The individual interview in couples treatment

This paper describes the use of concurrent individual and conjoint sessions in couples psychotherapy. The introduction of these individual interviews is seen as supporting the individual changes which must be made to effect change in the structure of the relationship. The benefits of this interventive scheme in dynamically oriented couples' treatment will be illustrated through the presentation of case examples.     

Behavioral sequelae of long-term self-attributed success and failure: an attribution theory analysis

Starting from earlier results that self-caused long-term failure improved performance, this experiment tested the effect of "working conditions" as well as successes and failures succeeding the experience of long-term success and long-term failure. 64 subjects participated in recognition tests, composed of 9 tasks (with 42 stimuli each), to be solved within five different experimental sessions. Subjects received false feedback concerning each judgement. The feedback was designed to correspond to Kelley's informational requirements for self-attributions. Results clearly show an impairment of performances within new "working conditions" if successes succeed long-term failure or long-term success. Failure succeeding long-term failure in new "working conditions", on the other hand, improves performance. Different attribution theories' capacity to explain these results is discussed.     

Objective and simulated stimulation: an empirical study of the effect of indirect suggestion on motor behavior

In an experimental investigation it is demonstrated that motor behavior-in contrast to the opinion forwarded in the literature-is not only elicitable by means of direct persuasion, but also to a great extend by mere indirect suggestion, (feigning of stimuli). A differential investigation of these effects provided evidence that reactions to feigned stimuli are highly person specific and relatively homogenous concerning the respective instruments whereas objective stimuli lead to reactions relatively specific for the respective instrument applied. The findings are interpreted as an analog on to placebo-effects in the area of motor behavior. Their extend may be seen as an argument for a stronger concern with subjective reaction tendencies in this field.     

Acquisition of strategies depending on the opponents' competence level

The development of problem-solving skills from novices to advanced subjects in dependence of the competence level of the opponent is examined in a two-person zero-sum game (Othello). In a repeated-measurement design 18 Ss. (6 Ss in 3 groups) played 10 games against one of three opponent-strategies (implemented on a computer): one "expertlike" strategy, which uses domain specific knowledge and local heuristics (minimax-algorithm with alpha-beta pruning); one "novicelike" strategy, in which global, domain independent problem solving strategies (means-ends analysis, goal-reduction) are implemented; and one strategy, which contradicts the supposed heuristics of the novices, but which results in a "weak" performance (minimization in move-selection). Contrary to our assumptions no significant effects of experience could be verified (win versus loss during single runs). An experience dependent differentiation of global problem solving strategies could not be shown for any of the groups. Neither could a general improving effect of the model for acquiring local, task specific heuristics be proved.     

Creating new memories that are quickly accessed and confidently held

In two experiments involving a total of 542 subjects, a series of slides depicting a burglary was shown. After the initial event, subjects were exposed to one or more narratives about the event that contained some misinformation or neutral information about four critical details. Finally, subjects were tested on their memories of what they saw, and their reaction times and confidence levels were measured. When subjects took a standard test in which the misinformation item was a possible response option, they responded very quickly and confidently when making this incorrect choice. Misled subjects responded as quickly and confidently to these "unreal" memories as they did to their genuine memories. It does not seem, then, that the misinformation effect arises from a large proportion of subjects who must resolve a conflict between two memories when they are tested, a conflict that would be expected to take time. When subjects took a modified test in which the misinformation item was not a possible response, misled subjects were as accurate as were controls, but they responded more slowly, regardless of whether they ultimately chose the right or wrong option. These findings indicate that misinformation does introduce some form of interference not detected by a simple test of accuracy.     

A model of the influence of processing effort and number of changes on subjective time perception

The paper is concerned with a model for subjective time estimation as determined by processing effort and number of changes. In a previous paper, a proposal was made that should solve a problem of confounded variables in the area of time estimation. An experimental design was developed to allow for the independent manipulation of processing effort and number of changes. It is shown that this proposal is valid only under the assumption that Stevens' law holds with exponent one. Therefore, another way of conceptualizing this problem is advanced in which one asks for the relative impact of processing effort and change on the parameters of Stevens' law. It can be demonstrated that this law yields considerable fit despite interindividual differences.     

Social psychology and the wrong revolution

Many social psychologists take increasing comfort in cognitive explanations of human action. This paper first attempts to demonstrate that cognitively based formulations not only delimit the possibilities for social understanding, but create a range of intractable conceptual problems. If real world events are reduced to cognitive representations of the world, then social events cease to exist for the discipline as legitimate foci of concern. Further, once the reality of cognition is granted, there is no conceptual means of viably explaining either the origins or acquisition of cognitive categories (schemas, representations, etc.), or the relationship between cognition and action. The paper then goes on to argue that the cognitive revolution in psychology blinds the discipline to the far more pervasive revolution occurring elsewhere in the intellectual world, that of social epistemology. When cognition is replaced by language as the major means for representing the world, then the individual is replaced by the social relationship as the central focus of concern. Theory and research within the framework of social epistemology are reviewed and their implications discussed.