Illness, Family Theory, and Family Therapy: I.Conceptual Issues

This article examines and clarifies controversies about the concept of illness in the field of family therapy. We contend that illness, as traditionally understood in all cultures, is a relational, transactional concept that is highly congruent with core principles of present-day family theories. Family therapists need not buy into a biotechnical, reductionistic reframing of illness as disease. Rather, it is more appropriate to conceptualize and work with illness as a narrative placed in a biopsychosocial context. Such a narrative includes how shared responsibility for coping and for finding solutions can take place, without becoming involved in disputes about causal models.     

Career Aspirations of Pregnant Teens

This study examined the career aspirations of pregnant teens enrolled in a program designed to minimize their chances of dropping out of high school. The teens completed a demographic data form that included questions on their career aspirations. The data were coded by Holland type using the Dictionary of Holland Occupational Codes. Trends were discussed in light of the future labor market and critical need for career counseling for this at-risk population.     

On estimating processing variance: commentary and reanalysis of Kail's "Developmental functions for speeds of cognitive processes".

A recent paper by Kail (1988) in this journal appears to contain a significant error in the data analysis. The "goodness-of-fit" coefficients reported which suggest that overall about 94% of the variance can be accounted for by the model seem to be a substantial overestimation as a result of inappropriate procedures for statistical modeling. Using the data made available to us by Kail, we have reanalyzed these results. The corrected values range from 0.9 to 92.1% for the individual tasks with an overall average between 40 and 60%. We suggest that the support for the original conclusions is considerably weaker than reported.     

Cognitive Biases in Playing the Lottery: Estimating the Odds and Choosing the Numbers

Three experiments were conducted to examine the operation of the representativeness and anchoring and adjustment heuristics in lottery play. Subjects in Experiments 1 and 2 indicated their chances of winning a lottery with an objective probability of 1 in 10. Consistent with the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, subjects (in both experiments) perceived their chances of winning to be greater when the lottery was based on a single event than when it was based on a disjunctive event. Subjects in these two experiments also selected numbers to play in a pick-3 (Experiment 1) or pick-4 (Experiment 2) lottery. Consistent with the representativeness heuristic, subjects in Experiment 2 demonstrated a preference for numbers without repeating digits. This also occurred in Experiment 3 wherein the numbers actually played in the Indiana daily Pick-3 lottery were examined.     

The Discrediting Effect in Eyewitness Testimony1

Loftus (1974) had subjects read summaries of criminal trials that contained the testimony of either credible or discredited prosecution eyewitnesses, and found no effect of discrediting an eyewitness. Instead, almost as many subjects voted guilty with a discredited eyewitness as with a credible eyewitness; this led Loftus to the conclusion that jurors tend to overbelieve eyewitness testimony. Loftus's conclusion was subsequently challenged by others who reported a strong discrediting effect. A series of three experiments using college students was conducted to explore the characteristics of trial summaries that might account for the discrepancy in results, such as inclusion of judicial instructions concerning proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or an eyewitness's reaffirmation of his testimony following discrediting. In all cases, a strong discrediting effect was found. Apparently the discrediting effect appears regardless of wide variation in content of trial summaries. The present data do not support the overbelief claim.