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Andrew C. Khoury 《The Journal of value inquiry》2011,45(2):135-146
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Peter Hawke 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(3):351-364
In this paper, the author defends Peter van Inwagen’s modal skepticism. Van Inwagen accepts that we have much basic, everyday
modal knowledge, but denies that we have the capacity to justify philosophically interesting modal claims that are far removed
from this basic knowledge. The author also defends the argument by means of which van Inwagen supports his modal skepticism,
offering a rebuttal to an objection along the lines of that proposed by Geirrson. Van Inwagen argues that Stephen Yablo’s
recent and influential account of the relationship between conceivability and possibility supports his skeptical claims. The
author’s defence involves a creative interpretation and development of Yablo’s account, which results in a recursive account
of modal epistemology, what the author calls the “safe explanation” theory of modal epistemology. 相似文献
908.
Christoph Kelp 《Philosophical Studies》2011,152(2):287-292
This paper raises a problem for contrastivist accounts of knowledge. It is argued that contrastivism fails to succeed in providing
a modest solution to the sceptical paradox—i.e. one according to which we have knowledge of a wide range of ordinary empirical
propositions whilst failing to know the various anti-sceptical hypotheses entailed by them—whilst, at the same time, retaining
a contrastivist version of the closure principle for knowledge. 相似文献
909.
Chad Kidd 《Philosophical Studies》2011,152(3):361-383
In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational
approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems
arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation.
In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which it is
contingently impossible for self-representations tokened in the context of a conscious mental state to misrepresent their objects. This
contingent infallibility allows the theory to both acknowledge the (logical) possibility of self-misrepresentation and avoid
the problems of self-misrepresentation. Expanding further on Weisberg’s work, I consider and reveal the shortcomings of three
other self-representational models—put forward by Kreigel, Van Gulick, and Gennaro—in order to show that each indicates the
need for this sort of infallibility. I then argue that contingent infallibility is in principle acceptable on naturalistic grounds only if we attribute (1) a neo-Fregean kind of directly referring, indexical content to self-representational mental states and (2)
a certain ontological structure to the complex conscious mental states of which these indexical self-representations are
a part. In these sections I draw on ideas from the work of Perry and Kaplan to articulate the context-dependent semantic structure
of inner-representational states. 相似文献
910.
Ram Neta 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(1):3-17
In his volume reflective knowledge, Ernest Sosa offers an account of knowledge, an argument against internalist foundationalism,
and a solution to the problem of easy knowledge. This paper offers challenges to Sosa on each of those three things. 相似文献