Reply to William R. Ferrell’s paper “A model for realism of confidence judgments: Implications for underconfidence in sensory discrimination”

Ferrell’s decision-variable partition model and our subjective distance model belong to the same family of Thurstonial models. The subjective distance model is limited to sensory discrimination with the method of constant stimuli and rooted in such notions as discriminal dispersion and sense distance. Ferrell’s model is intended to be wider in scope and to apply to both cognitive and sensory tasks. Both models need supplementary assumptions to predict calibration phenomena. The point of departure for us is the fact that the model predicts under-confidence under “guessing” and the empirical finding that people are about 100% correct when they report “absolutely certain.” Ferrell makes assumptions about cutoffs on the decision variable. The respondent is assumed to adjust or not adjust cutoffs according to “cues to difficulty.” We disagree with Ferrell’s claim that the hard-easy effect is explained by the respondent’s failure to adjust cutoffs sufficiently when there is a change in level of difficulty, and argue that this amounts to little more than a translation of the hard-easy effect into the lingua of Ferrell’s decision-variable partition model. Our argument is that the hard-easy effect is a consequence of the post hoc division of items according to solution probability. In addition, error variance may contribute to regression effects that enlarge the hard-easy effect. Finally, in contrast to Ferrell’s position, we regard inference (cognitive uncertainty) and discrimination (sensory uncertainty) as different psychological processes. An understanding of calibration in these two areas requires separate models.     

Students' self-estimated and actual knowledge of gender traditional and nontraditional occupations

This study investigated the degree and congruence of students' estimated and actual information about gender traditional and nontraditional occupations. Twenty-nine female and 29 male college students completed an instrument on which they rated how much they thought they knew about 18 male-dominant and 18 female-dominant occupations. They also completed an instrument measuring their actual knowledge of these and an additional wide variety of occupations. Results showed that subjects of each sex perceived themselves as less informed about nontraditional occupations. This result was much more pronounced for women than men. Each sex also tended to underestimate their actual knowledge of nontraditional occupations. Men and women did not differ in their actual knowledge, which was fairly limited for both sexes.     

STIMULUS (INSTRUCTIONAL) FADING DURING EXTINCTION OF SELF-INJURIOUS ESCAPE BEHAVIOR

Three individuals with developmental disabilities were exposed to a series of assessment conditions to identify the source of reinforcement for their self-injurious behavior. In each case, self-injury occurred most often in instructional (demand) situations containing a brief time-out from the task contingent on self-injury, indicating that the behavior was an escape response (i.e., maintained by negative reinforcement). Treatment was implemented in a multiple baseline across subjects design and consisted of extinction (prevention of escape) plus instructional fading (initial elimination of instructions followed by their gradual reintroduction). Results showed that the combined treatment produced immediate and large reductions in self-injury that were maintained as the frequency of instructions was increased across sessions to match the original baseline rate of presentation. Results of a component analysis conducted with 1 subject suggested that stimulus fading accelerated the behavior-reducing effects of extinction.     

Philo’s Argument from Evil in Hume’s Dialogues X: A Semantic Interpretation

Philo's argument from evil in a much-discussed passage in Part X of Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779) has been interpreted in three main ways: as a logical argument from evil, as an evidential argument from evil, and as an argument against natural theology's inference of a benevolent and merciful God from the course of the world. I argue that Philo is not offering an argument of any of these sorts, but is arguing that there is a radical disanalogy between the meanings of terms like ‘merciful’ and ‘benevolent’ when applied to God and human beings respectively. Drawing on the new ‘Irreligious Interpretation’ of Hume's philosophy developed by Paul Russell (2002, 2008), I suggest that the underlying aim of Philo's argument appears to be to show, in opposition to Christian teaching, that these terms, when applied to God, are in effect meaningless.     

Using individual differences to predict job performance: correcting for direct and indirect restriction of range

The present study investigates the relationship between individual differences, indicated by personality (FFM) and general mental ability (GMA), and job performance applying two different methods of correction for range restriction. The results, derived by analyzing meta-analytic correlations, show that the more accurate method of correcting for indirect range restriction increased the operational validity of individual differences in predicting job performance and that this increase primarily was due to general mental ability being a stronger predictor than any of the personality traits. The estimates for single traits can be applied in practice to maximize prediction of job performance. Further, differences in the relative importance of general mental ability in relation to overall personality assessment methods was substantive and the estimates provided enables practitioners to perform a correct utility analysis of their overall selection procedure.     

Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity

Permissivism about rationality is the view that there is sometimes more than one rational response to a given body of evidence. In this paper I discuss the relationship between permissivism, deference to rationality, and peer disagreement. I begin by arguing that—contrary to popular opinion—permissivism supports at least a moderate version of conciliationism. I then formulate a worry for permissivism. I show that, given a plausible principle of rational deference, permissive rationality seems to become unstable and to collapse into unique rationality. I conclude with a formulation of a way out of this problem on behalf of the permissivist.     

The effects of social influence on children's memory reports: the omission and commission error asymmetry

Children in two age groups (7 vs. 12 yrs, N= 174) individually interacted with a stranger and were later interviewed about this event. Right before the interview, each child encountered the stranger once again and he engaged in a conversation where he either suggested that a (central or peripheral) detail originally present in the event had actually not been there or that an originally non-present (central or peripheral) detail had in fact been there. It was hypothesized that the two types of misinformation would result in omission and commission errors respectively. The results showed that the social influence resulted in an asymmetric effect (i.e., more commission than omission errors). Importantly, we also found that the children made more errors with respect to the peripheral detail (a suitcase), compared to the central detail (a passenger). Younger children did not make more errors (neither omission nor commission errors) than older children.