Roles and Role Conflict of Women in Infertile Couples

This study explored the experience of role conflict for women in infertile couples. The infertile group consisted of 29 women who, with their husbands, were beginning an infertility program; comparison group subjects were 29 married women with no history of inability to conceive. Each subject completed self-report instruments measuring role conceptions and expectations, the experience of role conflict, and occupational commitment. Each husband also reported his role expectations for his ideal woman. Also, a semi-structured interview was conducted with each infertile subject. Compared to the control group, the infertile group's role conceptions were more traditional; they reported less role conflict of various kinds, and they showed greater occupational commitment. They did not differ significantly on degree of wife-husband role discrepancy, or on mother's occupational commitment. These findings lead to an understanding of infertility as part of an interactional system for dealing with potentially intolerable sources of role conflict.     

Epistemic constraints on practical normativity

What is the relation between what we ought to do, on the one hand, and our epistemic access to the ought-giving facts, on the other? In assessing this, it is common to distinguish ‘objective’ from ‘subjective’ oughts. Very roughly, on the objectivist conception what an agent ought to do is determined by ought-giving facts in such a way that does not depend on the agent’s beliefs about, or epistemic access to, those facts; whereas on the subjectivist conception, what an agent ought to do depends on his beliefs. This paper defends the need for, and explicates, a third category of ‘ought’: ‘warranted oughts’. Section 1 introduces the distinction between objective and subjective ‘oughts’. Sections 2–3 draw attention to some serious problems with each. Section 4 examines, though rejects, a recent attempt to replace subjective ‘oughts’ with objective ‘wide-scope oughts’ operating on belief-action combinations. Section 5 explicates the notion of a warranted ‘ought’ and defends the account against some possible objections. The resulting a picture is one in which an adequate analysis of practical normativity requires both objective and warranted ‘oughts’. Section 6 concludes by responding to a worry about countenancing both.