Accuracy of retrospective memory and covariation estimation in patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder

Assessment methods relying on biased or inaccurate retrospective recall may distort knowledge about the nature of disorders and lead to faulty clinical inferences. Despite concerns about the accuracy of retrospective recall in general and in particular with obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) patients, the accuracy of retrospective recall for one's own symptoms assessed in vivo is unknown in this population. This study used a prospective ecological momentary assessment (EMA) methodology to create a criterion against which to assess recall accuracy in OCD patients. Although results indicated that patients’ retrospective recall of OCD symptoms was fairly accurate, they consistently overestimated the magnitude of OCD symptom covariation with non-OCD facets (e.g., sleep duration, contemporaneous stress level, etc.). Findings suggest that even when recall of OCD symptoms is accurate, patients may be inaccurate in estimating symptom covariation. The findings have implications for the research, case conceptualization, and assessment of OCD, and may extend to other disorders.     

The effects of feature type in operant serial feature-positive discriminations

In two experiments, rats were trained on two operant serial feature positive discriminations in which one feature was a flavored solution and the second feature was a visual or auditory cue. As in a previous study ([Goddard and Holland, 1996]), transfer of a feature’s control to the target of the other discrimination was not observed when the flavor feature and the reinforcer were flavored sucrose solutions (Experiment 1). The performance of comparison groups showed that this lack of transfer was not due to confounded differences in the event contingencies resulting from having similar stimuli serve as feature and reinforcer. By contrast, in Experiment 2, transfer was observed between visual and flavor features when the flavor feature was unsweetened and the reinforcer was plain sucrose. These results suggest that the lack of transfer in Experiment 1 and in [Goddard and Holland, 1996] study were related to the biological significance or hedonic properties of the sucrose feature.     

Ambivalent or Indifferent? Examining the Validity of an Objective Measure of Partisan Ambivalence

This article examines the validity of an objective measure of partisan ambivalence. More generally, it draws attention to the idea that measurement is an active step taken by the researcher and therefore should be subjected to empirical examination. It is also argued that treating a variable at a higher level of measurement than warranted will cause a valid measure to cease to be so, and that the appropriate level of a variable is determined not by the underlying concept or the measurement procedure, but by the researcher. I demonstrate the measure examined can distinguish between various attitudinal states, but only at the nominal level. This is largely driven by individuals who offer no responses to open‐ended questions, who are termed indifferent. Furthermore, different coding schemes result in different conclusions. For example, the finding that indifferent individuals are less likely to rely on partisanship than ambivalent individuals when evaluating candidates is obscured when treating the measure as interval. The findings suggest the measure should be coded to account for indifferent individuals, and that even well developed measures of clearly defined concepts need to be subjected to empirical examination.     

A chimeric point-light walker

Ambiguity has long been used as a probe into visual processing. Here, we describe a new dynamic ambiguous figure-the chimeric point-light walker--which we hope will prove to be a useful tool for exploring biological motion. We begin by describing the construction of the stimulus and discussing the compelling finding that, when presented in a mask, observers consistently fail to notice anything odd about the walker, reporting instead that they are watching an unambiguous figure moving either to the left or right. Some observers report that the initial percept fluctuates, moving first to the left, then to the right, or vice versa; others always perceive a constant direction. All observers, when briefly shown the unmasked ambiguous figure, have no difficulty in perceiving the novel motion pattern once the mask is returned. These two findings--the initial report of unambiguous motion and the subsequent 'primed' perception of the ambiguity--are both consistent with an important role for top-down processing in biological motion. We conclude by suggesting several domains within the realm of biological-motion processing where this simple stimulus may prove to be useful.     

Neuropsychological mediators of the links among age, chronic illness, and everyday problem solving

Reductions in everyday problem solving (EPS) are often reported in older age, although the underlying mechanisms remain unclear. The authors examined the role of 2 variables predicted to mediate (neuropsychological abilities and health status) or moderate (health status) the relationship between age and EPS performance. Toward these ends, they compared EPS and neuropsychological performance in 50 functionally independent adults with chronic kidney disease (CKD) and 64 control participants matched on age and education. Both older age and CKD were associated with worse performance on measures of EPS and memory/executive abilities. Neuropsychological abilities were positively associated with EPS performance. In both the full sample and control participants only, memory/executive functioning mediated the association between presence of chronic illness and EPS. Furthermore, memory/executive functioning partially mediated the link between age and EPS. Findings indicate that relations among age, health status, and EPS are not straightforward. Although performance on neuropsychological measures appeared to underlie EPS declines in chronic illness, increasing age remained independently associated with reduced EPS. The authors discuss implications for models of adult developmental changes in everyday cognition.     

The new philosophy of psychiatry: its (recent) past, present and future: a review of the Oxford University Press series International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry

There has been a recent growth in philosophy of psychiatry that draws heavily (although not exclusively) on analytic philosophy with the aim of a better understanding of psychiatry through an analysis of some of its fundamental concepts. This 'new philosophy of psychiatry' is an addition to both analytic philosophy and to the broader interpretation of mental health care. Nevertheless, it is already a flourishing philosophical field. One indication of this is the new Oxford University Press series International Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry seven volumes of which (by Bolton and Hill; Bracken and Thomas; Fulford, Morris, Sadler, and Stanghellini; Hughes, Louw, and Sabat; Pickering; Sadler; and Stanghellini) are examined in this critical review.     

Representation recovers information

Early agreement within cognitive science on the topic of representation has now given way to a combination of positions. Some question the significance of representation in cognition. Others continue to argue in favor, but the case has not been demonstrated in any formal way. The present paper sets out a framework in which the value of representation use can be mathematically measured, albeit in a broadly sensory context rather than a specifically cognitive one. Key to the approach is the use of Bayesian networks for modeling the distal dimension of sensory processes. More relevant to cognitive science is the theoretical result obtained, which is that a certain type of representational architecture is necessary for achievement of sensory efficiency. While exhibiting few of the characteristics of traditional, symbolic encoding, this architecture corresponds quite closely to the forms of embedded representation now being explored in some embedded/embodied approaches. It becomes meaningful to view that type of representation use as a form of information recovery. A formal basis then exists for viewing representation not so much as the substrate of reasoning and thought, but rather as a general medium for efficient, interpretive processing.