Knowledge in society: anatomy of an emergent field

An emergent social science of knowledge applications, drawing on a substantial multidisciplinary literature published over the past twenty-five years, signals an inversion of typical scholarly reasoning about the knowledge-society nexus. Whereas most scholarly research thus far has concentrated on conditions believed to affect the production of scientific and professional knowledge, we pose a new problematic: What must we examine in order to comprehend and consciously shape applications of scientific and professional knowledge to the manifold problems facing contemporary societies? To date, approaches to this problematic have proceeded on the basis of four broadly accepted if abstract theses about the nature of contemporary knowledge systems: subjectivity, corrigibility, sociality, and complexity. Within the boundaries supplied by these commonly accepted theses are unresolved controversies expressed in competing visions of complexity, alternative perspectives of causation, rival images of progress, and conflicting criteria of application.     

Burden of proof

This paper presents an analysis of the concept of burden of proof in argument. Relationship of burden of proof to three traditional informal fallacies is considered: (i) argumentum ad hominem, (ii) petitio principii, and (iii) argumentum ad ignorantiam. Other topics discussed include persuasive dialoque, pragmatic reasoning, legal burden of proof, plausible reasoning in regulated disputes, rules of dialogue, and the value of reasoned dialogue.     

A high-gain,low-noise amplifier for EEG

This paper describes an amplifier for an electroencephalograph with gain of 1×10⁴ to 1×10⁶ and made entirely of commercially available IC components. The two-stage amplifier has a preamplifier stage with fixed gain of 1000, and a second stage with variable gain from 1 to 100. The final stage, an anti-aliasing filter, adds a gain of 10 to the signal. The circuit has high common mode rejection, low input bias current, very low noise characteristics, low offset voltages, and offset nulling capability built into the circuit.     

Malevolent object representations in borderline personality disorder and major depression.

To study malevolent representations, earliest memories were reliably coded on scales of affect tone. Ss were diagnosed with borderline personality disorder: 31 without and 30 with concurrent major depression. Nonborderline comparison subjects had either major depressive disorder (n = 26) or no psychiatric diagnosis (n = 30). Borderline subjects were discriminated from comparison subjects by their more malevolent representations; they more frequently produced memories involving deliberate injury; and they portrayed potential helpers as less helpful. Results suggest the diagnostic significance of malevolent representations, which need to be explained by any theory of borderline personality disorder.     

Hypnosis, reporting bias, and suggested negative hallucinations.

We examined the role of reporting bias in hypnotic negative hallucinations by using a paradigm in which reporting bias was assessed independently of perceptual change. In Experiment 1, highly hypnotizable subjects reported significant loudness reductions when tested for hypnotic deafness. Later, however, these subjects biased their reported loudness reductions in the absence of perceptual change, and their reporting bias scores were almost as large as their hypnotic deafness reports. Subjects also biased their ratings of strategy use. In Experiment 2, ratings of blindness given in response to a hypnotic negative visual hallucination suggestion were significantly correlated with reporting bias scores obtained in this paradigm. Although hypnotic blindness and hypnotic deafness correlated significantly, the partial correlation between these variables was nonsignificant when reporting bias scores were statistically controlled. Theoretical implications are discussed.     

Cognitive Biases in Playing the Lottery: Estimating the Odds and Choosing the Numbers

Three experiments were conducted to examine the operation of the representativeness and anchoring and adjustment heuristics in lottery play. Subjects in Experiments 1 and 2 indicated their chances of winning a lottery with an objective probability of 1 in 10. Consistent with the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, subjects (in both experiments) perceived their chances of winning to be greater when the lottery was based on a single event than when it was based on a disjunctive event. Subjects in these two experiments also selected numbers to play in a pick-3 (Experiment 1) or pick-4 (Experiment 2) lottery. Consistent with the representativeness heuristic, subjects in Experiment 2 demonstrated a preference for numbers without repeating digits. This also occurred in Experiment 3 wherein the numbers actually played in the Indiana daily Pick-3 lottery were examined.     

The Discrediting Effect in Eyewitness Testimony1

Loftus (1974) had subjects read summaries of criminal trials that contained the testimony of either credible or discredited prosecution eyewitnesses, and found no effect of discrediting an eyewitness. Instead, almost as many subjects voted guilty with a discredited eyewitness as with a credible eyewitness; this led Loftus to the conclusion that jurors tend to overbelieve eyewitness testimony. Loftus's conclusion was subsequently challenged by others who reported a strong discrediting effect. A series of three experiments using college students was conducted to explore the characteristics of trial summaries that might account for the discrepancy in results, such as inclusion of judicial instructions concerning proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or an eyewitness's reaffirmation of his testimony following discrediting. In all cases, a strong discrediting effect was found. Apparently the discrediting effect appears regardless of wide variation in content of trial summaries. The present data do not support the overbelief claim.