The tunnel effect,Gibson's perception theory,and reflective seeing

Summary Subjects can have continuous visual experience of an object's movement across a display though the movement's middle phase takes place behind an opaque screen. The present article considers explanatory issues pertaining to this so-called, tunnel effect, with special reference to Gibson' s perception theory and the visual activity that I have been calling reflective seeing. Among the issues discussed are the following. (a) In the tunnel experiments, I suggest, there occur both persisting perception, as Michotte held, and persistence perception, as Gibson held. The subjects pick up stimulus information that allows visually experiencing the object's going out of sight at one edge of the screen and coming back into sight at another edge of the screen; the subjects have visual experience of the continued existence and movement of the object while it is out of sight. Moreover, persistence of perceptual experience is involved: when the object goes out of sight, the subjects' visual experience of its movement goes on. (b) I also argue that the tunnel effect is a phenomenon of both straightforward and reflective seeing. Adopting a phenomenal attitude, as one does when reporting one's perceptual experience, one still sees movement taking place on the other side of the screen, as one does in straightforward seeing. However, whereas straightforward seeing does not give inner awareness of visual experience, the subjects in the tunnel experiments report visually experiencing the object's movement while also visually experiencing the opaque screen in front of it as opaque. I argue that these reports, and those about the object's going out of and coming back into sight, must be based on the kind of visual experience that is part and product of reflective seeing.     

A PRESCRIPTION FOR GENERATING A NEW PARADIGM IN THE CONTEXT OF SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY

Abstract. Many centers are now active in the study of the interaction between science on the one hand and theology on the other. Suggestions are made as to how such study might be furthered. The central proposal in this paper is based on the author's experience in founding and, over many years, operating the Neurosciences Research Program (NRP). The "faculty" of this group were highly competent in many fields of science and were able to deal with many of the major issues. It is here further suggested that if an NRP-like organization were established, capable of productively interacting with both science and theology, it might well generate new concepts and possibly a new paradigm in this context.     

Cocaine-induced brainstem seizures and behavior.

A variety of abnormal sensory/motor behaviors associated with electrical discharges recorded from the bilateral brainstem were induced in adult WKY rats by mechanical (electrode implants) and DC electrical current stimulations and by acute and chronic administration of cocaine. The electrode implant implicated one side or the other of the reticular system of the brainstem but subjects were not incapacitated by the stimulations. Cocaine (40 mg/kg) was injected subcutaneously for an acute experiment and subsequent 20 mg/kg doses twice daily for 3 days in a chronic study. Cocaine generated more abnormal behaviors in the brainstem perturbation group, especially the electrically perturbated subjects. The abnormal behaviors were yawning, retrocollis, hyperactivity, hypersensitivity, "beating drum" behavior, squealing, head bobbing, circling, sniffing, abnormal posturing, and facial twitching. Shifts in the power frequency spectra of the discharge patterns were noted between quiet and pacing behavioral states. Hypersensitivity to various auditory, tactile, and visual stimulation was present and shifts in the brainstem ambient power spectral frequency occurred in response to tactile stimulation. These findings suggest that the brainstem generates and propagates pathological discharges that can be elicited by mechanical and DC electrical perturbation. Cocaine was found to activate the discharge system and thus induce abnormal behaviors that are generated at the discharge site and at distant sites to which the discharge propagates. Cognitive functions may also be involved since dopaminergic and serotonergic cellular elements at the brainstem level are also implicated.     

Neighborhood frequency effects and letter visibility in visual word recognition

Two experiments are described that measured lexical decision latencies and errors to five-letter French words with a single higher frequency orthographic neighbor and control words with no higher frequency neighbors. The higher frequency neighbor differed from the stimulus word by either the second letter (e.g.,astre-autre) or the fourth letter (chope-chose). Neighborhood frequency effects were found to interact with this factor, and significant interference was observed only tochope-type words. The effects of neighborhood frequency were also found to interact with the position of initial fixation in the stimulus word (either the second letter or the fourth letter). Interference was greatly reduced when the initial fixation was on the critical disambiguating letter (i.e., the letterp inchope). Moreover, word recognition was improved when subjects initially fixated the second letter relative to when they initially fixated the fourth letter of a five-letter word, but this second-letter advantage practically disappeared when the stimulus differed from a more frequent word by its fourth letter. The results are interpreted in terms of the interaction between visual and lexical factors in visual word recognition.     

On axiomatization of many-valued logics associated with formalization of plausible reasonings

This paper studies a class of infinite-valued predicate logics. A sufficient condition for axiomatizability of logics from that class is given.To the memory of Jerzy Supecki     

Context effects in stroop-like word and picture processing

Presents a series of 6 experiments in which Stroop-like effects were generated by modally pure color-color, picture-picture, and word-word stimuli instead of the usual modally mixed color-word or picture-word stimuli. Naming, reading, and categorization tasks were applied. The Stroop inhibition was preserved with these stimuli but unexpectedly showed a semantic gradient only in the naming and not in the reading task. Word categorizing was slower and more interference prone than picture categorizing. These and other results can be captured by a model with two main assumptions: (a) semantic memory and the lexicon are separate, and (b) words have privileged access to the lexicon, whereas pictures and colors have privileged access to the semantic network. Such a model is developed and put to an initial test.     

Spatial frequencies and the cerebral hemispheres: contrast sensitivity, visible persistence, and letter classification

The hypothesis that the two cerebral hemispheres are specialized for processing different visual spatial frequencies was investigated in three experiments. No differences between the left and right visual fields were found for: (1) contrast-sensitivity functions measured binocularly with vertical gratings ranging from 0.5 to 12 cycles per degree (cpd); (2) visible persistence durations for 1- and 10-cpd gratings measured with a stimulus alternation method; and (3) accuracy (d') and reaction times to correctly identify digitally filtered letters as targets (L or H) or nontargets (T or F). One significant difference, however, was found: In Experiment 3, a higher decision criterion (beta) was used when filtered letters were identified in the right visual field than when they were identified in the left. The letters were filtered with annular, 1-octave band-pass filters with center spatial frequencies of 1, 2, 4, 8, and 16 cpd. Combining four center frequencies with three letter sizes (0.5 degrees, 1 degree, and 2 degrees high) made some stimuli equivalent in distal spatial frequency (cycles per object) and some equivalent in proximal spatial frequency (cycles per degree). The effective stimulus in the third experiment seemed to be proximal spatial frequency (cycles per degree) not distal (cycles per object). We conclude that each cerebral hemisphere processes visual spatial frequency information with equal accuracy but that different decision rules are used.