition. Experiments 3A and 3B used more natural source information by varying type of acoustic signal and demonstrated that subjective theories about differences in item recognition are sufficient to elicit differential source-guessing biases for recognized and unrecognized items. Together the findings provide new insights into the cognitive processes underlying source memory decisions, which involve episodic memory and reconstructive tendencies based on metacognitive beliefs and general world knowledge.