Surprising depth cue captures attention in visual search

A substantial amount of evidence indicates that surprising events capture attention. The present study was primarily intended to investigate whether expectancy discrepant depth information also is able to capture attention immediately and—more specifically—whether cues that are relatively closer or farther differentially modulate behavior. For this purpose, participants had to identify one of two target letters in a search display. Stimulus positions were initially cued by uninformative placeholders. After half of the trials, the cue at the target position was suddenly and unexpectedly (critical trial) displayed closer to or farther from the observer. In line with previous research, both depth cues captured attention on their very first appearance. Performance in the critical trial was superior to the error rates in the trials without depth cue and was even above the performance in subsequent trials that included depth cue. This effect was only observed when the cue preceded the target by 400 ms. Using a shorter cue-stimulus interval of 100 ms, only a delayed improvement was observed, which denotes a typical feature of surprise capture. Moreover, response times were faster in trials comprising a depth cue, and this was already true for the critical trial. Apart from that, no other marked differences between near and far depth cues were observed. Therefore, the present results emphasize that surprising depth information indeed captures attention. However, in contrast to other perceptual tasks, search performance was not considerably influenced by relative position in depth.     

The influence of relevant and irrelevant stereoscopic depth cues: Depth information does not always capture attention

Previous research reported ambiguous findings regarding the relationship of visuospatial attention and (stereoscopic) depth information. Some studies indicate that attention can be focused on a distinct depth plane, while other investigations revealed attentional capture from irrelevant items located in other, unattended depth planes. To evaluate whether task relevance of depth information modulates the deployment of attentional resources across depth planes, the additional singleton paradigm was adapted: Singletons defined by depth (i.e., displayed behind or in front of a central depth plane) or color (green against gray) were presented among neutral items and served as targets or (irrelevant) distractors. When participants were instructed to search for a color target, no attentional capture from irrelevant depth distractors was observed. In contrast, it took substantially longer to search for depth targets when an irrelevant distractor was presented simultaneously. Color distractors as well as depth distractors caused attentional capture, independent of the distractors’ relative depth position (i.e., in front of or behind the target). However, slight differences in task performance were obtained depending on whether or not participants fixated within the target depth plane. Thus, the current findings indicate that attentional resources in general are uniformly distributed across different depth planes. Although task relevant depth singletons clearly affect the attentional system, this information might be processed subsequent to other stimulus features.     

Metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements: the role of perceived differences in item recognition

This research investigated the hypothesis that metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements are based on the recognition or nonrecognition of an event together with perceived or expected differences in the recognizability of events from different sources. The hypothesis was tested with a multinomial source-monitoring model that allowed separation of source-guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items. Experiments 1A and 1B manipulated the number of item presentations as relevant source information and revealed differential guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items, with a bias to attribute unrecognized items to the source associated with poor item recognition. Experiments 2A and 2B replicated the findings with a manipulation of presentation time and extended the analysis to subjective differences in item recognition. Experiments 3A and 3B used more natural source information by varying type of acoustic signal and demonstrated that subjective theories about differences in item recognition are sufficient to elicit differential source-guessing biases for recognized and unrecognized items. Together the findings provide new insights into the cognitive processes underlying source memory decisions, which involve episodic memory and reconstructive tendencies based on metacognitive beliefs and general world knowledge.     

Attention and eye movements in reading: inhibition of return predicts the size of regressive saccades

A spatial cuing task was used to identify two types of readers, those with a relatively fast and those with a relatively slow buildup of inhibition of return (IOR). Backward-directed eye movements (regressions) during sentence reading were then examined as a function of the two IOR types. The results revealed that readers with fast IOR executed larger regressions than readers with slow IOR, as they directed the eyes away from the most recently attended area of text. Forward-directed eye movements (saccades), by contrast, were not a function of IOR type. Ease of sentence comprehension influenced the size of regressions, but this effect was also independent of IOR type. Multiple mechanisms of spatial attention, including IOR, bias eye movements toward upcoming words in the text during reading.     

Semantic inhibition of return is the exception rather than the rule

Inhibition of return (IOR) has recently been reported for lexical/semantic categories (see, e.g., Fuentes, Vivas, & Humphreys, 1999). The present research examines the impact on semantic IOR of three components: item repetition, item heterogeneity, and spatial variability. Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that lexical/semantic IOR occurs only after extensive repetition. Experiment 2 also shows that semantic IOR is independent of spatial variability. Experiments 3 through 5 show facilitatory rather than inhibitory effects when the item pool is heterogeneous. The results support an episodic account of semantic IOR, according to which inhibitory effects accumulate with massive repetition of homogeneous items.     

Racial healthcare disparities: A social psychological analysis

Around the world, members of racial/ethnic minority groups typically experience poorer health than members of racial/ethnic majority groups. The core premise of this chapter is that thoughts, feelings, and behaviours related to race and ethnicity play a critical role in healthcare disparities. Social psychological theories of the origins and consequences of these thoughts, feelings, and behaviours offer critical insights into the processes responsible for these disparities and suggest interventions to address them. We present a multilevel model that explains how societal, intrapersonal, and interpersonal factors can influence ethnic/racial health disparities. We focus our literature review, including our own research, and conceptual analysis at the intrapersonal (the race-related thoughts and feelings of minority patients and non-minority physicians) and interpersonal levels (intergroup processes that affect medical interactions between minority patients and non-minority physicians). At both levels of analysis, we use theories of social categorisation, social identity, contemporary forms of racial bias, stereotype activation, stigma, and other social psychological processes to identify and understand potential causes and processes of health and healthcare disparities. In the final section, we identify theory-based interventions that might reduce ethnic/racial disparities in health and healthcare.     

Beweislastverteilung und Intuitionen in philosophischen Diskursen

Allocating the burden of proof and intuitions in philosophical disputes.– This paper criticises the view that in philosophical disputes the onus probandi rests on those who advance a position that contradicts our basic intuitions. Such a rule for allocating the burden of proof may be an adequate reconstruction of everyday justification, but is unreasonable in the area of philosophy. In philosophy it is not only difficult to determine the plausibility of a proposition, at the same time contradictory claims may be equally plausible. – In contrast to such common sense proposals I try to show that in philosophical disputes the burden of proof does not depend on the material content of speech acts. A speaker simply bears the burden of proof for a proposition p if he has asserted that p and has agreed to justify it. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Training propositional reasoning

Two experiments compared the effects of four training conditions on propositional reasoning. A syntactic training demonstrated formal derivations, in an abstract semantic training the standard truth-table definitions of logical connectives were explained, and a domain-specific semantic training provided thematic contexts for the premises of the reasoning task. In a control training, an inductive reasoning task was practised. In line with the account by mental models, both kinds of semantic training were significantly more effective than the control and the syntactic training, whereas there were no significant differences between the control and the syntactic training, nor between the two kinds of semantic training. Experiment 2 replicated this pattern of effects using a different set of syntactic and domain-specific training conditions.