Die ganzheitliche Methode musikalischer Begabungsprüfung

Ohne ZusammenfassungIn dankbarer Erinnerung an meinen verehrten Münchener Lehrer Kurt Huber, dessen frühzeitigen gewaltsamen Tod (13. 7. 43) wir noch immer beklagen. Die Arbeit entsprang einer seiner letzten wissenschaftlichen Anregungen.     

Reinforcement and the organisation of behaviour in golden hamsters: Differential overshadowing of a CS by different responses

Are different responses differentially associable with their consequences? An overshadowing design was used to try to answer this question for three responses previously studied in golden hamsters. In Experiment I, scrabbling was rapidly suppressed by electric shock punishment, and it overshadowed a tone which occurred between scrabbling and shock. In Experiment II, no evidence of response-shock association was obtained when open rearing was the punished response, and open rearing did not overshadow the tone. Punishment had some effect on face washing, but there was no statistically significant overshadowing with this response. These results are consistent with the idea that differences in punishment suppression among these three responses have an associative basis. They also demonstrate the usefulness of a novel paradigm for studying “preparedness” of response-reinforcer associations.     

Feyerabend’s well-ordered science: how an anarchist distributes funds

To anyone vaguely aware of Feyerabend, the title of this paper would appear as an oxymoron. For Feyerabend, it is often thought, science is an anarchic practice with no discernible structure. Against this trend, I elaborate the groundwork that Feyerabend has provided for the beginnings of an approach to organizing scientific research. Specifically, I argue that Feyerabend’s pluralism, once suitably modified, provides a plausible account of how to organize science. These modifications come from C.S. Peirce’s account of the economics of theory pursuit, which has since been corroborated by empirical findings in the social sciences. I go on to contrast this approach with the conception of a ‘well-ordered science’ as outlined by Kitcher (Science, truth, and democracy, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001), Cartwright (Philos Sci 73(5):981–990, 2006), which rests on the assumption that we can predict the content of future research. I show how Feyerabend has already given us reasons to think that this model is much more limited than it is usually understood. I conclude by showing how models of resource allocation, specifically those of Kitcher (J Philos 87:5–22, 1990), Strevens (J Philos 100(2):55–79, 2003) and Weisberg and Muldoon (Philos Sci 76(2):225–252, 2009), unwittingly make use of this problematic assumption. I conclude by outlining a proposed model of resource allocation where funding is determined by lottery and briefly examining the extent to which it is compatible with the position defended in this paper.