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841.
Quantum logic as a dynamic logic 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We address the old question whether a logical understanding of Quantum Mechanics requires abandoning some of the principles
of classical logic. Against Putnam and others (Among whom we may count or not E. W. Beth, depending on how we interpret some
of his statements), our answer is a clear “no”. Philosophically, our argument is based on combining a formal semantic approach, in the spirit of E. W. Beth’s proposal of applying Tarski’s semantical methods to the analysis of physical theories,
with an empirical–experimental approach to Logic, as advocated by both Beth and Putnam, but understood by us in the view of the operational- realistic tradition of Jauch and Piron, i.e. as an investigation of “the logic of yes–no experiments” (or “questions”). Technically, we use the
recently-developed setting of Quantum Dynamic Logic (Baltag and Smets 2005, 2008) to make explicit the operational meaning of quantum-mechanical concepts in our formal semantics. Based on our recent results
(Baltag and Smets 2005), we show that the correct interpretation of quantum-logical connectives is dynamical, rather than purely propositional. We conclude that there is no contradiction between classical logic and (our dynamic reinterpretation
of) quantum logic. Moreover, we argue that the Dynamic-Logical perspective leads to a better and deeper understanding of the
“non-classicality” of quantum behavior than any perspective based on static Propositional Logic. 相似文献
842.
Jack Douglas Stecher 《Synthese》2011,178(1):49-66
This paper studies an economy whose agents perceive their consumption possibilities subjectively, and whose preferences are defined on what they subjectively experience, rather than on those alternatives that are objectively present. The model of agents’ perceptions is based on intuitionistic logic. Roughly, this means that agents reason constructively: a solution to a problem exists only if there is a construction by which the problem can be solved. The theorems that can be proved determine how an agent perceives a set of alternatives. A dual model relates perceived alternatives to a shared language, which the agents use in trading. So perceptions relate objective alternatives to an agent’s subjective view of them, and reporting dually relates an agent’s subjective world to a shared language. It turns out that an appropriately modified notion of competitive equilibrium always exists. However, in contrast with standard results in economic theory, competitive equilibrium need not be efficient. 相似文献
843.
844.
845.
Simon Robertson 《Synthese》2011,181(1):81-106
What is the relation between what we ought to do, on the one hand, and our epistemic access to the ought-giving facts, on the other? In assessing this, it is common to distinguish ‘objective’ from ‘subjective’ oughts. Very roughly, on the objectivist conception what an agent ought to do is determined by ought-giving facts in such a way that does not depend on the agent’s beliefs about, or epistemic access to, those facts; whereas on the subjectivist conception, what an agent ought to do depends on his beliefs. This paper defends the need for, and explicates, a third category of ‘ought’: ‘warranted oughts’. Section 1 introduces the distinction between objective and subjective ‘oughts’. Sections 2–3 draw attention to some serious problems with each. Section 4 examines, though rejects, a recent attempt to replace subjective ‘oughts’ with objective ‘wide-scope oughts’ operating on belief-action combinations. Section 5 explicates the notion of a warranted ‘ought’ and defends the account against some possible objections. The resulting a picture is one in which an adequate analysis of practical normativity requires both objective and warranted ‘oughts’. Section 6 concludes by responding to a worry about countenancing both. 相似文献
846.
Athanasios Raftopoulos 《Synthese》2011,181(3):489-514
Macpherson (Nous 40(1):82–117, 2006) argues that the square/regular diamond figure threatens representationalism, construed
as the theory which holds that the phenomenal character is explained by the nonconceptual content of experience. Her argument
is the claim that representationalism is committed to the thesis that differences in the experience of ambiguous figures,
the gestalt switch, should be explained by differences in the NCC of perception of these figures. However, with respect to
the square/regular diamond and some other ambiguous figure representationalism fails to offer a unified account of how representational
content makes them ambiguous. In this paper, I aim, first, to offer a representationalist account of ambiguous figures and,
second, to examine and rebut Macpherson’s arguments. My main point is that in each ambiguous figure Macpherson discusses there
are differences in representational content that can explain differences in phenomenal character or content. The representational
differences are due to the ways the Cartesian frame of reference in which perceptual content is always cast cuts the figure,
underlying different properties of the figure with respect to the axes of the Cartesian frame of reference. 相似文献
847.
John L. Pollock 《Synthese》2011,181(2):317-352
In concrete applications of probability, statistical investigation gives us knowledge of some probabilities, but we generally want to know many others that are not directly revealed by our data. For instance, we may know prob(P/Q) (the probability of P given Q) and prob(P/R), but what we really want is prob(P/Q&;R), and we may not have the data required to assess that directly. The probability calculus is of no help here. Given prob(P/Q) and prob(P/R), it is consistent with the probability calculus for prob(P/Q&;R) to have any value between 0 and 1. Is there any way to make a reasonable estimate of the value of prob(P/Q&;R)? A related problem occurs when probability practitioners adopt undefended assumptions of statistical independence simply on the basis of not seeing any connection between two propositions. This is common practice, but its justification has eluded probability theorists, and researchers are typically apologetic about making such assumptions. Is there any way to defend the practice? This paper shows that on a certain conception of probability—nomic probability—there are principles of “probable probabilities” that license inferences of the above sort. These are principles telling us that although certain inferences from probabilities to probabilities are not deductively valid, nevertheless the second-order probability of their yielding correct results is 1. This makes it defeasibly reasonable to make the inferences. Thus I argue that it is defeasibly reasonable to assume statistical independence when we have no information to the contrary. And I show that there is a function Y(r, s, a) such that if prob(P/Q) = r, prob(P/R) = s, and prob(P/U) = a (where U is our background knowledge) then it is defeasibly reasonable to expect that prob(P/Q&;R) = Y(r, s, a). Numerous other defeasible inferences are licensed by similar principles of probable probabilities. This has the potential to greatly enhance the usefulness of probabilities in practical application. 相似文献
848.
Michela Massimi 《Synthese》2011,182(1):101-116
This paper investigates some metaphysical and epistemological assumptions behind Bogen and Woodward’s data-to-phenomena inferences.
I raise a series of points and suggest an alternative possible Kantian stance about data-to-phenomena inferences. I clarify
the nature of the suggested Kantian stance by contrasting it with McAllister’s view about phenomena as patterns in data sets. 相似文献
849.
James Ladyman 《Synthese》2011,178(1):87-98
van Fraassen (The empirical stance, 2002) contrasts the empirical stance with the materialist stance. The way he describes
them makes both of them attractive, and while opposed they have something in common for both stances are scientific approaches
to philosophy. The difference between them reflects their differing conceptions of science itself. Empiricists emphasise fallibilism,
verifiability and falsifiability, and also to some extent scepticism and tolerance of novel hypotheses. Materialists regard
the theoretical picture of the world as matter in motion as a true and explanatory account and insist on not taking ‘spooky’
entities or processes seriously as potential explanations of phenomena that so far lie outside the scope of successful science.
The history of science shows us that both stances have been instrumental in the achievement of progress at various times.
It is therefore plausible for a naturalist to suggest that science depends for its success on the dialectic between empiricism
and materialism. A truly naturalist approach to philosophy ought then to synthesise them. Call the synthesized empiricist
and materialist stances ‘the scientistic stance’. This paper elaborates and defends it. 相似文献
850.
Haim Gaifman 《Synthese》2011,179(3):501-502